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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation contributes to the global political economy of finance by examining 
the historical evolution of the German financial system. The origins of Germany’s non-
market financial structure are consistently identified as path-dependent influences of its 
system of “patient” rather than “speculative” financial capitalism.   
 
This thesis revisits the historical evolution and crystallization of German corporate 
banks on universal, as opposed to specialized, financial practices. In stark contrast to the 
existing literature that relies on efficiency-based explanations, it emphasizes the 
political nature of bankers’ financial practices, and the role of social power in shaping 
financial structure. Examining universal banking in this way stands its significance 
upside down by showing its roots in speculative practices and the politics of 
industrialization rather than patient finance and efficient calculation. 
 
The thesis consists of three parts: Part I delineates the intellectual riddle posed by the 
received scholarship: “despite obvious connections,” between economics and politics, 
orthodox political economists have been mystified by the role of power in universal 
banking’s development. It therefore outlines an historical sociology of financial 
development to reassemble this puzzle. Part II charts the developmental path of German 
banks from the 18th to mid 19th century. This section first stresses how early universal 
banking—“mixed-banking”—was an unintended product of the speculative practices of 
Rhenish financiers engaged in a political struggle over industrialization. It further 
demonstrates that the adoption of “mixed-banking” practices by corporate banks must 
similarly be understood in terms of power rather than as a solution to market failure. 
Part III charts the historical narrative to 1914 highlighting how the early speculative 
character of “mixed-banking” engendered a transformation into the concrete form of 
universal banking following social struggles around the introduction of deposit banking. 
The thesis underscores the general importance of examining economic institutions from 
the perspective of power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recasting German Finance in Global Political Economy 
Bringing speculation back in 
 
 
 
“The biggest crisis for decades has shown that, the universal 
banking system specially befitting our social market 
economy—with its three pillars of private commercial 
banks, cooperative banks and public savings banks—has 
proven itself far more robust than the Anglo-American 
specialized banking system with its overblown obsession for 
profits.”1 
 
“The German model of capitalism is regularly contrasted 
with an Anglo-Saxon style ‘liberal market economy,’ with 
its strong commitment to the principle of unimpeded 
competition… [German capitalism] is dominated by big 
economic players—large scale, vertically integrated 
enterprises and universal banks—who interact less in a spirit 
of competition, but in one of collaboration and co-
operation.”2 
 
“Germany’s rapid industrial development… meant that 
banking institutions emerged which combined the functions 
of commercial and investment banks in order to pool 
deposits into direct lines of credit and raise the needed 
investment capital by underwriting bond and stock issuance 
for very heavy investments in plant and machinery…. 
Remarkably, most of the key institutional features of 
German capitalism (with the exception of cartels) remain in 
place in reunified Germany today, despite two destructive 
world wars and Cold War division in the twentieth 
century…[this includes] the dominant position of powerful 
banks.”3 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 On the 25th September 2008, Peer Steinbrück, the German Federal Minister of 
Finance (2005-2009), pronounced the German universal banking system secure from 
the dangers of speculative finance demonstrating themselves in the wake of the Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse. In his speech to the Bundestag, Steinbrück was exercised to explain 
the rapidly unfolding financial crisis across the Atlantic to the assembly of German 
parliamentarians. This included the looming dangers afforded to the German economy 
                                                
1  Steinbrück, Peer in: Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 179. Sitzung. Berlin, 
2 Torp (2011: 349) 
3 Grimmer-Solem (2015: 88-9) 
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from the bleak prospects that the crisis augured at that moment (Deutsche Bundestag, 
2008: 18968-72). At the same time, and as the above quote makes clear, Steinbrück 
mobilized the enduring specificity of Germany’s “universal banking system” of 
corporate finance as a relevant indicator of the assurance that the German financial 
system was, and would remain, stable. Germany’s universal banking system was a non-
market one, delivering patient rather than speculative capital, German banks would 
therefore not fail. 
Steinbrück’s claims however “appeared to ignore the obvious difficulties facing 
the German banking system” at the time (Hardie and Howarth, 2013b: 104). Over a year 
previously, in August 2007, several German banks, inter alia IKB (Industrie Kredit 
Bank) of Düsseldorf, had already faced ruin because of their voluminous holdings of 
American asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) (cf. Gumbel, 2007), while “a range 
of banks announced heavy losses in mid 2008” (Hardie and Howarth, 2013b: 104). Not 
long after Steinbrück’s speech, the German state would be required to bail out Hypo 
Real Estate to the tune of !35 billion owing to the financial crisis (Zimmermann, 2012) 
and then implement stimulus packages of !11.8 billion on 5th November 2008 and then 
again of !50 billion on 27th January 2009 (Hassel, 2014: 141). Following the speech, 
moreover, the early phase of the crisis would see the German economy contract by more 
than 5%. This was an even larger drop than the 3.5% of the United States during the 
same period of the Great Recession (see the OECD figures compiled in Detzer et al. 
2013: 310). Germany’s “non-market” financial system did not provide the panacea of 
protection against the financial crisis that Steinbrück insinuated it would, and was partly 
spared serious ongoing devastation in the “real economy” by a relatively quick return to 
growth in 2010 driven by the reappearance of export surpluses.4 Did crisis hit the 
German financial system despite its lack of speculative financial practices? Or is there 
something more to the failures of even the non-profit Landesbanken that occurred in 
2008-9? 
That Germany’s universal banking system was not the fortified buttress against 
financial crisis that it had been promoted to be was surprising for many learned and 
                                                
4 There is little space to discuss it here, but the growth of export surpluses in 2010 can 
potentially be linked back to Germany’s role as ideological taskmaster of an austere Eurozone, 
and its need to protect the balance sheets of banks already threatened by the GFC (cf. Jessop, 
2014); however, this would not be the entire story, as the contagion within the German financial 
system must also be explained by reference to the interbank lending market that follows distinct 
dynamics of those in the US that initiated the credit crunch. 
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expert commentators. Even if Steinbrück’s speech is discounted as that of a non-
specialist, many scholars, analysts and businessmen also expected the “non-market” 
nature of the German financial system to protect it against the reverberations of the 
financial crisis (Detzer, 2014: 56; Hardie and Howarth, 2013b: 104). Indeed, experts 
within the German government had often taken the opportunity to promote stricter 
regulations at the international level and chastise other countries for their lax financial 
regulations believing that German finance was not subject to crisis (Handtke and 
Zimmermann, 2012: 119). These expectations are testament to the way in which the 
German financial system has been widely cast as a peculiar non-market financial system 
devoid of speculation. 5  This intellectual edifice is built around a nomological 
conception of efficient economic behaviour derived from mainstream Economics. Such 
thinking avers that despite German financial institutions being “non-market,” they are 
not “extra-economic.” The banks of Germany’s “bank-based” financial system are, after 
all, economic actors, for the most part concerned with maximizing profits and 
minimizing losses.6 Ironically then, despite the lack of markets, the German financial 
system has frequently been depicted in Political Economy as following pristine 
economic principles. This perspective holds that German financial institutions substitute 
for the lack of formal capital markets.  
This assessment is too beholden to the market by locating speculative dynamics 
exclusively as an outgrowth therefrom. Moreover, fixated on the non-market character 
of German finance it often fails to consider the role of other institutions’ financial 
dynamics. 
Steinbrück’s speech serves as a useful exemplar of this widely dispersed non-
market misconception about German finance. In his speech Steinbrück conflated several 
different features usually identified with the German financial system: its 
                                                
5 “Peculiar” because despite being capitalist, and fulfilling the functions of a financial system, it 
seems to avoid the pitfalls that are otherwise accepted as the dark side of Western capitalist 
financial markets.  
6 This is nominally not the case for the savings banks, as they have a public mandate to operate 
on a non-profit basis. However, in the lead-up to the financial crisis, the “advantages” of the 
Landesbanken (LBs)—providing private economic services for small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) under public guarantees—was a constant thorn in the side of European 
bureaucrats attempting to enforce EU competition policy. Before the outbreak of the crisis, LBs 
fearful of being let loose into competitive markets had expanded their balance sheets into 
securities transactions. The involvement of Banks such as West-LB—the regional “central 
bank” for the savings banks of North Rhine-Westphalia—in the purchase of ABCP, leading to 
their insolvency and later bankruptcy demonstrates the peculiar combination of speculative 
financial practice and non-profit motives (Handtke and Zimmermann, 2012: 121-2). 
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universalism—the universal, rather than specialized nature of financial service 
provision from banks; its “bank-based” nature—that is to say, the relative weakness of 
securities markets for corporate finance; the “patient” form of capital provision, 
whereby banks are willing to take equity positions in firms with a view towards long-
term rather than simply short-term (quarterly) profitability; finally, its three pillars, the 
(corporate) for-profit banks (Großbanken), as against the non-profit savings 
(Sparkassen), and cooperative banks (Genossenschaftsbanken). Steinbrück refers to the 
universal character of banking institutions, but in name only, repeatedly referring to 
German finance as a “universal banking system.” Indeed, the key feature of universal as 
opposed to specialised banks is their engagement in both credit issuance, as well as 
securities business—the latter which necessarily brings them into contact with markets. 
Steinbrück’s speech however highlighted the role of banks as non-market agents for the 
interruption of market-based activities like speculation.  
The aforementioned stylized facts of German finance highlighted by Steinbrück 
are so widely recognized by experts that there is rarely discussion any longer of their 
stylistic character.7 Not only is this the majority opinion in circles of government, but it 
agrees with the established typologies of financial systems forwarded by the Varieties 
of Capitalism (VoC) and Comparative Capitalism (CC) scholarship. These strands of 
Global Political Economy (GPE) distinguish between Liberal and Coordinated Market 
Economies (resp. LMEs and CMEs), wherein CMEs typically have a bank-based 
financial system (Vitols, 2004; Jackson and Deeg, 2006). Indeed, for VoC and CC 
Germany is the “bank-based” financial system par excellence, while the US and UK are 
the epitome of market-based finance (cf. Hall and Soskice, 2001). Readers familiar with 
the discussion about the convergence of national financial systems on “market-based” 
finance (cf. Lütz, 2000) will recognise that the rhetoric of Steinbrück’s speech not only 
highlights the pressing concerns of the short-term possibilities for crisis in Germany 
circa September 2008, but also a somewhat vindicated stance about the “battle of the 
systems” (Story and Walter, 1997; cf. Menz, 2005). The features of German finance 
therefore spoke to its putative “non-market” character, and helped to distinguish it from 
the savage rapaciousness of Anglo-American financial practices. In the context of 
autumn 2008, the easy association of Anglo-American “market-based” finance with the 
                                                
7 Indeed, an influential member of the Sachverständigenrat für Wirtschaft (something like 
Germany’s “council of economic advisors” to the Bundeskanzler), Horst Siebert, also the head 
of the Kiel Institute of World Economics, acknowledges all of these as important facts of the 
German financial system vis-à-vis the Anglo-American (Siebert, 2005: 213-243). 
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vicissitudes of the financial crisis allowed these core “non-market” features of the 
German financial system to ring like magical bulwarks against the speculative 
irrationality of unbridled market competition. 
Was German finance that distanced from the market? It is accurate to highlight 
that in the post-World War II “Golden Years” of capitalism, German bourses have been, 
in international comparative perspective, underdeveloped when compared to English 
and American securities exchanges (Cable, 1985: 119; Deeg, 1995). Nevertheless, the 
relatively torpid German financial markets between 1945 and the mid 1980s were an 
exceptional circumstance. This owed in part to the necessity of reestablishing a financial 
centre in Frankfurt more or less from scratch following the shutdown of the Berlin 
Bourse with Soviet occupation at the close of WWII (Zschaler, 2002). German 
securities exchanges, in particular Frankfurt, to a lesser extent Hamburg, have been 
expanding in their volume of transactions, number of listed firms, and worth since the 
late 1980s (Holtfrerich, 2005). Indeed, prior to the World Wars there were numerous 
marketplaces for German securities all of which were very active (inter alia Burhop and 
Lehmann, 2014). Therefore the identification of German finance with a non-market, 
bank-based system as its defining attribute seems not entirely reflective of 
contemporary, nor longer term, developmental trends.  
And yet, the presence of securities markets does not automatically imply 
speculative activity. The issue that arises here is whether speculative practices can be 
deduced by distance from the market. Even in the eras where German finance had lively 
securities exchanges, it was to be distinguished from its liberal, market-oriented, 
capitalist cousins. The German financial system was historically “peculiar” in relation 
to its English (Collins and Baker, 2003) and American (Calomiris, 1995) peers during 
the pre-WWI era owing principally to the combination of commercial and investment 
financial services within individual banks (cf. Weber, 1915): i.e. banks were “universal” 
rather than specialized.  German finance has continued to exhibit different patterns of 
development during the period of “globalisation” as well. During the 1990s, the 
universal character of German banks was operationalized in American legislative 
debates to provide intellectual ammunition for overturning the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933 (Guinane, 2001).8 Following the end of specialized banking in the US, distinctive 
                                                
8 The Glass-Steagall act of 1933 was promulgated to legally prohibit American banks from 
engaging simultaneously in commercial and investment banking. American unit banks for the 
most part did engage only in commercial banking, but through a system of reserve recycling 
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patterns of financial dynamics persisted between the American and German political 
economies. However, now that both countries had universal banks, it appeared more 
sensible to distinguish them by reference to the more “obvious” distinction of the role of 
the market. This change roughly coincided with a great deal of debate in International 
Political Economy (IPE) about the potential convergence of national financial systems 
on the “market-based” model because of financial globalisation and deregulation (cf. 
Jackson and Deeg, 2006; Lütz, 2000). Financial globalisation produced footloose capital 
flows not witnessed since before the First World War. For example, the new openness 
of international finance introduced the grim spectre of foreign takeovers, exemplified 
through the acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 1999 (cf. Kellermann, 2005: 
112, 114-6).  
Partly as result of these historical changes, GPE has both substantively, and 
theoretically drifted away from studying the institution of universal banking.9 This is 
substantive because the empirical and historical research focus in GPE has centred on 
the analysis of financial features like the quantitative level of bank-assets held by 
households (deposits as against securities), and the weakness of existing capital markets 
(cf. e.g. inter alia Siebert, 2005; Vitols, 2004). That is to say the quantitative 
examination of markets for financial products and services has been favoured over the 
qualitative study of bank practices. Few scholars ask what qualities of financial 
dynamics are impelled by participating in issuing securities simultaneously with retail 
banking in different milieus. In other words, how we might better theorize how it is that 
financial institutions engage in universal banking in different socioeconomic contexts. 
When they have done so, they have presumed a universal logic of markets, thereby 
obscuring potential differences in the concrete practice and dynamics of universal 
banking. This leads to an intellectual dilemma: if universal banks occur in both LMEs 
and CMEs, and if both have markets, then must it not be something external to the 
                                                                                                                                          
functionally used short-term deposits for long-term investment (Konings, 2011). The Glass-
Steagall act was for the most part a dead letter already by the time it was repealed: many 
commercial banks had already began to engage in securities business in the 1960s through 
affiliated companies (cf. Krippner, 2011). All the same, the symbolic importance of overturning 
the law itself, through the Graham-Leach-Bliley-Act (1999) should not be understated. Indeed, 
that German universal banking was utilized to achieve this legal victory demonstrates the 
prevalence of this conception about universal banking. 
9 The extant literature nominally pays tribute to the institution of universal banking, usually by 
simply naming the large for-profit banks as “universal,” indeed often without examining any 
more closely what that might mean or entail for actual financial practice, while also ignoring 
that banks in liberal market economies are now often also universal. 
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market hindering its proper operation that explains differences in financial dynamics? 
This also underlies the difficult problem of assessing whether German finance has 
“converged” on more market-based forms. Typically, this question is addressed by 
observing the extent of the market. When scholars demonstrate the extension of markets 
in German finance, the persistence of non-market dynamics becomes perplexing. For 
example, how can it be that financialization has advanced, even in the savings and 
cooperative banks, in Germany and yet the close relationships with non-financial firms 
have persisted (Deeg, 2012)? Where the normal dynamics of markets do not arise, it is 
attributed to the interfering influence of power, politics, social or cultural institutions.  
This sets politics, as well as social relations, theoretically at odds with the 
market as an economic realm devoid of power. This opposition treats “the market” and 
power as separate, discrete, and countervailing forces that are not co-constitutively 
involved and imbricated with each other’s development. Indeed, it is an assumption of 
the Comparative Capitalisms (CC) literature that even though markets are themselves 
institutions, their dynamics may be influenced by other “external” social institutions 
(Streeck, 2001: 7-8; cf. Bruff and Harmann, 2014; Konings, 2006). That is to say, the 
market may be a social institution, but it is distinct from all other social institutions 
because of its hard core of economic content (cf. Krippner, 2001). Conversely, it is 
argued here that, a new appreciation of the dynamics of German finance is to be had for 
GPE by highlighting the internal relation between “market” and “non-market” 
institutions (cf. Konings, 2008). This helps push the connection of universal banking, as 
a non-market institution, to specific markets, and their social purpose, into sharper 
relief. This argument makes evident the necessity for GPE to rethink the historical 
development of universal banking in the German context. 
To make this case, the next section outlines the typically highlighted qualities of 
the German financial system, and how these have all too often been conflated as 
compelled by “non-market” finance. In the third section, the recent contribution of the 
new “market-based banking” approach (Hardie et al., 2013a; idem, 2013b) is critically 
examined as a frame through which to appreciate the intellectual problems of 
organizing the study of German finance through the banks-versus-markets dichotomy. 
“Market-based-banking,” despite being forwarded as an attempt to move beyond the 
banks-versus-markets dichotomy, has been constructed on the edifice of a monolithic 
understanding of “the market.” It is argued that a shift from the rubric of “bank-based” 
finance to the institution of universal banking is more promising for the ongoing study 
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of German finance; however, in order to properly appreciate the operation of this 
institution we must understand it historically. Consequently, in the third section, some 
preliminary aspects of universal banking are presented. It is here posited that to grasp 
the role of this institution it must be deconstructed through historical sociological 
analysis, necessitating a return to its origins in the 19th century. The final section 
presents a summary of the argument as a whole, and an outline of the thesis. 
 
THE FEATURES OF GERMAN FINANCE 
All of the central attributes of German finance suggest alternatives to market 
organization. This has underpinned the commonplace conflation of these key 
institutional facets wherein each is suggested as a metonym for “bank-based” finance. 
Germany has long been held to have “weak” securities markets. That is to say there is a 
low volume of trades on the DAX in Frankfurt (historically, the Berlin securities 
exchange) compared with leading world securities exchanges, there are few secondary 
markets (where existing rather than newly issued shares and debt can be traded), and 
because of these former features its markets are not very liquid (Baliga and Polack, 
2004). Moreover, a high proportion of German financial assets are held as bank deposits 
rather than as financial securities (Siebert, 2005; Vitols, 2002). For many of these 
reasons Germany is typically considered to be a “bank-based” financial system (Allen 
and Gale, 2000). Germany’s banks are “universal” rather than specialized, which is to 
say that instead of focusing strictly on the commercial business of taking deposits and 
making loans, they also engage in investment business floating equity and debt on 
securities markets (Büschgen, 1998). The key actors in the German financial system 
have been with few exceptions universal banks, often leading authors to use the term 
“bank-based” finance as a way to appeal to the underdeveloped level of securities 
markets while simultaneously highlighting the role of universal banks. Similarly, 
German banks are renowned for their “patient” rather than “speculative” provision of 
external capital to non-financial firms (Goyer, 2011). The patience of German capital is 
frequently located in its “relationship” or “relational” banking that is the converse of 
Anglo-American “transactional” banking (European Central Bank, 2002). The dual 
provision of commercial and investment services under one roof creates economies of 
scope in the provision of multiple services allowing banks to forge long-term 
relationships with non-financial companies: this is then linked to “bank-based” finance 
and highlighted as converse to the market   (Walter and Story, 1997: 137, 140-2).  In the 
 22 
UK and US, as well as “market-based” systems of corporate finance more generally, 
financial markets provide investment capital and determine the cost of credit based on 
short-term (quarterly) profitability: when firms do not perform well quarter over 
quarter, equity holders sell their shares and buy those of firms that perform better (issue 
higher dividends, or increase the share price) (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1997). This is 
often called “transaction(al)” banking, as the associations between banks and their 
borrowers are centred on relatively anonymous arms-length transactions. Once a 
transaction for a particular loan or credit is complete, both parties to the transaction do 
not retain any ongoing relationship with each other.  Conversely, in Germany banks are 
held to be the principal providers of capital and holders of equity. While many of the 
“big three” (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank) have since the early 
2000s divested their block holdings of shares (Hassel, 2014), universal banks are 
nonetheless more willing to keep equities on their books than their specialized Anglo-
American peers. Banks’ decisions for holding equity are often made on long-term 
considerations of firms’ profitability, as well as the stakes held by banks in firms, rather 
than the short-term considerations of quarterly profitability (Carney, 2009). Finally, 
Germany has a large proportion of “non-profit,” and member-run (co-op) banks that 
operate alongside the large “for-profit” banks. Consequently, Germany is often labelled 
as having a “three pillar” banking system: these are the pillars of “commercial banks” 
(Aktienbanken, for-profit incorporated banks),10 savings banks (Sparkassen) and credit 
cooperatives (Genossenschaftsbanken) (Butzbach and Mettenheim, 2015; Brunner et al, 
2004; Deeg, 1999). As outlined above, the universal banks are often highlighted as 
operating under non-market principles; similarly, and quite obviously, the co-op and 
non-profit organizing principles for financial institutions indicate other “non-market” 
forms of business practice. 
It is not necessarily unwarranted to assume an association between these 
features. In a way, they all highlight “non-market” methods of financial coordination. 
                                                
10 In the Anglo-American context, “commercial banks” are considered to be those institutions 
that focus on taking deposits and providing short-term credit, whereas “investment banks” are 
those banks that provide long-term industrial finance by underwriting the flotation of securities. 
As universal banking is typically described as the amalgamation of “commercial” and 
“investment” banking, I refer to the Aktienbanken or corporate banks as “commercial banks” 
only in this specific context here. Their chief features are that they are legally incorporated as 
for-profit financial institutions. In order to avoid confusion in the remainder of the text where a 
great deal of discussion pertains to the combination of “commercial” and “investment” banking 
of universal banks, I refer to this class of banks as corporate, or joint-stock banks only  . 
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Especially historically, these four traits can be found with a certain amount of regularity 
amongst Continental European political economies (Fohlin, 2012; Forsyth, 2003; 
Michie 1998; Ziegler 1998).11 This prevalence is therefore also correlated with the 
CMEs, or “nonliberal” economies of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) and 
Comparative Capitalism (CC) literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Deeg and Jackson, 
2006). The key aspect of CMEs vis-à-vis their LME counterparts is the ability of the 
former to coordinate economic activity through non-market institutions (Höpner, 2007; 
Streeck, 2001). Straightforwardly then, banks exercise control over loan contracts based 
on personal familiarity rather than the anonymous calculations of market actors (cf. 
Zysman, 1983; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Banks that provide a universal range of 
services, have failed to specialise as advanced market actors that float equity and debt, 
or accept deposits and issue short-term loans as their sole services (i.e. investment banks 
or commercial banks) (cf. Ziegler, 1998). Investors that leave their capital with one firm 
for extended periods of time have foregone the potential for higher returns that could 
have been acquired by alternative investments. Non-profit banking institutions like 
savings banks and credit cooperatives directly subvert the profit incentive of market 
actors (Butzbach and Mettenheim 2015; Brunner et al., 2004). These different terms for 
institutional structures in the (esp. German) financial system all imply non-market 
coordinating mechanisms, and so are frequently used interchangeably in an analytical 
and theoretical sense.12  
 
BANK-BASED FINANCE: WEAK SECURITIES MARKETS 
It has been conventional to understand differentiation amongst national financial 
systems along a “market” to “bank-based” spectrum of ideal-types in GPE (Hardie et 
al., 2013a: 2-8). Indeed, it is even prevalent in the more mainstream literatures of 
Financial Economics (cf. Baliga and Pollack, 2004; Allen and Gale, 2000) and 
Economic History (cf. Fohlin, 2012; Tilly, 1998). This dominant schema for the 
analysis and study of financial systems in political economy can be traced back to the 
work of John Zysman (1983). Zysman’s classic typology aimed to demonstrate how 
differing constellations of financial institutions could explain differing economic 
dynamics in the advanced industrial countries (Zysman, 1983, 55-95). Zysman’s 
                                                
11 With the exception of the non-profit sector. 
12 This was also the case in earlier strands of political economy and historical research that 
considered the German economy to be an example of “organized capitalism” (cf. Winkler, 
1974). 
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typology was premised upon a “classic model” of bank lending, whereby banks accept 
deposits from one group of customers, for which they pay interest, in order to make 
loans to another group of customers at a higher rate of interest and thereby profit from 
the interest rate differential. At the center of Zysman’s model is an idea of power as 
opposed to market forces in the setting of prices for credit (cf. Hardie et al. 2013a: 4). 
Market forces act through mass, anonymous, coordination to set prices beyond the 
agency of individual lenders. By contrast, banks exercise power when they determine 
the price of credit autonomously from market forces. Zysman delineates this distinction 
using Hirschman’s dichotomy of “exit” and “voice” (Zysman, 1983: 64; cf. Hirschman, 
1970). Market actors provide credit to borrowers on fixed terms, and when those terms 
are broken, the creditors exit from the contract (either by selling on to those who find 
the realized terms acceptable, or by writing off the loan). Conversely, banks “use their 
voice” and involve themselves in the operations of borrowers in order to ensure that 
acceptable secondary terms are agreed in the event that an original contract cannot be 
met. In (capital) market based financial systems, markets are strong, deep and liquid and 
there exist also secondary markets for financial assets. In bank-based systems by 
contrast, securities markets are weak, shallow and illiquid. Consequently, when banks 
are the dominant intermediary in financial systems, market forces are unable to play the 
central role in setting the price of credit. Conversely, in market-based systems the 
prevalence of markets compels market actors to accept the discipline of exit and short-
term performance oriented goals.  
The continuing validity of the “market” and “bank-based” typology has been 
increasingly questioned since the turn of the 21st century. During the 1990s and early 
2000s there was a great deal of energy invested in exploring the convergence of bank-
based systems of national finance on market oriented structures (Deeg and Jackson, 
2006). This scholarship was principally driven in academic political economy circles by 
questions of financial globalisation (cf. Menz, 2005; Windolf, 2005; Streeck and 
Höpner, 2003; Lütz, 2000; Streeck, 1997; Strange, 1997). It was reinforced by the work 
of international institutions with large research apparatuses, like the IMF, who were 
interested in exploring the role of the financial system in economic development (e.g. 
Byrne and Davis, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; cf. with Aybar and Lapavitsas, 2001 
for context). Yet, the question of convergence in the 1990s missed the way in which 
more fundamental changes had already altered prevailing institutions since the 1970s 
(Deeg, 2010).  
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Iain Hardie, David Howarth, Sylvia Maxwell and Amy Verdun (2013a; idem, 
2013b) have recently advanced what they call a “framework” of “market-based 
banking” in order to challenge the continued utilisation of the market-bank dichotomy. 
This framework has been advanced individually as a theoretical framework (Hardie et al 
2013a), and also as an edited volume exploring the nuts and bolts of this vision (Hardie 
and Howarth, 2013a) as well as specific national case studies (e.g. Germany, Hardie and 
Howarth, 2013b).  The scholars argue that changes in the international financial system, 
and specifically in the business practices of banks, have invalidated the moniker of 
“bank-based” finance because all banks are now highly reliant upon wholesale markets 
for obtaining their own working capital. That is to say, in contrast to the practice of 
banking from which Zysman based his typology, wherein banks draw their working 
capital from deposits, banks across the capitalist West now borrow from wholesale 
markets in order to finance their lending operations (Hardie et al 2013a). The authors 
argue that this fundamental change in the manner in which the regular business of 
banking is carried out requires a commensurate change in conceptualization on the part 
of political economy. The financial crisis of 2007-8 makes this problem all the more 
evident. The GFC presented numerous instances of confounded expectations for 
political economists because countries such as Germany that were anticipated to be 
unscathed because of their “bank-based” character were in fact much more heavily 
damaged by the fallout of the crisis (Hardie et al, 2013b: 13). In a nutshell, they argue 
that Zysman’s typology was probably apt for the period up until the 1990s; however, 
since then changes in banking practice, aided by the expansion of international financial 
markets, have increasingly invalidated this old measure of financial differentiation, and 
that the global financial crisis served as the final writing on the wall. Hardie et al 
forward “market-based banking”—in essence, market forces are the ultimate originator 
of banks’ working capital instead of depositors—as a better frame through which to 
examine changes in contemporary financial systems (Hardie et al. 2013b: 1, 14-5; 
Hardie and Howarth, 2013a: 23-25).  
“Market-based banking” presents several conceptual and analytical problems 
that serve to further highlight the difficulty of the market-bank dichotomy. Firstly, 
“market-based banking” is not a sufficient ersatz for the conceptual core of the market-
bank dichotomy. By simply highlighting the greater role of wholesale markets for 
commercial credit on the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets, Hardie et al have 
simply recorded a change of the contemporary international political economy. This is 
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not a conceptual refinement of the original model, but rather an empirical observation. 
Owing to this conflation of theoretical novelty and empirical observation, Hardie and 
Howarth are themselves incapable of explaining the “peculiar” nature of devastation of 
the financial crisis in Germany during the GFC. The peculiarity here was the initial 
sudden devastation of particular banks, followed by a lack of any real ongoing damage 
to the “real” economy. Hardie and Howarth show that German banks, like banks across 
the capitalist West, have become since the 1990s much more dependent on wholesale 
markets to finance their credit operations (i.e. instead of relying on deposits). 
Nevertheless, despite this greater “market dependence” they also point out that the 
majority of German banks borrow from the domestic German interbank market, which 
they highlight as exhibiting entirely different characteristics of such markets in the UK, 
or US (Hardie and Howarth, 2013b: 115-6). That is to say, despite greater market 
dependence (or increased “market based banking”), a divergent outcome from other 
market-based banking systems was the result. In this case the framework of market-
based banking provides us with little more than a new puzzle to solve.   
In a recent contribution, Richard Deeg (2012) has also highlighted an ongoing 
empirical puzzle generated by the market versus bank dichotomy. Deeg examines 
processes of financialization in the UK and Germany as the two emblematic national 
financial systems of the VoC typology. While earlier VoC and CC discussions about the 
convergence of national financial systems were framed around the concept of 
globalization, Deeg modernizes this approach by studying financialization: namely, 
decomposing this category into “profit” and “control” financialization. Increase of 
financialization on either scale would typically imply a convergence on the “market” 
based model of financial system and its trademark characteristics.  Oddly control 
financialization decreased in the large German banks, where it would have been 
expected to increase, and increased in the savings and co-operative banks where it 
would have been expected not to occur (Deeg, 2012: 143-4). Deeg submits that the 
understanding of this unexpected constellation is given by the dominant political 
coalition, and is a highly path-dependent outcome extending back to the immediate 
post-WWII period (ibid: 145). In other words, according to Deeg, the financial 
institutions prevalent in Germany since the end of the Second World War helped to set 
the stage for 21st century developments. Deeg is correct in highlighting the path 
dependent character of these developments, but somehow does not consider how a more 
rigorous study of the institution of universal banking—as the historical practice of 
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linking commercial and investment banking—might help to clarify the divergence of 
outcomes. 
 According to both of these recent studies covering German finance since the 
turn of the 21st century, the “bank-based” model is no longer sufficient to understand 
contemporary developments. The typical pattern of “patient finance” provided by house 
banks (Hausbanken) has in fact been strengthened, despite their financialization (greater 
involvement in securities business), while this financialization has resulted in a decrease 
in relational banking activities for the large corporate banks (Deeg, 2012). Despite an 
increase in “market-based banking,” and initial bankruptcies and failures in the crisis of 
2008, the German financial sector did not encounter a credit crunch as a similar 
consequence to the GFC that Ango-American countries did (Hardie and Howarth, 
2013b; idem, 2009). How is it, in short, that German finance has become ever more 
market-like in its financial activities while concomitantly maintaining many of its 
traditional non-market characteristics?  Does it make sense to continue pursuing a 
research agenda for German finance focused ultimately on the influence of the market? 
To answer these questions we need to examine the associational ties and social 
purpose undergirding market activity. Moreover, we need to turn our attention from the 
bank-based character of German finance to the concrete institution of universal banking. 
Financial markets do not operate everywhere and always the same. The interbank 
market in Germany did not shut down the provision of credit in the wake of the GFC, in 
part because banks were less apt to mistrust each other. Indeed, the depiction of the 
German banking system as stable likely had a role to play. Even if this “performative” 
interaction suggests a force softer and more social than hard material economic 
compulsions, it nevertheless indicates that the same “rational response” to the economic 
problem of the GFC cannot be adduced to all “markets.” The operation of the big 
corporate banks and their drift away from blockholding until the 1990s, and the 
increased use of securities issuing undertaken by savings and cooperative banks, are 
both examples of how compulsions generated in one business segment affect operation 
in another (Ahrens and Wixforth, 2010). The early internationalization of the large firm 
sector in Germany, served by the big universal banks, helped to change the social 
purpose undergirding their securities business. This suggests that in order to understand 
the contemporary constellation of financial forces in the German political economy, we 
need to break open the black box of the market. Doing so foregrounds the role of the 
institution of universal banking, as a set of historical social relationships linking 
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differently situated market actors. Moreover, it does so without presupposing how it is 
that those market actors behave, or what form of dynamics their activity generates. 
 
GERMAN UNIVERSAL BANKING 
What is universal banking? There is no one agreed definition (Benston, 1994); 
however, we can distinguish between a minimalist or abstract conception and a 
maximalist and concrete conception. The abstract conception is premised on parsimony 
and suggests that universal banking is simply the practice of combining commercial and 
investment banking. Commercial banking is here understood as the regular business of 
banking, borrowing at one interest rate and making loans at a higher one (cf. Sgambati, 
2015). Investment banking is understood as accumulating capital in order to finance 
investment. The former is concentrated on the short-term, and the latter on the long-
term. The concrete conception suggests that universal banking was a specific 
combination of commercial and investment activities that arose at a precise time. The 
specific financial services were deposit-taking and the underwriting of IPOs and bonds. 
The precise time was the “second industrial revolution” of the late 19th century. 
Universal banking is “peculiar” in the latter concrete sense because it involves the risk 
of liquidity problems in translating its short-term borrowing (deposits) into long-term 
credit (securities issuing).  
The distinction between these two forms of universal banking is important for 
theoretical as well as historical intellectual reasons. Theoretically, the simple 
combination of commercial and investment banking is such a broad understanding that 
it could potentially arise at any point in history. Merchant bankers advancing short-term 
credit in bills of exchange while also financing longer sea voyages or taking shares in 
government run monopolies could potentially fall under “universal banking” in this 
regard. In this study, we will add the caveat of advancing credit and finance to non-
financial industrial ventures to our delineation of abstract universal banking. This brings 
the concept nearer to the concrete concept so that the threat of liquidity lock-up can be 
better understood even in this parsimonious definition (industrial firms, unlike 
governments, are more prone to bankruptcy). Moreover, it avoids the problem of eternal 
regress throughout history, and temporally brings us to the vicinity of the 
industrialization period. This definition still remains too broad for historical purposes, 
but is at least not elastic enough to stretch through all of recorded commercial history. 
The distinction between these two definitions is also pertinent because Alexander 
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Gerschenkron’s first recognized “theory” of the origins of universal banking (cf. 
Forsyth, 2003; Verdier, 2002; Gerschenkron, 1962) rooted his understanding of this 
institution in the specific financial techniques and practices of the German banks circa 
the last quarter of the 19th century. These included the practice of accepting deposits, 
which historically was not pursued by German banks (or indeed many other banks), 
before this period of time. That is to say universal banking as per this definition cannot 
exist prior to the incorporation of deposit-taking into the regularized financial praxis of 
banking institutions.  
Both conceptions of universal banking highlight its chief peculiarity as an 
economic one: the successful and efficient transformation of maturities. That is to say, 
universal banking is intellectually interesting for scholars of finance because of the risk 
of liquidity lock-up presented by the potential failure of long-term investments for 
short-term liquidity of banks (cf. Canals, 1996; Benston, 1995). Universal banks are 
presumed to collect liabilities that can be redeemed in the short-term, in order to finance 
long-term investments in industrial non-financial corporations. As deposits can be 
claimed on short notice, but equity stakes or bonds are less liquid, in the event of a high 
number of customers asking to withdraw their deposits, banks would be forced into 
insolvency, even if the absolute value of their assets was greater than their liabilities.  
This problem has led scholars to examine universal banking often from the perspective 
of efficiency: what kind of investments can be made that will minimize the risk of 
financial loss, and therefore avoid runs on deposits?  
This framing of universal banking, as a purely economic institution, has led 
economists to cast universal banks, using those in Germany as the epitome of their 
expression, as institutions that solve the market failure of incomplete information in 
existing financial markets (cf. Cable, 1985; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In financial 
markets with poor information distribution, potential borrowers may not be able to 
signal their credibility for paying back a loan. Consequently, capital may not flow to 
good projects because investors are fearful that they will be defrauded. The close 
relationships of universal banks with their customers allows them to better assess the 
performance of potential borrowers of long-term capital through the monitoring of their 
regular repayment of short-term credit. In this way, universal banks are said to represent 
a conservative, risk-averse financial institution substituting for perfect markets.  
This presentation obscures the often speculative character of the investment 
business undertaken by universal banks—the sometimes very high risks taken, and 
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failures experienced, by banks in different historical contexts. Instead, only the 
successful long-term investments of prosperous banks with long lineages have been 
underscored. This is a classic way of presenting finance whereby “speculation is 
undertaken by those who fail; banking is engaged in by those who succeed” 
(paraphrased from Pohle, 1995). Universal banking is in short depicted as an institution 
that arises and is reproduced to serve a purely economic, and efficiency enhancing, 
function.  
The operation and reproduction of German universal banking as an institution 
serving efficiency is frequently expressed as the outcome of path-dependent events 
leading back to industrialization. Even if its contemporary operation can be highlighted 
to diverge from the efficiency explanation, this might simply fall victim of the charge of 
the “economic externality”—contemporary actors have misunderstood their role as 
universal bankers. Consequently, in order to produce the maximum critical 
understanding of contemporary German universal banking and its peculiarities, we must 
not only decompose different concrete market imperatives associated in specific 
universal banking practices, but return to their historical origins. To get a proper handle 
on the institution of universal banking, we need no less to return to its “origins,” 
diffusion, and crystallization on a form that has been reproduced for a century.  
 
THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT 
This thesis engages with the theoretically informed historical literature about the 
origins, expansion and institutionalisation of universal banking during the 
industrialization period. It presents a necessary prolegomenon to a combined new 
research programme into the historical development of German finance, as well as 
towards further theoretical enquiry into the social bases of economic institutions more 
generally. The central substantive argument of the thesis is that contra the prevalent 
explanation in the literature, universal banking developed as a path-dependent 
outgrowth of speculative financial practices and the politics of industrialization. 
Underscoring the speculative and political origins of universal banking inverses the 
typically accepted significance of this economic institution. Rather than being grounded 
in “economic” behaviour seeking the efficient generation of profits and minimization of 
risk, the emergence of universal banking is best understood as the result of struggles 
over social power, and the direction of social transformation.  
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The way in which several key terms—speculation, social struggle, and social 
transformation—are understood bears stressing here. Speculation is understood as 
wagering in relation to uncertain social outcomes. Defined this way, speculation 
encompasses both the narrow definition of “rational” economic investment and 
irrational “gambling.” Whereas investment is undertaken in relation to calculable 
“economic fundamentals,” “gambling” or “betting” is without such “rational” 
foundation (Konings, 2015). Historically, much of the “investment” activity of German 
bankers could in no way be calculated in relation to strictly economic fundamentals. 
This suggests that “investment” activity was more weighted toward “gambling.” 
However, it is only when such investments are examined in relation to strictly economic 
pay-offs that there appears to be no basis for such wagers. Here the role of social 
struggle, and the reward of social reordering was paramount. Social struggle is deployed 
to highlight contests between different historical agents over the generalized form of 
associational logic and social relations prevalent within specific spatio-temporal areas. 
The terms “struggle over social power,” “sociopolitical struggle” and “social struggle” 
are all used synonymously in that regard. Social struggle in this sense overlaps with its 
typical usage as a euphemism for class struggle, but is also broader as this usage directs 
attention similarly towards intra-class conflict. Finally, social transformation is 
mobilized throughout the course of this work as a manner to highlight generalized 
change in the macro character of historical social relations.  
This argument also carries a broader significance for GPE. As the above 
discussion about the banks-versus-markets nature of German universal banking made 
clear, scholars’ attempts to rethink existing frameworks are often, if not always, 
indebted to mainstream approaches. Attempting to get beyond the constant appraisal of 
German finance in relation to the baseline of a homogenous depiction of “the market” 
has typically returned scholarship to the point where it started. In a similar fashion 
critical GPE more generally is at a disadvantage in promoting its alternative theoretical 
perspectives, because when conducting empirical or historical research it must often 
found itself upon the basis of orthodox studies about the economy. This occurs as 
above in terms of clashing with existing theories, or supporting ones critical theory with 
established secondary empirical sources. In this way, non-critical perspectives become 
imbricated in the narratives told about economic institutions, and “the economy” more 
broadly. While theoretical reflection and reasoning can establish the abstract conditions 
to provide novel accounts of the social bases of the political economy, the actual 
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accounting for social dynamics must be more fundamentally pieced together by telling 
substantively new analytical stories.  
 
 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
 The thesis is comprised of three parts: Part I delineates the significance of the 
economic institution of universal banking for GPE (the introduction). Secondly, it 
explains the intellectual riddle posed by theoretically sensitive accounts of financial 
historiography that aim to account for the development of universal banking in 
Germany. Finally, it outlines some considerations on theory and method necessary to 
piece together the puzzle that has been constructed around universal banking with the 
help of mainstream accounts of the economy. Chapter 1 reconstructs the lineages of 
debate and discussion pertaining to the genesis, diffusion, and institutionalisation of 
universal banking in Germany. It argues that scholars who have engaged with the 
problem of universal banking’s institutional development have wandered into an 
intellectual cul-de-sac because of their inability to observe the sociopolitical character 
of this “economic” institution. Caroline Fohlin inadvertently highlights this problem 
when she writes that “despite obvious connections,” between economics and politics, 
orthodox political economists have been mystified by the role of power in universal 
banking’s development (Fohlin, 2000: 23). The chapter begins by recounting the legacy 
of Alexander Gerschenkron’s theory of backwardness on historical theorizing about 
German universal banking. Subsequently, it outlines the role of asymmetric information 
theory in developing an explanation for abstract universal banking. Revisionist scholars 
like Fohlin have highlighted the failure of asymmetric information to account for the 
development of concrete universal banking in the last quarter of the 19th century. 
Nevertheless, despite positing this, Fohlin herself offers no theory for this development. 
Constructivist scholars have recently also joined the fray, but have taken as given the 
origins of universal banking in the corporate banking sector. Consequently, 
constructivist scholarship offers a sociopolitical theory of the diffusion of universal 
banking, while failing to provide a theory for its genesis. The result of this research 
vector has been that there is no viable explanation for the genesis of abstract universal 
banking in the first half of the 19th century, nor of the emergence of concrete universal 
banking amongst the large corporate financial institutions of the German Kaiserreich. 
What is required is a theoretically sensitive historical account of the emergence of 
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universal banking in sociopolitical perspective. The chapter presents some preliminary 
musings in this vein, arguing that in order to understand the development of financial 
institutions from a sociological perspective, it is necessary to find a method that can 
reconstruct the basic associational ties of different forms of historical agency. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting the necessity of deploying this perspective to four 
specific historical periods where key elements of the institution of universal banking 
emerged. These historical periods are respectively covered by each of the historical 
chapters. 
Part II charts the first half of these historical periods, examining the evolutionary 
path of German banks from the 18th century to the end of the 1860s. This part of the 
thesis underscores the social purpose of the struggle over industrialization, that helped 
to propel the key transformations of German finance and initiate a path-dependent 
trajectory around “abstract universal banking.”  
Chapter 2 examines the first critical conjuncture, relating to the emergence of 
abstract universal banking in the 1830s Rhineland of Prussia. This chapter argues that 
universal banking was an unintended product of the speculative practices of Rhenish 
financiers engaged in a struggle to bring about industrialization. The predominant 
asymmetric information and New Institutional Economics (NIE) explanation posits that 
the amalgamation of commercial and investment banking was undertaken as an 
institutional solution to market failures generated by uneven distribution of information. 
This suggests that calculative practices conceptualised in terms of efficiency, helped 
financiers make rational decisions about combining commercial and investment banking 
to found railway companies. This justification might potentially explain the later 
practices of large corporate universal banks that emerged following the foundation of 
Imperial Germany. In the context of the 1830s Rhineland, its projection of rational 
action comes into contradiction with the sequence of private bankers practices. The key 
target of investment banking activities was the foundation of railway companies, with 
whom the private bankers could not have had prior commercial banking relationships. 
Asymmetric information therefore puts the cart before the horse by suggesting that it 
was the regular short-term credit relationships that provided a basis for long-term 
investment finance. Long-term investment finance preceded short for railway 
companies, thereby posing the question why rational bankers would have wagered their 
entire livelihood on firms that had a large potential for failure. The answer lies in the 
social context. Rhenish bankers believed that railway companies held the promise of 
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generating the basis for a self-sustaining dynamic of industrialization. Railways would 
provide the payments that would solve the dearth of payments prevalent in the 
Rhineland as well as provide a decisive shift in the direction of social change towards 
an industrial future.  
Chapter 3 examines the spread of abstract universal banking practices from 
private to corporate banks. The chapter details the circumstances of the “first foundation  
wave” of joint-stock (corporate) banks in Germany from 1848-57, and follows the 
evolution of these new corporate banks’ financial practices until 1868. The predominant 
explanation for the foundation of joint-stock banks is itself a product of NIE reasoning, 
and has largely conflated this development with the evolution of universal banking. 
Chapter 3 argues that these were two distinct developmental trends, which when 
considered separately, (a) highlight the historical inconsistency of the NIE position, (b) 
the sociopolitical motivations for founding corporate banks, (c) the unintended outcome 
of conjoining abstract universal banking practices with the joint-stock legal form, and 
(d) the ongoing evolution of universal banking as an institution. The corporate form was 
chosen for a variety of reasons, all of which must be set against the ongoing struggle 
over industrialization. This is detailed in relation to four case studies of joint-stock bank 
foundations that establish how the background of the ongoing conflict over the future 
shape of German society provided the missing social context to understand why 
financiers sought to establish joint-stock banks. These four detailed cases also 
emphasize how there was no pre-existing demand on the part of financiers to meld 
abstract universal banking with the corporate form. Indeed, the variety of their financial 
practice highlights the continuing breadth of this institution, but also importantly 
underscores the common theme of their engagement with the speculative foundations 
business. Towards the end of the period, these banks may have all become “universal” 
in an abstract sense, but the diversity of their financial practice indicates a constellation 
that was not yet capable of reproducing universal banking in a path-dependent manner. 
The chapter underscores more generally how the adoption and creation of economic 
institutions is better depicted in terms of power than efficient functionality. 
Part III rounds out the historical narrative, chronicling developments up to the 
outbreak of the First World War. This section of the thesis outlines a new phase  in the 
development of universal banking following a shift in the struggle over 
industrialization. Towards the end of the 1860s, and especially at the beginning of the 
period covered here, the sociopolitical conflict over the shape of German society 
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between forces favouring agrarian or industrial interests, had shifted as the forces within 
the Prussian and German states began to more widely accept liberal politico-economic 
ideology. There was widespread social discontent with this ideology following the 
Foundation Crash of 1873, but it continued to inform the practices of bankers until 
almost the end of the period.  
Chapter 4 follows the “second foundation wave” of corporate banks during the 
“Foundation Years” between 1869-1873. The literature on universal banking history 
argues that this wave of joint-stock foundations was unleashed by the liberalization of 
the North German Confederation’s concession policy in 1870. It is further argued in the 
extant literature that by the end of this foundation wave, the corporate banking sector 
was organized along universal banking principles and practices. By contrast, this 
chapter argues that legal changes nominally intended to curb speculative practices, 
actually compelled private bankers to found corporate banks. The second foundation 
wave often serves as a companion to the first insofar as the literature highlights the role 
of economic efficiency as the driving raison d’etre for the establishment of joint-stock 
banks. Conversely, the ongoing diversity of practices within the corporate banking 
sector is presented to highlight the continuing openness of the historical process. The 
corporate banking sector was at the end of this period driven forward principally by the 
needs of the “irregular” speculative foundation business: the potential profits from 
foundations were highly lucrative for financiers, but as the technical aspects of this 
business required also banks that could specialise in the “regular” banking business of 
providing short-term commercial loans for the operating capital of firms in the 
provinces, a rough division of labour developed between financial centre and provincial 
joint-stock banks. Before the outbreak of the financial crisis (Gründerkrise), it seemed 
as though German financial development might move in the direction of specialization 
rather than further universalization.   
In chapter 5, the final steps towards the crystallization of concrete universal 
banking on the form that would correspond to its image as a provider of patient capital 
were taken. The chapter argues that the key dynamic setting this institutional 
crystallization in place was a change in the issuing of securities in the foundation 
business. As earlier chapters explained, when banks engaged in the foundation business, 
they underwrote securities for corporations that had not yet come into existence. This 
was a speculative practice because even for firms such as railway companies, the 
potential for failure was still very high. During the Kaiserreich the corporate banks 
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began to only float securities for firms with whom they already had established 
commercial credit relationships. It is only at this point that it is even possible for the 
efficiency argument based on asymmetric information to correspond to the shape of 
universal banks. However, far from principally seeking to take advantage of their 
superior information and thereby become more conservative and patient lenders, the 
corporate banks were hemmed into this strategy as the cumulative result of earlier 
speculative decisions. In particular, the chapter shows how the speculative decision to 
implement deposit-taking by the Deutsche Bank engendered new competitive pressures 
in the corporate banking sector. These competitive pressures, when experienced 
regulatory changes implemented by anti-industrial reforms helped to establish an 
evolutionary dynamic whereby banks were forced to be more conservative in their 
issuing of securities.   
Universal banking is a seminal economic institution, and its German variant is 
typically considered to be its quintessential form. The existing explanations for the 
origins, diffusion and crystallization of German universal banking on a form that could 
be institutionally reproduced throughout the 20th century currently represent the 
retrojection of mainstream economics into the past. The theoretical premises that frame 
the accepted historical narrative help to structure not only contemporary researchers’ 
assumptions about the financial past, but are also fed into our thinking about the 
financial present. This thesis was written in order to demonstrate the surprising nature 
of that financial history, and how our contemporary expectations are so often 
confounded by it. When the action of financiers is no longer entirely conceived strictly 
in relation to economic justifications for that action, the role of politics and power 
becomes all the more visible. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
Accounting for German Finance  
Towards a historical sociology of financial systems 
 
 
“For over forty years, Gerschenkron’s arguments have stood 
at the center of historical research on the development of 
financial institutions…. Criticisms of and exceptions to 
Gerschenkron’s thesis have emerged in this vast literature, 
but until recently, one looked in vain for an encompassing 
alternative explanation for the origins of difference between 
national financial systems.”13 
 
 “‘[O]bjective processes’ that are determined prior to 
concrete and historical actions of subjects raise the problem 
of their own enactment. How can subjects instantiate a logic 
which transcends them? This definition of a logic, created 
prior to what people do in history, generates a problematic 
trade-off since theory is ‘explanatory’ only to the extent that 
people do not alter substantially what was defined abstractly. 
In other words, the theory has explanatory powers only if it 
considers subjects to be reified.”14 
 
“Dates cannot lie, and the more distant the dates, the less 
willingness to uncover their social content, context and 
significance. But periodization is no innocent exercise, no 
mere pedagogical and heuristic device to plant markers in 
the uncharted flow of history.”15 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the central debates pertaining to the development of 
Germany’s universal banking system, and sketches some principles for a historical 
sociology of financial development. Focusing chiefly on that scholarship that is 
theoretically informed,16 I argue that there exist two central problems in the historical 
narratives about the development of German universal banking. Firstly, despite the 
frequent mobilization of terms such as “peculiar” or “backward” to indicate the 
                                                
13 Forsyth (2003: 2) 
14 Knafo (2002: 147-8) 
15 Teschke (2003: 2) 
16 In selecting which scholars to examine I struggled with including Manfred Pohl, who wrote 
Entstehung und Entwicklung des Universalbankensystems: Krise und Konzentration als 
wichtige Faktoren (1986), a monograph ostensibly with a theoretical focus on the development 
of universal banking. I have decided not to include any extended analysis of this text, because 
there is little delimitation of how exactly we should understand universal banking. Moreover, its 
“theory” for the development of universal banking is simply an observation of changes in 
banking structure following periods of concentration and crisis. There is little methodical 
linkages made as to what might induce crisis or concentration, taken exogenously as they are.  
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differentiated form of Germany’s financial development, this always occurs against the 
background of a constant underlying assumption of a naturalized logic of economic 
activity. Secondly, and in part consequentially, this reliance on the deductively assumed 
“normal” operation of markets, “the economy” or “rational actors,” has shunted the 
examination of universal banking’s origins and development away from politics and 
power. These two problems have together resulted in an intellectual cul-de-sac. Scholars 
recognize that “social, political and regulatory environments play key roles” in the 
development of financial structure (Fohlin, 1999: 306); however, what exactly those 
roles might be is never articulated. The paradoxical outcome is that there exist 
“obvious” connections between politics and the development of financial institutions, 
yet these connections cannot be identified or accounted for (cf. Fohlin, 2000: 23)!  
By contrast, institutional constructivist approaches have added politics and 
social struggle to explain the expansion of universal banking practices throughout the 
entire German financial system. This contribution has focused on the typically 
underemphasized role of the savings banks and credit co-operatives in German financial 
history. Despite this laudable advance, because the narrative is focused on the diffusion 
of universal banking across the non-profit “pillars” of German finance it takes for 
granted how it is that the for-profit banking sector came to be organized around a 
universal provision of financial services. Consequently, the constructivist approach has 
no explanation for the emergence of universal banking apart from that provided by 
orthodox economic historians. This also posits problems for its account of the diffusion 
of universal banking to the other financial pillars, because it assumes coherent 
institutions had already developed by the late Kaiserreich. 
The product therefore of theoretically sensitive historical explanation for the 
emergence of German universal banking, are explanations centred on an ahistorical 
logic of market relations, and rational economic action. The literature essentially 
presumes that because universal banking is an “economic” institution, that any 
explanation of the emergence, and development of these institutions must be conducted 
with reference to efficiency, or through economic categories. Power, politics, legal 
institutions and historical context may enter the analysis, but only as accidental and 
external influences on an already established economic dynamic. 
The chapter offers a chronology charting the development of this problem. The 
scholarship on German financial history is extensive, and consequently, the analysis 
here is organized around the work of authors representative of different key advances. 
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Firstly, I outline the Gerschenkronian argument about universal banking. 
Gerschenkron’s account was not principally concerned with financial institutions, but 
nonetheless helped to establish the explanandum for a generation of researchers into 
German finance. One such follower was Richard H. Tilly whose renovation of 
Gerschenkron through theoretical elements of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
and mainstream Economics’ asymmetric information approach is discussed in section 
two. Tilly’s theoretically sensitive narrative advances, but is firmly a part of the 
“Gerschenkronian paradigm,” for the manner in which it preserves an economic 
functional core at the centre of his argument. Nevertheless Tilly’s explanation has itself  
set the groundwork for a generation of economic historians, and has helped to 
proliferate NIE, and information theoretic, themes throughout German historical 
scholarship. Thirdly, I discuss the recent wave of revisionist research challenging the 
Gerschenkronian and information theoretical assumptions for Germany’s financial 
development. This scholarship is examined through the work of Caroline Fohlin, who 
despite meritoriously deepening the wealth of empirical details about universal banking, 
does not provide any theoretical explanation herself.  Finally, I discuss the constructivist 
literature on the history of Germany’s universal banking through the prism of Richard 
Deeg’s scholarship. Deeg’s historical institutional approach to narrating the 
development of a German system of universal banking incorporates the long overlooked 
influence of sociopolitical conflict as well as the role of the savings (Sparkassen) and 
cooperative (Genossenschaftsbanken) banks. Deeg’s work provides important clues for 
the dispersion of universal banking practices across all pillars of the German financial 
system. Nevertheless, because Deeg does not probe the origins of universal banking 
practices in the for-profit banks, his narrative cannot account for the origins of universal 
banking.  
 
ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN RETROSPECTIVE  
 Following the Second World War, Alexander Gerschenkron challenged the 
linear view of economic development implicitly propounded by mainstream economics, 
as well as the prominent and de rigeuer stagist understanding of development promoted 
by “modernisation theory.” “Modernisation theory” advanced the idea that all societies 
passed through essentially the same development “stages” before arriving at economic 
“take-off” (the beginning of self-sustaining growth) and then industrialization (e.g. 
Rostow, 1960; cf. Slattery, 2005: 146-150). In contrast, Gerschenkron posited that the 
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modernization/industrialization process itself could not be foretold apart from specific 
historical circumstances. Most importantly for Gerschenkron, is the presupposition that 
the development process varies depending on the starting point of different 
countries/societies. The relationship of different societies to the “first mover”17 (Britain) 
determined different combinations of the rate of industrial growth, the ideology of 
industrialization and, different market substituting institutions (Gerschenkron, 1962: 7). 
These different institutional structures related to the specific way that markets, banks 
and the state were involved in the industrialization process.  
The further removed from the industrial pioneer, the more “backward” was a 
country in its industrialization. This “relative backwardness” manifested itself in 
growing amounts of institutional involvement in the industrialization process. In 
drastically backward countries like Russia, the state was required to directly intervene in 
the industrialization process. Conversely, backward countries like Germany were not so 
dissimilar from England that state intervention was necessary. Primarily lacking in 
moderately backward countries was an institution to mobilise the capital for large scale 
investment:  
in a relatively backward country [like Germany] capital is scarce and diffused, the distrust 
of industrial activities is considerable, and, finally, there is greater pressure for bigness 
because of the scope of the industrialization movement, the larger average size of plant, 
and the concentration of industrialization processes on branches of relatively high ratios 
of capital to output (Gerschenkron 1962: 14).  
 
According to Gerschenkron, in Germany, universal banks arose as economic institutions 
to satisfy this gap. The universal banks provided these services in a fundamentally 
different manner than English deposit banks. English banking was based on the quick 
turn-over of business:18 the transformation of deposits into short-term loans––focused 
on bills of exchange, to make liquidity possible for industry and commerce. This 
English method of attracting deposits required that loans be short-term, as the banks’ 
customers could return at any time to withdraw their deposits. Therefore loans were 
made more for the purposes of “working” rather than “fixed” capital (Collins, 1991). 
“External” finance for large industrial projects was rarely needed during initial 
industrialization. When it was later needed, special institutions—securities markets—
                                                
17 This is not a Gerschkronian term per se, but accesses a key insight in it. See Selwyn (2011: 
440) and Schwartz (2009: 83, 86, 145). 
18 The following description can not be found in its entirety in Gerschenkron’s pivotal text itself, 
but is consistent with the view in the kind of sources that he himself likely consulted (e.g. 
Whale, 1930; Weber, 1915). 
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had arisen in order to satisfy this need through the issue of stocks or bonds. There was 
in England a division of labour between commercial banks, investment banks and 
capital markets. In Germany, all of these functions were amalgamated (and augmented) 
under one roof. The “universal banks” combined the “regular” banking business of 
short-term lending activity associated with English banks together with the “irregular” 
long-term industrial finance of securities underwriters. Furthermore, the German banks 
formed tight institutional connections with industrial firms, vis-à-vis the supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat), to assist and guide non-financial companies (NFCs)19 in their 
entrepreneurial activities. 
Ultimately, “it [was] the pressure of these circumstances [of backwardness] 
which essentially gave rise to the divergent development in banking over large portions 
of the Continent as against England” (Gerschenkron, 1962: 14, my emphasis).  In other 
words, the organizational structure of universal banks and all of the related services that 
would come to be associated with a system of universal banking––entrepreneurial 
advice to non-financial firms, “patient capital” for investment, “interlocking 
directorates,” and business policy decision making power––was a functional outcome of 
“the timing of industrialization.”20  
Gerschenkron refrained from straying too close to historical details in order to 
paint the broad-brush strokes of his over-arching vision of European industrialization. 
Such perfunctory formulations leave us with a sketchy narrative of the development of 
German finance: continental “backwardness” vis-à-vis England necessitated the 
development of an institution that could mobilise significantly larger amounts of capital 
in order to industrialize. The earlier development of England ensured that when 
Germany and other continental societies started their industrialization processes, more 
advanced technology was available to them. For example, when Germany was 
industrializing, the textile, leather and food-stuff industries were not at the cutting edge 
of the industrialization process any longer as they had been in England. Instead those 
archetypal heavy industries––“coal mining, iron and steel making, electricity and 
engineering, and heavy chemicals” (Gerschenkron, 1962: 15) represented the leading 
sectors of industrialization. The functional necessity for an institution to finance the 
dissemination of these innovations was answered by the development of “joint-stock 
                                                
19 This is anachronistic nomenclature, but analytically useful for the development of this 
chapter’s argument. 
20 This turn of phrase is not used by Gerschenkron himself, but has a wide currency in the 
literature (Fohlin, 2007; idem, 1999; Vitols, 2001; Edwards and Ogilivie, 1996). 
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banking” as exemplified by the Péreire Brothers Crédit Mobilier investment bank 
(banque d’affaires) in France. By adopting the model of the Crédit Mobilier from 
France and combining its investment model with the short-term activity of commercial 
banks, the German banks became the “paragon of the universal banks” (Gerschenkron, 
1962: 13) that were then able to mobilise the funds necessary for these heavy industries 
which required significantly larger injections of long-term financial capital. While the 
Crédit Mobilier had been overly reliant on stock market fluctuations and subsequently 
failed as a result, German (and Austrian) banks substituted close links with industrial 
concerns in order to manage their finances. These close links were managed via the 
appointment of bank officials to supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) positions in non-
financial firms.21 
Gerschenkron’s argument relies problematically on a baseline, or “normal,” case 
of industrialization against which “backward” countries are compared: England. This 
particular case, according to the Gerschenkron view, flows from the understanding of 
England as the primordial bastion of liberalism, where the market was unleashed and 
industrialization occurred without the sullying influence of institutions, politics or 
agency (Knafo, 2008).22 This is not only problematic because there is evidence to 
indicate that English liberalism was not as liberal as its rhetoric indicates that it was 
(Knafo, 2013), but also because it injects necessity in a functionalist fashion into the 
analytical spaces of the narrative. Institutions emerge quasi-automatically in order 
produce the outcome of successful industrialization as measured against England, and 
                                                
21 As an important note to the forthcoming analysis, it is crucial to point out some of the 
historiographical assumptions this narrative makes. Firstly, Gerschenkron pins his hopes on the 
functional utility of the Great Banks making possible industrialization during “the Great Spurt.” 
This Great Spurt most likely corresponds to the period from 1870 until shortly before the First 
World War. Although this was a period replete with depressions (Wehler, 1995: 552-609), it  
also marks a permanent shift to an industrial society. In other words the leap forward in growth 
is profitably seen as a permanent qualitative change of social structure rather than a sustained 
period of quantitative economic growth. Additionally, he presumes that the close links between 
the banks and industry were managed through the institution of the supervisory board 
(Aufsichsrat). This formal institution did not appear until after the amendment to the New 
Company Law (Aktienrechstnovelle) of 1884; and finally, and perhaps least importantly, 
Gerschenkron makes reference to bank paternalism through the expression “the cradle to the 
grave” (a phrase attributed to Jakob Riesser who wrote about the Great Banks chiefly post 
1870). Consequently, we can safely assume that Gerschenkron is making reference to the Big 
Berlin Credit Banks and rapid industrialization and economic development which occurred in 
the last three decades of the nineteenth century. 
22 Indeed, Knafo (2008) demonstrates that this perspective is difficult to accept given the weight 
of historical evidence: the English state played a prominent role in the development of its 
financial system. 
 43 
given a specific historical endowment of technology and institutions. Consequently, the 
emergence of institutions to satisfy the “preconditions” for industrialization in 
individual backward countries appear as necessary outcomes in a historical teleology 
converging toward English development. The problem of backwardness in Germany 
was experienced as the dilemma of accumulating sufficient quantitative levels of capital 
in one place to satisfy the higher demands required for the most advanced technology. 
Ergo, universal banks arose in Germany to collect the necessary levels of capital and 
channel it to industry.  
 
RICHARD TILLY: THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY ACCOUNT 
One reason Gerschenkron’s pithy comments perhaps have lasting power, is 
because they appear to provide a basic theory for the development of Germany’s 
universal banking system. Of the scholars and historians working on this subject since 
Gerschenkron’s time, Richard Tilly has formulated the most consistent and 
comprehensive theoretical engagement with the development of universal banking in 
Germany (Tilly 1999; idem, 1998; idem, 1995; idem, 1994; idem, 1992; idem, 1989; 
idem, 1986; idem, 1967; idem, 1966a).23 
Tilly’s attention to the history of German finance extends nearly half a century. 
Over such a period of time it is not uncommon that a scholar might adjust or update his 
positions. Without much surprise then, we can bisect Tilly’s theoretical formulations on 
German finance into basically two different periods that are separated by an over-
arching change in the thrust of his theoretical position about financial development. The 
first begins with the publication in 1966 of Financial Institutions in the Rhineland 
(1966), where Tilly used primary archival research in order to assess the impact of 
financial institutions on industrialization in the Rhineland (reiterated in Tilly, 1967). 
Beginning in this book, Tilly propounded a synthetic theory of socioeconomic interests 
in order to explain the development of German “mixed-banking.” Many aspects of 
Tilly’s original interpretation expounded in this book would remain more or less 
unchanged. There was a crucial alteration beginning in 1986, wherein he would update 
his interpretation of universal banking evolution using the “asymmetric information,” 
and New Institutional Economics (NIE) theoretical approaches of neoclassical 
                                                
23 Indeed, Tilly (1998) contends that “economic backwardness” à la Gerschenkron is not 
actually much of a “theory” per se. From his perspective it is a typological formula––
“backwardness plus historical inertia.” 
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economics. Tilly’s theorization of German finance is undisputedly more sophisticated 
than that of Gerschenkron. Nevertheless, it is not without its problems. The most 
significant problem arising from Tilly’s work, and persisting across his oeuvre, is the 
tacit, or unexpressed, separation that he creates between “economic” and “political” 
phenomena. In connection with his later espousal of the “information asymmetry” 
approach, this is especially problematic for advancing the status of research on the 
development of German universal banking.  
 
Socioeconomic interests or class struggle? 
What is striking about Tilly’s early engagement with German financial history, 
is the theoretical sensitivity that he brings to the historical narrative. Financial 
Institutions in the Rhineland (1966), is a remarkable book in part because of the way 
that it blends primary archival research with a careful attention to the wider significance 
of the often localized financial stories that it has to tell. In this, Tilly’s first research 
monograph, Tilly blends a theoretical perspective developed from Schumpeter and 
Gerschenkron in order to outline the connection between the “real” and “financial” 
aspects of capitalist economies in development. Mobilizing Schumpeter, Tilly posits 
that the key function of banks (or financial intermediaries) is the task of creating new 
purchasing power, which is linked to their ability of credit creation (Tilly, 1966: 6). 
Tilly is quick to note, crucially I might add, that  
The importance of credit creation––which is not, after all a monopoly of profit-
maximizing firms––turns entirely on the purpose to which new purchasing power is 
put.  Governments, for example, have made large-scale use of credit creation since pre-
industrial times to finance unproductive activities such as warfare or monument-
building. Credit creation provides a means to development, but guarantees no results 
(Tilly 1966: 6, my emphasis) 
 
This is an important theoretical statement. By contending that “the importance of credit 
creation…turns entirely on the purpose to which new purchasing power is put” we are 
immediately told that the key practice of “finance” in the capitalist economy is not 
necessarily politically neutral in its consequences for social development. Additionally, 
financial development is most consistently averred to be a social process throughout the 
opening theoretical salvo.  
Tilly also mobilizes Gerschenkron in order to set the stage theoretically for the 
historical narrative of the advent of credit creation in Germany (ibid: 9-10; also Tilly, 
1967: 151). Importantly, Tilly distances himself from Gerschenkron almost immediately 
by noting that the “advantages of backwardness” that might have been reaped by early 
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German entrepreneurs extended only to the railway industry and related backward 
linking trades (mostly mining and iron smelting) (ibid: 9). This presents a different 
chronological narrative to Gerschenkron’s account, placing the development of 
universal banking in the 1830s rather than the post 1870 period. 
Tilly’s opening theoretical chapter is also interesting because he foregrounds the 
geographic distinctiveness of the Rhineland in relation to the rest of Germany. In 
particular, Tilly distinguishes the social-political differences of the ruling classes and 
their concomitant socioeconomic interest bases. The Rhineland had been stimulated into 
early industrialization as far back the 15th and 16th centuries through trade with Northern 
German states and the South Netherlands and propelled into the earliest industrializing 
area within the German states after the take-over of the Rhineland by the French during 
the Napoleonic Wars. Prussia, by contrast, had not made the same strides toward 
industrialization, and its primary socioeconomic interests lay in agriculture and not 
industry. The conjoining of the Rhineland with Prussia, following the Congress of 
Vienna, set the stage for conflict between the ruling classes of these Western and 
Eastern regions.  
This account of Prussian “geography” is the fulcrum upon which many of 
Tilly’s contributions to German financial history pivot. The sociopolitical interest 
conflict between the Eastern agriculturally focused Junkers and the Western industrially 
oriented Rhenish businessmen animates the particular development of universal banking 
according to Tilly because of its consequences for Prussian monetary policy: the 
essence of this historically informed explanation relating to bank-note issue, and the 
chartering of new private issuing bank.24  
Not unlike Gerschenkron, Tilly utilizes a comparison with England in order to 
explain the importance of Prussian government restrictions on the foundation of banks 
that could issue their own paper money. In England, banks had been able to issue 
promissory notes in relation to their deposit business, and as a consequence were able to 
provide the liquidity needed for industrialization. Conversely, the Prussian government 
refused to charter private banks of issue to satisfy the Rhenish need of liquidity for fear 
of diluting the strength of its conservative agrarian oriented interests. In particular, Tilly 
traces the debates amongst contemporaries and suggests that members of the Prussian 
state bureaucracy feared that private issuing banks would ultimately undermine the 
                                                
24 This is indeed a highly important issue, but needs to be contextualized in a much different 
way in order to underscore the development of universal banking. See Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
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ability of the government to provide credit to agricultural producers on favourable 
terms. Moreover, in the event of a banking crisis, the government might be responsible 
for the claims against the banks in order to preserve the health of the industrializing 
economy. Consequently, any form of financial assistance would most likely necessitate 
adding to the already high level of government debt. This latter consequence was also 
considered less than ideal because in relation to the State Edict of January 7, 1820, or 
the “State Indebtedness Law,” increases in government borrowing would eventually 
require the approval of an elected legislature––an outcome that was not favoured by the 
Junker elite (Tilly, 1966).25  
There were several consequences of prohibiting the chartering of new note-
issuing banks in the Rhineland according to Tilly. The most immediate of these was the 
foundation of such institutions in German states bordering Prussia. The ultimate 
significance of these banks, however, was never particularly great, and following mid-
century, most of them ceased to be of much importance (Tilly 1966a: Chapter 3). The 
real pertinence of this early monetary prohibition according to Tilly was in the way that 
it directed Rhenish financiers to other means of credit creation and money substitutes. 
These were found in the devices of overdraft credit and bills of exchange.  Unlike the 
promissory notes used by English commercial banks that could be redeemed on 
demand, bills of exchange as credit instruments had longer maturity dates. This 
provided more opportunity for bankers to reinvest the money loaned to them in other 
projects where the risk of their money being tied-up was greater.  Moreover, current 
account credits granted to clients could be rolled over, so that a formally short-term 
credit could be transformed into a long-term one. The Prussian state had therefore 
unwittingly created the conditions for an entirely different form of credit creation––the 
signal Schumpetarian aspect of Capitalist banks.  In a few words, this was the nascent 
combination of “mixed-banking” brought about by the actions of the Prussian state 
(Tilly, 1966: 134-5; idem 1967: 181-2) and profit oriented financiers who stepped into 
the available business opportunities left to them.  
Tilly’s early interpretation is at odds with the strict Gerschenkron account in 
several ways. Pace Gerschenkron, who argued that the “relative backwardness” of 
Germany was not significant enough to involve the institution of the state, Tilly is 
evidently keen to point out an important role for the state in the development of German 
                                                
25 For a highly readable account of the indebtedness law, also called “Hardenburg’s Time-
Bomb” see Christopher Clark (2007).  
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finance. This “early Tilly” all the same mobilized Gerschenkron insofar as the historical 
timing of leading industrialization technologies––railroads and the their ancillary 
industries––were important in the determination of “mixed-banking.” The relatively 
large volume of financial capital required still has a role to play in calling forth the 
institutions that funnel it from source to destination. 
Perhaps one of Tilly’s most important contributions is to find fault with the 
implicit Gerschenkron argument equating the “Great Berlin Banks” (Berliner 
Großbanken) with the distinctiveness of universal banking circa the post-unification 
period (1870s–1914).  Tilly suggests that the roots of universal banking practice began 
as early as the 1830s in the Rhineland. Basing his argument on solid archival evidence, 
Tilly reasons that this “mixed-banking” even predates the unification of commercial and 
investment banking in the 1850s with the early proliferation of joint-stock and 
commandite banks. Early private banks were the first financial intermediaries to 
combine commercial and investment practices together. Among them the Abraham 
Schaaffhausen and the Salomon Oppenheim private banks in Cologne (Tilly, 1966: 
Chapter 8), who would both then transport the associated activities into the joint-stock 
banks which they founded. Finally, the “early Tilly” is also very ambivalent about the 
role of banks and financial intermediaries in economic growth and industrialization. He 
does not find clear evidence to suggest that financial institutions had a decisive causal 
role to play in stimulating the “real” side of the economy––that is as a decisive 
influence in the process of industrialization. This casts further doubt on the ability of the 
banks to act in the Gerschenkronian functional manner of stimulating the “Great Spurt” 
or “second wave” of German industrialization.  
The analysis of the early Tilly shares with Gerschenkron a fundamentally 
functional theorization of the development of universal banking. The ultimate 
theoretical connection that Tilly makes between financiers and “mixed-banking” 
basically assumes the emergence of a practice to fit an existing economic need: agency 
follows a simple path of least resistance. In the concise formulation of two scholars who 
essentially agree with Tilly’s account: “[banks] had to adjust their liabilities to fit the 
necessary asset structure, that is, they… engage[d] in the remaining promising business 
of financing industry by short-term and long-term credits” (Pollard and Ziegler 1992: 
29, my emphasis). This explanation takes for granted what needs to be explained if we 
are to treat the institutional structure of “mixed-banking” as problematic. By simply 
positing that this was a profitable avenue of business and that financiers stepped into 
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that void, we are not left with any real understanding of why it is that they decided to do 
something that was fundamentally different from their peers. We are left without a 
theory of this interesting new form of historical financial agency.  
Indeed, if Tilly’s assessment of the chronological commencement of this 
practice is correct, then we must recognize that engaging in large-scale industrial 
finance was a fundamentally strange type of behaviour for these early private bankers. 
Indeed, the literature is replete with evidence to suggest that the “financial system” in 
the German states, until roughly the middle of the nineteenth century, was largely 
dominated by the business of mercantile (trade) and government finance (inter alia 
Born, 1983; Engberg, 1981; Feldenkirchen, 1991; Kindleberger, 1993; North, 1997; H. 
M. Pohl, 1982a; idem, 1982b; Ziegler, 1997). Thus the combination of investment and 
commercial banking, no less industrial financing, by Rhenish bankers in comparison to 
their competitors and peers––both internationally (across Europe), but also within 
Prussia (and the other German states)––was a highly “peculiar” turn of events. When 
the earliest “mixed-banks” began to practice this way, they engendered a social 
rationale which was sociohistorically novel. To attribute this to the profit motive surely 
captures some aspect of this behaviour accurately––if it had not held some promise of 
profit, or had not at all proved profitable, then financiers would most likely not have 
pursued it. Nonetheless, profits were to be had in other segments of the financial sector, 
and the mentality of many investors was predominantly conservative26 in the sense of 
avoiding catastrophic hazards to accumulated wealth. In this way, it is important to 
harken back to Tilly’s Schumpetarian inspired maxim that credit creation is not 
sociopolitically neutral in its consequences. We may also need to tarry with the notion 
that that credit creation may not be sociopolitically neutral in its origins. Taking this 
suggestion seriously requires acknowledging the insulation that is created in Tilly’s 
account between the “economy” and “polity,”27 and that a proper account of this agency 
may require un-thinking many of the assumptions that a priori separates what is 
“economic” from what is “political.”  
 
 
 
                                                
26 In the contemporary economics parlance “conservative” translates as “risk averse,” but I 
would use this non-euphemistically here as a general political term. 
27 We may wish to further suggest between “economy” and “society.” 
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Asymmetric Information and Perfect Markets 
 Tilly’s thought in the intervening time since he published his earliest research on 
the German banking system has moved even further in the direction of isolating the 
“political” from the “economic.” In the mid-1980s, Richard Tilly learned of and 
appropriated the nascent theory of “asymmetric information,” along with comparable 
elements from NIE, in order to interpret and explain the origins of “mixed-banking” in 
Germany. Continuing from the evaluation of Tilly’s early work in the last sub-section, I 
now demonstrate how the continuing ontological and phenomological separation 
between “economics” and “politics” in Tilly’s work, if anything strengthened by the 
importation of the “information theoretic” approach, poses serious challenges to a 
theoretically controlled appreciation, and interpretation, of the development of German 
universal banking.  
 
Markets for sub-standard goods 
 The new informational economics, despite being only a slightly modified 
approach to all of the classic elements of “the dismal science,” is actually a relatively 
novel reinterpretation of quintessential aspects of the “marginalist school” of 
neoclassical economics. Almost all of the basic assumptions remain the same–– 
methodological individualism, instrumental rationality, equilibrium price theory, 
marginalism and stable preferences (Fine and Milonakis, 2009: 63)––except for the 
perfect information postulate––that fictio juris where all agents in the market have an 
encyclopædic knowledge of all commodities.  
What had been termed “market failure” by classical and neoclassical economics 
was usually oligopoly and monopoly conditions within the market––impediments to 
perfect competition. “Information theoretic” scholars have dubbed these kinds of market 
breakdown “the old market failures” (Stiglitz, quoted in Fine and Milonakis, 2009: 57). 
Classical and early neoclassical theorists rarely considered other types of market failure. 
In order to overcome many of the contradictions between theory and empirical data, the 
idea of “externalities” was mobilized in order to explain inefficient outcomes in markets 
(Screpanti & Zemagni, 2005: 400, 403). Essentially, an “externality” occurs where an 
agent not party to contract can impose an inefficiency on a market-outcome. This is a 
variation of the idea of a “non-profit” motivated government intervening in the 
economy and disturbing the egoistic equilibrium of its participants (usually, to the 
detriment of all). What is crucial to note is that the idea of “externality” mobilized by 
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neoclassicals allowed them to maintain their grasp theoretically on the idea of “perfect 
markets” (despite the widespread evidence of monopoly and oligopoly). Inefficient 
outcomes were not a problem with underlying “perfect markets,” but rather a problem 
of something exterior to the eternal logic of the market. This “exterior party” to 
contracting market participants intervened in the market process and spoiled the 
otherwise pristine equilibrium wrought by forces of supply and demand. The concept of 
“externality” is not terribly useful for concrete historical and social research, because it 
mobilises something that is unexplained, and left unexplained, according to the central 
theoretical logic of analysis. That is to say, it simply displaces the contradiction 
experienced from the incongruity of theory and empirical data to a third category which 
serves as something beyond analysis, un-theorizable and purely contingent.28 
Information economics by contrast can largely do away with the concept of 
“externality” because it has developed a different understanding of market failure and 
its relationship to those aspects of the social world “exterior” to the pure logic of 
markets. Stiglitz has dubbed these “new market failures” (Stiglitz, quoted in Fine and 
Milonakis, 2009: 57), and they assume as generally, or frequently, operative the notion 
of imperfect and/or costly information and incomplete markets. In the face of such 
imperfection, however, “rational actors” will take the opportunity to create institutions 
that serve to either make information more symmetrical or complete markets. The 
radical nature of this proposition arises because it has popularized the acceptance by 
otherwise orthodox economic theorists that markets may often operate in an imperfect 
manner. Furthermore it allows economists to extend the purview of their discipline into 
other disciplines by suggesting that institutions and social relations are the result of 
rational actors attempting to perfect the market mechanism (Boldizzoni, 2011). 
 George Akerloff’s “Market for Lemons” (1970) provides an excellent example 
of this kind of reasoning.29 The market for lemons is, first of all, not a market for citrus 
fruits. For the uninitiated, “a lemon” in North American parlance, is a used-car that has 
a hidden defect, or is actually a pile of junk masquerading as a legitimate means of 
carbon powered locomotion. Secondly, according to Akerloff, seemingly perverse 
effects might occur in the market for used cars if all of the neoclassical assumptions 
were observed. Akerloff explains by asking us to  
                                                
28 “Stochastic” is the term most likely to be used by my disciplinary interlocutor in this kind of 
circumstance.  
29 This article serves as one of the popular touchstones in the “information theoretic” literature 
and a key source for  Tilly’s re-interpellation of German finance. 
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Suppose (for the sake of clarity rather than reality) that there are just four kinds of cars. 
There are new cars and used cars. There are good cars and bad cars (which in America 
are known as "lemons"). A new car may be a good car or a lemon, and of course the same 
is true of used cars. 
The individuals in this market buy a new automobile without knowing whether 
the car they buy will be good or a lemon. But they do know that with probability q it is a 
good car and with probability (1-q) it is a lemon; by assumption, q is the proportion of 
good cars produced and (1-q) is the proportion of lemons. 
After owning a specific car, however, for a length of time, the car owner can 
form a good idea of the quality of this machine; i.e., the owner assigns a new probability 
to the event that his car is a lemon. This estimate is more accurate than the original 
estimate. An asymmetry in available information has developed: for the sellers now have 
more knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers. But good cars and bad cars 
must still sell at the same price––since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference 
between a good car and a bad car. It is apparent that a used car cannot have the same 
valuation as a new car––if it did have the same valuation, it would clearly be 
advantageous to trade a lemon at the price of new car, and buy another new car, at a 
higher probability q of being good and a lower probability of being bad. Thus the owner 
of a good machine must be locked in. Not only is it true that he cannot receive the true 
value of his car, but he cannot even obtain the expected value of a new car.…most cars 
traded will be lemons, and good cars may not be traded at all…the bad cars sell at the 
same price as good cars since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a 
good and a bad car; only the seller knows. (Akerloff 1970: 489) 
 
Akerloff is arguing that if buyers of vehicles were privy to sufficient information and 
could assess in advance of purchase the quality of the cars they were buying, then the 
price for “lemons” would decrease, and the price for “good” cars would increase. 
Without this information, sellers know that the value of their “good” cars will not be 
reimbursed in the market so they do not sell. Purchasers of automobiles will not buy 
automobiles because they know in advance that all of the automobiles are “lemons.” 
Consequently, the market for used automobiles will cease to exist!  
 What is very interesting is the turn that the argument makes following this 
reasoning. Akerloff avers that the sellers or consumers will actually take the opportunity 
of market failure to create institutions that will enable them to overcome market 
imperfections.30 Akerloff forwards several institutions that have such origins: product 
guarantees for consumer durables, brand names (which supposedly therefore suggest a 
certain level of quality), franchising (which creates a network of offices where quality 
complaints may be reported), and licensing.  In all of the examples that Akerloff notes, 
it is most likely immediately apparent to the reader that our “information theoretic” 
author has presumed what he means to explain. The institutions Akerloff enumerates are 
                                                
30 Akerloff actually articulates the development of new institutions in a much more passive 
fashion. He suggests that institutions will “arise” in order to counteract this type of market 
failure.  
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assumed to have arisen in order to satisfy, or perfect, markets for specific goods. This 
suggests an odd relationship to the history of these types of institutions.  
If we do not take Akerloff at his word, and instead interpret his formulation 
“loosely” then we might suppose that he really intended that these particular institutions 
did not arise in order to solve market imperfections. Rather, they may have arisen as the 
result of other activities––economic, political, social or otherwise, but produced the 
consequence of “perfecting markets” for specific products in an entirely unintentional 
fashion. This speaks only to one aspect of these institutions’ continued function and 
very little to their development or evolution. It should be clear from this latter, looser 
interpretation that the deductive reasoning presented in Akerloff (1970) is therefore not 
terribly useful for the direct understanding of the development of specific institutions. 
 
Information Asymmetries in Rhenish Finance 
Tilly began in the 1980s to draw on theories of information asymmetry in 
financial intermediation in order to provide a more comprehensive theroretical account 
of “mixed-banking.” Tilly’s first explanation for the development of “mixed-banking” 
is overly reliant on the state as the indirect facilitator of this institutional form. Without 
the state intervening in the economy, and inhibiting the ability of “private” actors to 
pursue profit-oriented business with issuing banks, the development of Germany’s 
distinctive banking system would not have been possible. The substance of Tilly’s 
assessment of the state’s role in developing “the mixed-banking programme,” is 
ultimately one of a permissive condition. As I explained in the section on Tilly’s early 
work this must then assume what it needs to explain.  
Through a series of different papers Tilly has developed upon his earlier 
interpretation by applying the theory of information asymmetry (Tilly, 1986; idem, 
idem, 1989; idem, 1992; idem, 1994; idem, 1995; idem, 1998).   This has led him to 
criticize the pure Gerschenkron typology as amounting to little more than “economic 
backwardness plus historical inertia” (Tilly, 1998: 10). By contrast the work of 
asymmetric information scholars (Akerloff, 1970; Stiglitz, 1985; Diamond, 1984) 
according to Tilly provides a theoretical account of early German financial practices 
that has a “rational core.”  
Financial intermediaries’ role within the economy is to provide finance for 
industrial projects. Being profit oriented, they charge a certain price for this finance, as 
indicated by the interest rate on loans. The difficulty arises because of the unevenly 
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possessed information between those seeking finance (borrowers––entrepreneurs, those 
with industrial projects) and the financiers (lenders). Borrowers have a much better idea 
of their capabilities, intentions and possibilities than do lenders. Consequently, there is 
the possibility of “moral hazard”: essentially, that those receiving loans will not pursue 
reasonable, safe, the least risky or most assured path to success in completing their 
industrial project. When borrowers are uncertain about the amount of risk that a 
particular loan entails they “naturally” seek conditions in order to improve the assurance 
that they will not only accrue interest payments, but also receive their principal back. In 
the event that few or insufficient conditions can be put on loans, or that such conditions 
as may be imposed do not ameliorate the perceived riskiness of investment projects, the 
interest rate across the market will rise as all investment projects are assessed in 
accordance with the least successful in the economy. That is to say, the interest will rise 
above the level that risk averse entrepreneurs with “sound investment” plans will be 
willing to pay for loans. The market interest rate will be determined by those investment 
projects that are “sure losers.” Consequently, those projects that actually do seek loans 
at such a high rate of interest will most likely be perceived as risky business––after all, 
why would a risk averse entrepreneur with a sound business plan be willing to pay the 
usurious rate of interest that the market charges? Therefore, a market for industrial loans 
would according to this logic cease to exist.  
This model is of course formulated upon the idea of a market for loans that 
envisions participants related solely by contract––i.e. a stock market as imagined in 
relation to the Anglo-American typology of market based finance. Those providing 
loans do so without any previous knowledge of the borrower; a situation which does not 
hold for universal banks. Economists have mobilized this simple deductive exercise in 
order to suggest that the universal programme of banks—the combination of investment 
and commercial business is simply a way of reducing the units of risk incurred in 
relation to the price of loan contracts (cf. Cable, 1985). When banks have better 
information about their clients, they can price loans (set interest rates) higher or lower 
based on a better assessment of the risk that the loan carries, as well as assess whether 
or not such clients present potentially profitable long-term investments for securities 
flotation.   
Richard Tilly has mobilized this logic in order to explain the combination of 
“mixed-banking” activities of even the earliest private financiers in the Rhineland (Tilly 
1986; idem, 1989; idem, 1992; idem, 1999).  Quite simply, by combining current 
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account facilities (commercial banking) with large scale loans and securities business 
(investment banking) early private bankers were able to better assess the riskiness of 
specific investment projects. By developing the institution of “mixed-banking” private 
bankers overcame the conditions of capital “market failure” in the early nineteenth 
century Rhineland and thereby spurred industrialization by facilitating market 
transactions. 
 In some ways this does seem to provide a rational core to the institution of 
“mixed-banking.” This interpretation suggests that universal bankers were indeed 
rational market actors. Despite being confronted with a situation that might impede their 
continued or expanded profitability, they inaugurated an entirely new economic practice 
to help them overcome this setback. On the surface, this is relatively appealing as a 
parsimonious explanation. It does not reduce the institution of universal banking to an 
externality of the economic process. Indeed, it specifically brings it within the purview 
of the theoretical framework. Nonetheless, it is misconceived insofar as it purports to 
capture the rational core of “universal banking,” because it reduces this rationality a 
priori to a strict market rationality.  
 This explanation is a far cry from Tilly’s earlier recognition that credit, amongst 
other economic institutions may not be politically neutral. Indeed, the explanation in 
relation to information asymmetry specifically reduces the political or social input into 
the construction of this particular institution and deepens the sequestration between the 
economic and the political that Tilly created with his initial explanation.  Tilly 
seemingly overlooks the evidence that the early railroad financiers he himself highlights 
as the progenitors of “mixed-banking,” while they may have wished to reduce the 
uncertainty of speculation, most likely engaged in this financial practice for multiple 
other reasons as well. 
 Early railroad financing was a wildly expensive endeavor, and surpassed the 
limited means of individual private banking houses. In order to amalgamate the required 
capital, individual private banking houses would form together in syndicates that could 
pool large amounts of financial resources (Tilly, 1989; idem, 1986; idem, 1966). This 
pooling served the function of being able to underwrite enormous amounts of equity 
from these early railroad companies. Subsequently, the syndicates would then undertake 
to find purchasers for all of this equity (this is the business of floating equity). In many 
cases, not all of the shares could be necessarily immediately subscribed, in which case 
the remaining shares would be kept by the bankers in the syndicate in their own 
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portfolios until they could sell them to securities markets. While holding these shares, 
however, their price could fluctuate in the secondary market based on the fortunes, or 
business prospects of the company. Ideally, these banks preferred to retain these extra 
shares until such a time as they could sell them for a greater amount than the intial issue 
price (what the first round of shareholders paid for their equity in the firm). Bankers 
would not want the price of the share to decline as this could then involve enormous 
losses for them. By maintaining current account and deposit business (commercial 
financial practices) with these same firms, banks could indeed monitor the “riskiness” 
of the firm in order to assess whether underwriting a securities issue would be a safe 
bet. Essentially, combining commercial banking and investment banking allowed banks 
to gain informational economies of scope. With the extra information provided by 
regular commercial banking business, banks could assess whether firms paid their bills 
in a timely manner. However, this does not hold in relation to early railway companies 
in the Rhineland. These firms needed investment finance before they could be founded, 
and they had no commercial credit relations prior to foundation. Ergo, Tilly’s 
explanation can present a potentially ex post facto activity of risk reduction, after the 
firms were founded, but not before. Consequently, this logic is no explanation for the 
combination of investment and commercial finance in one bank.  
In extending his analysis of the foundation of “mixed-banking” into information 
asymmetry, Tilly has also augmented his account of the role of the state in relation to 
these financial institutions. While Tilly’s early work was largely focused on the 1815-
1870 period, his later writings also aim to account for the period up to the First World 
War (Tilly, 1986; idem, 1989) and sometimes even  the Second World War (Tilly, 1992; 
idem, 1994). In particular Tilly argues for a central role of the Prussian state in creating 
financial legislation in the last quarter of the nineteenth century which consecrated 
universal banking in the financial system more generally (Tilly, 1999; idem, 1986). 
Here the role of regulations introduced in 1881 (stamp tax on securities), 1884 (tighter 
regulations for securities issuing), 1896 (the Stock Exchange Law), secured the role of 
the universal banks vis-à-vis other actors in the financial system (stockjobbers, private 
bankers, savings banks and credit cooperatives). The universal array of services 
provided by the big Banks became further enshrined when the Reichsbank was made an 
effective lender of last resort: this created a division of labour between the universal 
banks who engaged in industrial finance, and the Reichsbank that focused on pure 
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payments. Moreover, the Reichsbank provided a liquidity guarantee allowing the 
universal banks to rediscount when a lock-up of their assets was threatened.  
Despite Tilly’s early recognition of the sociological significance of credit, and 
the permissive role of government intervention in the economy, he has consistently 
aimed to explain the actions and behaviours of financiers as a function of the 
“economy,” or as subject to an “economic” rationality separated from the rest of social 
reality. Tilly’s analysis warrants such extended coverage because it has proved largely 
persuasive for many economic historians, and is the accepted explanation for universal 
banking in contemporary economic history (Burhop 2006a; Da Rin, 1996; Ziegler, 
2005a; Guinanne 2002; idem, 2001).  
 
CAROLINE FOHLIN: MARKET-LED REVISIONISM 
 As I have demonstrated thus far, the literature suffers a serious lacuna in its 
ability to provide a theoretically controlled explanation for the form of German finance 
as a universal banking system. While the rise of Tilly’s “information theoretic” casting 
of the history of “mixed-banking” has gained a certain level of distinction, in a number 
of papers since the mid-1990s Caroline Fohlin has begun to cast doubt on this 
interpretation. In particular, Fohlin has laudably aimed to increase the attention which 
researchers give towards the political, legal, social and cultural forces in the constitution 
of the financial system and Germany’s in particular (Fohlin 2012; 2007; 2000; 1999: 
335). Despite this admirable advance, if we are to espouse the conclusions of Fohlin’s 
writing, then we should be drawn away from financial system differentiation itself.  
This has arisen because on balance Fohlin has concentrated her scholarly efforts on 
testing hypotheses about German growth in a strictly economistic fashion. In other 
words, problems of methodology prohibit Fohlin from directing her attention towards 
the most significant interpretation of the evidence. While she accurately highlights the 
need for more sustained research into the social aspect, on balance her work reaches a 
cul-de-sac in recognizing the importance of social, political and legal aspects, without 
being able to account for them.  
 To begin, Fohlin has made the critique of the Gerschenkronian paradigm 
perhaps the central animating idea of her work (Fohlin, 2007: chapter 1 & 2, 330; idem, 
2002a; idem, 2002b). In particular, one of her key arguments is that “German banks 
may have developed as a result of such factors [social, political and regulatory 
environments], rather than as a natural response to economic backwardness” (Fohlin, 
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1999:306, my emphasis). Chief among the faults that Fohlin finds with the 
Gerschenkronian paradigm is the historical anachronism that “universal, relationship 
banking developed after the first wave of industrialization” (Fohlin, 1999: 311; cf. idem, 
2007: 45). Furthermore, Fohlin advances in particular the idea that the joint-stock form 
is a key element of the historical continuity of “universal banking.” Prior to this legal-
institutional innovation there was no securities business––no shares or equities to float. 
Moreover, the accumulation of supervisory board seats by German banks was 
impossible prior to joint-stock banking because this element of corporate governance 
was a key aspect of limited liability from the 1870s onwards through the proxy voting 
rights (Depotstimmrecht) awarded to banks that held shares deposited with them on 
behalf of customers. Finally that extensive branching also occurred during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century (although she suggests that this is not inherent to the 
concept of universal banking).  
Fohlin argues that Tilly’s connection of the early private “mixed-banks” with the 
“universal banking” characteristics à la Gerschenkron is problematic because the 
majority of early private bankers engaged more consistently in government finance and 
mercantile credit (Fohlin, 1999: 311). This is indeed accurate, but sidesteps the marginal 
few private bankers which Tilly highlights to have definitely engaged in this practice. In 
Fohlin’s more recent work she does not even return to this earlier proposition. Indeed, 
she attaches so little weight to Tilly’s argument for the commencement of an early form 
of “mixed-banking” in the 1830s that she later begins her revisionist chronology 
specifically with the early joint-stock banks in the 1850s (Fohlin, 2007: Chapter 2).  
Fohlin might argue that early “mixed-banking” does not itself require an account 
because it clearly did not occur under the “joint-stock” form of legal organization and it 
was clearly not the early “mixed-banks” that Gerschenkron hypothesized had the 
monumental impact on the German economy. Arguing that a strict interpretation of the 
Gerschenkron “paradigm” is anachronistic in this way presents a couple of problems. 
Firstly, in relation to the development of financial system structure, Fohlin has actually 
failed to make a strong case that there is no “economic” argument for the development 
of a differentiated system. When Fohlin argues that the joint-stock form of banking is 
the most significant element of continuity, she is implicitly choosing this particular 
characteristic because it most closely matches with Gerschenkron’s own account. 
Nonetheless, Tilly’s account which links a continuous form of organization between the 
early “mixed-banks” and later joint-stock banks may still present important insights into 
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the development of German universal banking. Fohlin’s dismissal is only legitimate if 
we are attempting to examine the Gerschenkron hypothesis, and universal banking per 
se. Fohlin has also missed the potential significance of the early “mixed-banks” because 
she so strongly aims to disprove Gerschenkron. Recall that in Gerschenkron’s account 
he places the significance of financial structure differentiation on its functional ability to 
raise large volumes of capital and therefore bring about industrialization. Fohlin, 
attempting to test this proposition as equivalent to the ability of our late nineteenth 
century “joint-stock” banks singularly ignores the earlier “mixed-banking” institutions.  
Fohlin leaves us with only an implicit, anodyne, narrative in relation to the 
development of universal banking in Germany: the universal banking system arose in 
tandem, and evolved with the changes in the industrial system (Fohlin, 2007: Chapter 4, 
331-333; Fohlin, 1997). Moreover, Fohlin argues that securities markets were an 
integral part of Germany’s banking system (ibid: Chapters 6 and 7, 336-341; Fohlin, 
2002). Consequently, and therefore against the idea of bank-based finance, Fohlin 
argues that the dichotomy between banks and markets is a false one. In dismissing this 
depiction of German finance, she simply implies that markets were prevalent, and the 
driving force behind the development of universal banking.  
In summation, the historical narrative of, and explanation for, the origins of 
universal banking that Fohlin provides us with as a revisionist critique of the existing 
literature fall short.  Crucially, her narrative relies on problematising the role of legal-
political and social externalities in influencing the development of the universal banking 
system, without explaining what or how exactly these might function.  
 
CONSTRUCTING GERMAN UNIVERSAL BANKING 
In direct opposition to the naturalizing tendencies of the above evaluated 
approaches, Richard Deeg has attempted to present a social constructivist account of the 
development of universal banking in Germany. By putting social and political conflict 
at the centre of his account (Deeg, 2003; cf. idem, 1999). Deeg has specifically aimed to 
avoid functional explanation, by incorporating sociopolitical struggle, and context in his 
account of the rise of a system of universal banking.  
 The primary criticism of Deeg’s analysis is the overwhelming emphasis on the 
Big Berlin Banks (Berliner Großbanken) that occurs throughout the other literature here 
discussed (Deeg 2003; idem, 1999; idem, 1996). In particular, Deeg advances the idea 
that it is the competition that occurred between the three pillars of the German financial 
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industry that ultimately brought about the form of a universal banking system where all 
banks provided both commercial and investment business.  Deeg further argues that the 
differences in customer specialization between the different banking industries 
corresponded to spatial and class cleavages (the former marked by centre and 
periphery). Deeg posits that “conflicts across these cleavages promoted the formation 
and extension of alternate banking systems” (Deeg, 2003: 101).  
 Deeg is careful to outline the fashion in which the institutions of universal 
banking were spread from one segment of the German financial industry to another; 
however, his account pays very little attention to the genesis of the practice of universal 
banking in the corporate banking sector. The struggles between the different pillars are 
indeed a requirement to chart the diffusion of universal banking throughout Germany’s 
financial landscape, however, Deeg simply accepts the information asymmetry account 
for why it is that universal banks arose in the for-profit sector.  Laudably Deeg 
delineates the way in which the unintended consequences of adopting various 
institutional measures or responding to market competition altered the practices of the 
different banking sectors as they reacted to newfound competition.  
 Deeg’s account brings us slightly too far in the opposite direction from the other 
authors discussed in this chapter. It is commendable that Deeg aims to inject a greater 
amount of agency into the history of “universal banking,” by following social and 
political contestation between regions and socioeconomic groups. Unfortunately, here 
as well we do not get much of a proper sense of the historical necessity of why it is that 
“universal banking” was the outcome. In fact, Deeg reduces his account to such a strict 
focus on the different types of banks, that we are left in some cases with a seemingly 
voluntarist understanding of different financial system outcomes.  
 For example, Deeg largely ascribes to a similar account of the development of 
“universal banking” practices as the early Tilly insofar as he posits that the key 
prerequisite for the “joint-stock” banks to become universal lay in the liquidity policy of 
the Prussian Bank (Deeg, 2003: 97). As I pointed out previously, this is little more than 
a permissive condition and says very little positively about why it is that this practice 
was adopted. Similarly, when Deeg discusses the adoption of investment banking 
functions by the savings banks he simply notes that the legal prohibition (by Länder 
governments) was removed from such activities because the hyper inflation of the 
1920s had eroded their traditional savings business. Why is it that they began financing 
industry? Why not engage in any other number of short-term commercial financial 
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activities? The adoption of any strategy other than industrial investment business would 
not have classified them as a “universal bank.” Consequently, there needs to be further 
specification of why such a strategy was taken.  
 Deeg avoids many of the pitfalls of a “naturalizing” logic in order to explain the 
development of the German financial system. His strategy of a loose constructivism that 
postulates social and political conflict fails to identify the specific reasons why “mixed-
banking” developed as it did first amongst private bankers before being transmitted to 
joint-stock banks and ultimately graduating to its universal moniker. Without an 
explanation for why for-profit banks originally adopted universal banking, an 
essentialist conception of “the economic” is maintained at the heart of this constructivist 
account. 
 
THE NARRATIVE COMPONENT 
Historically-empirically, the discussion of the literature on German banking 
therefore identifies four key transformations pertinent for the development of universal 
banking. The establishment of (1) early “mixed-banks;” (2) the transposal of “mixed-
banking” from private to corporate banks; (3) the generalization of joint-stock “mixed-
banking;” finally, (4) the introduction of the deposit business. These transformations are 
differently stressed in the scholarship dependent on scholars’ focus on necessary or 
sufficient features for the operation of universal banking as either abstract or concrete. 
As this thesis treats both abstract and concrete universal banking as explananda, all of 
these historical conjunctures require delineation.     
Firstly, (1) private bankers in the Rhineland initially developed “mixed-
banking” around the 1830s. This initial foray of combining commercial and investment 
banking was undertaken so that investment might flow to building Germany’s 
railroads—the leading sector of industrialization. This practice supposedly “made 
economic sense” because it allowed bankers to prevail over existing information 
asymmetries. The regular flows of information provided about customers by insight into 
their short-term credit needs (through current accounts), allowed “mixed-bankers” to 
judge whether the same borrowers would be a credit risk, or potentially lucrative 
enterprises worthy of investment in the long-term.  
These private bankers supposedly experienced difficulties underwriting equities 
issues, requiring them to form coalitions of financiers (in syndicates) in order to 
underwrite securities floatations. This necessarily led to the two subsequent “foundation 
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waves” of joint-stock universal banks: the first from (2) 1848-1857, and the second 
from (3) 1869-1873. These foundation waves saw the transposal of “mixed-banking” 
from private banks with unlimited liability to corporate banks with limited liability. 
According to Tilly’s reasoning, these banks were established as joint-stock companies 
to (a) increase their available capital in relation to the (b) exponentially augmented 
needs of large industrial firms (like railroads), and (c) thereby forego the difficulties of 
organizing syndicates for underwriting on an ad hoc basis while institutionalizing their 
advantages in one organization. In short, this institution was adopted because it reduced 
transactions costs (Tilly, 1989; Ziegler, 1997; Dahlem, 2009). In the process of 
corporate consolidation following the second foundation wave, (4) the large corporate 
universal banks in Berlin began to introduce deposits as a manner through which to 
increase their capital.  
In order to chart the influences institutionalizing universal banking over these 
four separate conjunctures, it is necessary to turn to a historical sociology of financial 
development. This entails principally recognizing that economic and political behaviour 
are always rooted in dynamic social relationships. To study these social relationships in 
their historical dynamism, it makes more sense to chart them in relation to concrete 
contexts rather than prejudge them in relation to an a priori theoretical framework. In 
other words, the “history is the theory” (Knafo, 2013). Following this maxim, the 
discussion pertaining to each of the above-itemized four conjunctures tightly intertwines 
theoretical reflection within the historical narrative. Through this recounting of pivotal 
conjunctures, the operation of power amongst historical social actors, can be made 
visible, and thereby accounted for every step of the way. In short, this thesis traces the 
historical social relationships of the German corporate banking sector and its forebears 
in long-term historical perspective.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has surveyed the literature that theoretically considers the 
development of universal banking in Germany. The balance of the analysis delivers us 
with a theoretical puzzle that plays itself out over four different historical conjunctures. 
Beginning with Gerschenkron, the authors studied here all, in one way or another, 
presume what they seek to explain. Gerschenkron assumes the automaticity of universal 
banking’s emergence in relation to backwardness. Tilly forwards an efficiency 
justification for universal banking in terms of asymmetric information, but then simply 
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projects this onto the action of Rhenish financiers. Caroline Fohlin presents some 
important historical inconsistencies in the information theoretic account, namely, the 
later emergence of features like deposit banking, and the dynamic nature of securities 
exchanges. Moreover, she also accurately posits the importance of social, political, legal 
and historical “factors.” Nevertheless, she never spells out why it is that deposit banking 
emerged when it did, or how the aforementioned extra-economic factors concretely 
came to play a role in shaping the institution of universal banking. Indeed, despite the 
overt tribute to factors extra-economical, Fohlin never discusses them, except as 
exterior forces buffeting market dynamics. Consequently, Fohlin presumes—or perhaps 
very strongly implies—that the development of universal banking was ultimately a 
market-led affair. Finally, Richard Deeg has provided a very worthwhile first cut of a 
constructivist account of universal banking’s development; however, because he 
assumes that the hard economic core of this institution more or less matches the 
asymmetric information justification, he fails to provide a constructivist account of the 
emergence of universal banking. Furthermore, his account of the spread of universal 
banking to the savings and cooperative banks is accordingly not “constructivist” 
enough. The competition between the different pillars of German finance that Deeg 
describes helped to shape the ongoing evolution of universal banking in the corporate 
financial sector: universal banking was not yet a discrete coherent institution ready for 
export from the for-profit banking sector until at least the outbreak of World War I. 
Ergo, Deeg also presumes exactly that which he seeks to explain. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Universal Banking avant la lettre, 1750-1844 
The early development of “abstract” universal banking 
 
“The speculative merchant exercises no one regular, established, 
or well-known branch of business. He is a corn merchant this year, 
and a wine merchant the next, and a sugar, tobacco, or tea 
merchant the year after. He enters into every trade when he 
foresees that it is likely to be more than commonly profitable, and 
he quits it when he foresees that its profits are likely to return to 
the level of other trades…men of speculation, whose trade it is not 
to do any [one] thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon 
that account, are often capable of combining together the powers 
of the most distant and dissimilar objects.”31  
 
“Under the term ‘Speculation,’ he understood not risky, but rather 
long-term transactions. ‘Speculative’ was not a synonym for 
irresponsible, hazardous, or likely to generate losses…the negative 
connotation of the term speculation was less common to 
contemporaries [of the early 19th century].”32 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this chapter is the earliest episode in the historical evolution of 
Germany’s universal banking system. It examines the unintended development of 
abstract universal or, “mixed-banking,” by private bankers in the Prussian Rhineland 
during the German Pre-March (Vormärz) era.33 “Mixed-banking” was that successful 
combination of long- and short-term lending that, according to Tilly (1986; idem, 1966) 
would eventually be practiced by the Berliner Großbanken. While recent scholarship 
has demonstrated that “mixed-banking” does not correspond to the concrete practice of 
universal banking as it existed during the Kaiserreich (Fohlin, 2007: 4-5), this earlier, 
more informal combination of commercial credit with issuing services for industrial 
firms nevertheless exhibits powerful continuity with those financial practices of the 
incorporated universal banks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
According to asymmetric information theory, the combination of commercial 
and investment banking was undertaken in the context of railway finance because of the 
economies of scope in information gathering that could be garnered through the 
amalgamation of short and long-term financial services (Tilly,1998; idem, 1995; idem, 
1992). This explanation grounds the mixing of these financial services in their economic 
                                                
31 Adam Smith (1776, quoted in Engel (2013)).  
32 Fritz Seidenzahl (1960: 86-7), describing David Hansemann’s understanding of “speculation” 
viz. financial activities. 
33 This was the period following 1830, but before the outbreak of revolution in March 1848. 
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efficiency; however, in the case of financing for Germany’s “leading sector,” railroads, 
such strictly economic efficiency is likely only to have been gleaned after the fact. 
Railroads as a form of technology in the 1830s were beyond novel. In the 1820s, rail 
lines were used with horse drawn carts (which was apparently faster than horses 
travelling over paved roads), and the idea of steam trains seemed to contemporaries 
beyond bizarre (Brose, 2013; idem, 1993). The promotion of the first railroad 
companies involved not only a largely untested technology, but also persistent failures 
to accurately project costs, and a great deal of skepticism that those costs could ever be 
amortized over normal operation (Brose, 1993: 216-220). In short, investing in railroad 
companies was a highly uncertain prospect during the 1830s. Contemporaries of this 
period did not possess the formalized mathematical or technical knowledge to calculate 
risk as the information theoretic position suggests. Moreover, the untested nature of 
railway technology would have prevented any potential calculation if they had had the 
means to do so! Most problematic of all, however, is that the key mechanism 
highlighted by Tilly and others (inter alia Tilly, 1998; Ziegler, 1997) to have provided 
the informational window on firms’ potential profitability, the current account, could 
not have played the role suggested by the theory. When Rhenish bankers undertook to 
found new railway firms, those firms had no prior or existing current account 
relationship with these banks. Therefore, the promotion of new railway companies, and 
the concomitant issuing of their securities was undertaken blindly. In fewer words, 
information asymmetry puts the cart before the horse, and ergo presumes what it seeks 
to explain. If bankers were as rationally calculating actors as the asymmetric 
information theory presumes, and they did not unduly accept risk, then why did Rhenish 
bankers, in particular from Cologne, engage in securities issuing for a highly untested, 
wildly uncertain endeavour such as the founding of railroad companies? To recount the 
historical development of abstract universal banking in a theoretically sensitive manner, 
requires understanding why it would have made sense for bankers to perform such 
investment banking services ex ante, before they knew that railway investment would 
certainly pay-off. The accepted historical details of railway company foundation suggest 
there is little way to understand such behaviour if we limit our analytical lens to 
economic efficiency. 
The asymmetric information scholarship has also made much of the 
geographical origin of “mixed-banking” in the Prussian Rhineland, yet without 
explaining why it crystalized in this particular region.  Why did it not develop in the 
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more “advanced” financial centre of Frankfurt? Scholars in this tradition have implied 
that the relative density of industry in the hinterland around Cologne helped to support 
the turn towards the most efficient means of industrial financing (e.g. Ziegler, 2005a), 
whereas Frankfurt had already specialized in government finance. The hinterlands 
around Frankfurt, while further from areas such as the Ruhr, nevertheless had industry 
and some bankers in Frankfurt even tentatively began investing in industry in the 1830s 
(e.g. the Bethmanns, see below).  However, the predominant business model for private 
banks in Frankfurt remained that of government issues (Holtfrerich, 1999; North, 1997). 
Why did the bankers of Cologne, and not Frankfurt, pioneer the combination of short 
and long-term financing characteristic of “mixed-banking”?  
In order to fully appreciate how it is that the first “mixed-banks” originated, it is 
necessary to situate the activity of German financiers in their specific historical social 
context. Pivotal for achieving this is dissolving the a priori theoretical assumptions that 
have guided research heretofore. In particular, it is crucial to jettison the assumption that 
an economic institution such as universal banking might only be connected to, or 
influenced by, economic aspects of social action, and not the social world more broadly. 
Doing so, and casting a wider net into the connections of German financiers to their 
surrounding social milieu underscores that the struggle over social change in Germany, 
namely the struggle over the direction, extent and form of industrialization, was the 
defining aspect of financiers’ social purpose. This was not an economic struggle in the 
marketplace conducted by means of price and quantity changes, or reduction in 
transaction costs, but rather a sociopolitical struggle over the future shape of German 
society. Curtailing the search for an efficiency based answer to the question of why 
Rhenish bankers added investment banking to their palette of commercial financial 
services allows us to understand this activity through the category of speculation. 
Indeed, it is the ironic leitmotif of this chapter that by abandoning a devoutly economic 
conception of Rhenish financiers’ railway promotion for a political one, we might be 
better able to see it as an act of speculation. The grave uncertainty, and possibilities for 
failure associated with such speculation can nevertheless only be made sense of in 
relation to the social pay-offs that would be incumbent with long-term industrialization.   
The chapter argues that the social context of the struggle over industrialization 
provides the critical foundation upon which an understanding of the first practices of 
abstract universal banking can be based.  In order to develop this idea, the chapter is 
divided into several sections. Firstly, it outlines the fault lines of transformation in 
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Germany’s social order during the period between roughly 1770 and 1848. This section 
adumbrates generally the change that occurred in the organization of political space, the 
growth of social classes vis-à-vis feudal-corporate estates, and the basic normative 
political programmes that have been the fodder of historiographical literature on the 
period. In the second section, sense is made of the struggle over industrialization itself. 
Finally, the chapter examines the development of financial intermediaries in Cologne 
and Frankfurt.  
 
SOCIAL CHANGE BETWEEN REVOLUTIONS 
To grasp the political activity of financiers and bankers between the French 
revolution and that of 1848, it is necessary to understand something of the changing 
constellation of social forces in German Central Europe during this time. This was a 
period of generalized upheaval and transformation. The “old” Germany of the 18th 
century was composed of myriad different forms of feudal social organization. 
(Vierhaus, 1988). The basis of this order in hierarchical personalized political relations 
of fealty and distinct corporate estates began to come under pressure for reform in the 
1780s (Shilliam, 2009). This pressure became a more persistent one for modernization 
during the Napoleonic period (Wehler, 1987), before reaction firmly set in following the 
Carlsbad decrees. The entirety of the period 1750(89)-1848 can be characterized by an 
uneasy co-existence between the social institutions of the ancien régime in their 
persistence with emerging social praxis and forms centred around abstract authority 
relations (to state and market rather than specific individuals).  This was a Germany of 
growing bureaucracy, “middle class occupations,” market relationships, participatory 
political movements and the impersonal state, with its “subject-citizens.”34 The political 
activity of German social actors can be sketched under three rubrics:  (1) the shifting 
organization of political space in the “Germany” of this time, (2) the changing nature of 
social collectivities, (3) the normative programmes of participatory politics.35,36  
                                                
34  All of these categories—including the term “Germany”—are in some fashion anachronisms. 
Nevertheless, they will help assist propaedeutically to organize and understand the social transformations 
of that time, before we can safely jettison them in order to focus exclusively on financial actors (such 
outsourcing to historians safely allows them to continue their philological debates about the appropriate 
terminology while nevertheless giving us the coordinates and “sense” to let us move forward with our 
understanding of universal banking’s development).  
35 I use the term “participatory” here, rather than “formal” because the kind of politics associated with the 
conservative, liberal and socialist movements of this period were anything but formalized. Widespread 
state censorship, as well as a lack of representative public political institutions meant that much political 
thought and activity occurred “underground” or in informal fashion in salons, reading rooms. This also 
led to a generalized fragmentation of political movements. Consequently, even though it is possible to 
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The organization of Political Space  
In the 18th century, “Germany” was not a solid geopolitical entity, but rather a 
“ramshackle, invertebrate entity…loosely draped over an array of independent highly 
diverse territories” with the name of “the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” 
(Blackbourn, 2003: 10). This was a pastiche collection of 350 different territorial 
sovereignties based on the social order of feudalism. The Napoleonic wars undid this 
motley assortment, by rearranging it into 38 states following the negotiations amongst 
the great European powers at the Congress of Vienna. Only four of these 38 political 
jurisdictions were not dynastic states, while the five largest states were monarchies 
(Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover and Württemberg) and the remainder were some 
form of duchy, grand duchy or principality (Blackbourn, 2003: 72). 
There is some rough agreement amongst historians that the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic era had initiated a period of reform, or “defensive modernization” (Wehler, 
1987; Ullmann, 1987), whereby different groups within the absolutist state recognized 
the need to reorganize the basis of social and political life in order to better survive the 
social, political and economic challenges emanating from France and England (cf. 
Maiwald, 2005 for the latter). These reform activities were numerous. They included the 
reorganization of property relations through the “freeing” of the peasants; the removal 
of guild restrictions on employment; fiscal reform (including the creation of regular 
budgets and the keeping of government books, as well as the issuing of government 
bonds through markets for the first time (Holtfrerich, 1999; Ullmann, 1990); the 
“replacement of the personal debts of princes” with a “funded public debt which was 
based on a central government’s legal obligation to pay” (Tilly, 1999: 135); agitation 
for representative political institutions, as well as the expansion of political institutions 
in the typical areas where states claimed authority—“security of the borders, public 
order, taxes, conscription, compulsory schooling, justice” (Blackbourn, 2003: 74). The 
reorganization of German territory in 1815 created a further reason for the expansion of 
state institutions as territorial gains needed to be incorporated into existing 
                                                                                                                                          
talk about a liberal political movement during this time period, there was little of the coordination one 
would expect from an organized party system (cf. Brose, 1993: 259, 261, 266-9; Sheehan, 1989: 391-450, 
588-603; Ritter, 1985). 
36 While these three distinct themes can all be analytically isolated to make sense of the field of politico-
economic action, their delineation necessitates an overlapping, interwoven and crisscrossing presentation. 
Therefore, while the background history outlined below sequentially follows the enumerated themes, 
important information arises occasionally in different categories than the reader might anticipate. 
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administrative mechanisms (“digested”), which included the creation of new 
institutions, or the coopting of old ones, at the regional, district and municipal levels in 
the aforementioned areas (Blackbourn, 2003: 72, 74). The reorganization of political 
space that occurred between the 18th and early 19th century therefore not only 
exemplified the cementation of more cohesive forms of sovereignty, but was intimately 
bound up with a transformation in the feudal legal order. 
While this “defensive modernization” had been spurred in almost all of the 
German states by a relatively similar position vis-à-vis the threat of revolutionary 
uprising,37 not all German states carried through on reform projects with the same 
methods, nor were they evenly enacted within individual German states (Brose, 2010). 
Prussia’s response to the crisis of revolutionary France began with agricultural reform 
and rationalization of state domains (including for example coal mines in the new Rhine 
Province) (Brose, 1993; Wehler, 1987); however, in order to avoid creating a legislative 
assembly it turned to a fiscal politics of austerity, and a relatively laissez faire industrial 
policy. 38  The southern German state of Baden conducted by contrast a highly 
interventionist industrial policy sponsoring industry and the construction of railways 
(Brose, 2010; Kitchen, 1978). In the area of “financial regulation,” while Prussia was 
busy using its patchwork system of concession and royal privilege to effectively 
prohibit all forms of joint-stock banks in the 1830s (Ilgmann, 2011; Bösselman, 1939), 
King Ludwig of Bavaria founded a royal joint-stock bank with the intent of sponsoring 
industry (M. Pohl, 1982a: 35). Furthermore, the reorganization and amalgamation of 
formerly distinct political territories had consequences for sociopolitical constellations. 
For example, Prussia’s acquisition of the Rhineland province at the Congress of Vienna 
provided it a political territory that had almost entirely dispossessed the aristocracy and 
nobility of its holdings of land over two decades of occupation.39 Furthermore, under 
French occupation, Napoleonic forces had introduced the French Code de Commerce 
into operation in the Rhineland (1807), which remained in force even after its 
integration into Prussia. Consequently, Prussia exhibited an uneven regulatory 
landscape, with French Code de Commerce or “Free Enterprise Law” in the Rhineland, 
and the General States Law in Eastern Prussia. In practice this meant that there was a 
                                                
37 Some aspects of the modernisation and state-building projects had been begun already in the 18th 
century before the threat of revolution from France (see e.g. Ullmann 2005).  
38 Increases in state borrowing could only be approved by an elected legislature following Hardenberg’s 
promulgation of the state indebtedness law in 1820 (Clark, 2007).   
39 96 Percent of land was in the hand of “commoners” when it was ceded to Prussia in 1815 (Brose 2013: 
112). 
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system of concession in place for joint-stock companies in the Rhineland, and a system 
of seigniorial privileges for the establishment of joint-stock companies in the East 
(Ilgmann, 2011: 14). Overall, the diverse nature of territorial size, natural resource 
endowment, domestic industries and their sociopolitical contexts across the German 
states led to a mosaic pattern of economic and business regulation across German 
Central Europe. 
 
Corporate Estates and Classes 
State-building and the institutional augmentations connected with the 
reorganization of territorial governance had significant consequences for the social 
power of different classes. Under the society of corporate orders that had existed prior 
to Napoleon’s demolition of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, social and political 
power had been organized through chains of personal authority and fealty running 
hierarchically from monarchs and princes, through the nobility and clergy down to 
craftsmen and peasants. According to the letter, this was an institutionally rigid social 
order, where distinct laws existed for different corporate estates that bestowed the rights 
and obligations of those different corporate orders. In practice there were significant 
differences in the balance of social power between the different corporate orders across 
the German lands.40 Most significantly for our purposes here is to note the hierarchical, 
and differentiated form of legal identity for different persons and groups under the 
ancien régime, of which the aristocracy and nobility were the primary legal (and for the 
most part, material) beneficiaries.  
The thirty-four ruling families of the aristocracy—e.g. the Habsburgs, 
Hohenzollerns, and Wittelsbachs—were left largely unharmed in their direct standing 
by the state’s growth (Brose, 2013: 111), and likely benefited from the expansion of 
administrative capabilities. The eighty former ruling families (Standesherren) of the 
higher nobility—e.g. Hohenlohes and Sayn-Wittgensteins—that had their right to rule 
                                                
40 The most remarked upon distinction was between forms of sociopolitical power in lands West and East 
of the Elbe: West of the Elbe, and in Southern Germany are typically referred to as areas of 
Grundherrschaft, and East of the Elbe as Gutsherrschaft. In the former, peasant labour duties had largely 
been commuted to payment in kind, whereas these persisted in the latter. The thoroughgoing direct 
control over peasant production in areas of Gutsherrschaft has been used to explain a myriad of different 
sociological outcomes, but it is important not to take these forms of authority entirely at face value. As 
Blackbourn notes, “domination and subordination” in areas to the East of the Elbe were challenged 
increasingly by revolt and litigation as early as the late 18th century (Blackbourn 2003: ch. 1). That is to 
say, even within this larger division of social property relations there were important regional settlements 
of corporate and class power that institutionalized different dynamics of socioeconomic development and 
transformation. 
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removed pursuant to the territorial reorganization of the Congress of Vienna had been 
well compensated by extensive rights and privileges and seemed similarly entrenched in 
their material and social power during the restoration and Vormärz periods (excepting 
that this was not the case in areas such as the Rhineland, see above).  The lower nobility 
by contrast had been more forcibly extricated from their former corporate privileges. 
Many lost landownership owing to territorial reorganization in 1815, as well as the 
“freer” economic competition provided by the reforms that were being extended during 
the period. This process helped to pressure many lesser noble families to seek security 
for the status of their families in civil service—thereby further adding to the ranks of the 
bureaucracy as well as in this case the army (Brose, 2013: 113).  
The state’s expanding demands helped to swell the ranks of the bureaucracy 
surrounding German princes, first in the late 18th century, and then increasingly with the 
ever growing need for administrative machinery in the post-Napoleonic period. 
Whereas the society of orders had been comprised essentially of aristocrats, nobles, 
clergy, burghers, craftsmen, and peasants, the societies of restoration Germany saw the 
growth of a new social position in the group of salaried state officials. Instead of 
personal bonds of fealty to a specific prince, the bureaucrat’s loyalty was primarily to 
the state in the abstract. Other state regulated professions also expanded during this 
period—university professors, school teachers, doctors, lawyers—which helped to fill 
out the ranks of a burgeoning “middle class” across the Germanies of the early 19th 
century.  
Concomitant with the expansion of the state, was also the growth of “market” 
related activity41 leading to a numerical increase in that class of society which we can 
profitably understand as “bourgeois” (and thereby adding further to that nebulous 
category of “middle class”). The growth of rural industry in the form of the “putting-
out” system, the reinvigoration of trade at the end of the continental blockade, the 
auction of ecclesiastical lands during the occupation, the increase in financial 
transactions from state loan issuing all helped to increase the number of people engaged 
in business: merchants, factory owners, bankers and financiers. 
Related to this process was also the growth and transformation of the lower 
corporate orders, brought on by the complex of state-building, “market-oriented” 
                                                
41 The “market” in the abstract is a highly problematic category.  I employ the term “market-oriented” 
here to emphasize the growth of a social group whose primary occupation and regularized, habitual and 
materially directed activities and social interactions occurred in relation to specific concrete 
marketplaces, that were the focal points of larger networks of money or material exchange transactions. 
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activity, and crucially the emancipation of the peasantry (Bauernbefreiung). Peasant 
emancipation, while irregularly executed and implemented across the Germanies, 
helped to increase the number of those available for the “putting-out” system, menial 
labour, as well as agrarian wage- and factory work. The reason for this is that 
emancipation provided less obvious “freedom” than it implied. Feudal privileges like 
the right to hunting remained, while peasants were forced to reimburse their lords for 
subsequent lost dues.42 In some cases, the aims of reforms careened off of the contesting 
social force of the nobility: e.g. in the 1820s laws to enclose and divide common lands 
amongst peasants were manipulated such that the Junkers appropriated 80% of such 
lands in areas East of the Elbe (Brose, 2013: 113).43 Western areas of Germany had 
often commuted feudal dues from personal labour services to monetary compensation 
while Eastern ones had maintained serfdom. The timing of emancipation meant that the 
lords were on the defensive in the former areas, and peasants often came out better in 
the balance of sociopolitical power with the ability to purchase their plots. In East 
Elbian Germany where effective serfdom was still in place until the emancipation, 
peasants with small plots of land were often unable to satisfy the financial requirements 
to purchase their land. Moreover, peasants without possession of their own draught 
animals were also legally prohibited from owning their land. Consequently, many were 
reduced to dependency on the large latifundia of Junker estates through emancipation. 
The process of emancipation helped bring about a commercialization of agricultural 
production, land valuation and pulled the Eastern nobility further into the grips of 
market relationships for their material needs. Western peasants produced specialized 
goods for market like wine and flax. Conversely, the Eastern Junker nobility ruled over 
large estates of rye monoculture for export. Against the background of a “demographic 
explosion” (Blackbourn, 2003: pp. 79-80; Wehler, 1987: 8-25), this helped to swell the 
ranks of both the urban and agrarian underclass.  
The effects of these changes were not limited to this group of direct producers, 
but also impinged on the material well-being and life prospects of skilled craftsmen. 
Under the ancien régime entry to handicraft trade production had been strictly regulated 
by the guilds. Beginning in the 1790s when the Rhineland guilds were abolished by the 
                                                
42 This is a bit like being freed from slavery only to have a financial debt to one’s former master for the 
sum of lost revenues.  
43 The unevenness of the process would most likely require an entire monograph, but suffice it to say that 
there were important differences within the Eastern Germanies as well: Junkers in East Prussia managed 
to guard very closely their privileges of police powers and tax exemptions; the Saxon nobility was less 
successful, and laws prohibited them from exploiting their peasants (Brose, 2013). 
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French occupational authorities, many further German states and cities followed suit 
and removed guild restrictions to entry of artisanal professions. The elimination of guild 
controls and their quasi ejection from special legal privileges under corporate society in 
connection with the growth of a new labouring poor helped to flood the ranks of those 
in skilled labour. This began to create something of a crisis however, as it strained the 
ability of journeymen to advance to masters, and many master craftsmen themselves 
were left effectively as jobbers.44 
 
Participatory, party and normative political trends 
 The German political field can loosely be broken down into a spectrum 
adumbrated by party positions not unfamiliar to contemporary readers: this extends on 
the “right” side from conservative, through liberal, to the “left” of radical democrats and 
socialists. The aim of conservatives was a mix of goals—ideological, political and 
material—related to perpetuating aspects of the feudal order. In stylized terms, that is to 
say the conservation of traditional, agrarian, feudal society and its commensurate 
norms, ideals, and unequal distribution of power and wealth skewed in favour of the 
aristocracy. The left-most end of the political spectrum was composed of those aiming 
for a radical alteration of German society, economy and polity. It should be noted that 
while liberal ideas began to be introduced already in the 18th century, it was not until the 
restoration period that a “liberal movement” began to grow. The “liberal movement” 
was the most important bearer of this political cause, even though to give it the cohesion 
implied by the term movement depicts a group with more unity than existed historically. 
This “radical” left aimed, in a stylized sense again of course, for a more democratic 
organization of society, along with greater autonomy in the ability of all sections of 
society to dispose of private property (Ritter, 1985). 
The synoptic breakdown of the sociopolitical normative goals of different 
sections of German society can only help to orient us in a very general sense to the 
overarching conflict of the political imaginary during this period. The way in which 
different fractions of these normative groupings acted in particular situations was given 
often by the specificity of socioeconomic interests of small groups within their wider 
political affiliation. For example, it is not unsurprising that monarchs and princes across 
German central Europe were the physical embodiments of the conservative movement. 
                                                
44 In Berlin almost 80% of masters did not earn enough income in order to pay taxes, and figures were 
similarly grim for those of Cologne (Brose, 2013: 115; Blackbourn, 2003).  
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Nevertheless, it was members of the nobility, who had understood the end of the Holy 
Roman Empire and defeat at the hands of the French levée en masse as a crisis of the 
Absolutist State. The reforms initiated in the early 19th century at the hands of 
bureaucrats like Stein and Hardenberg, setting in motion the end of serfdom and 
liberalizations for trade and occupations, had begun at the hands of state officials 
nominally concerned with the preservation of the Prussian state.  Similarly, many 
historians have labelled the failure of Germany “to turn at its revolution” as a problem 
of the bourgeoisie (or in other terms liberal businessmen) (e.g. Taylor, 1988 [1945]): 
that is to say, that the social forces that ultimately prohibited a further transfer of social 
power from agrarian conservatives towards liberally oriented merchants, bankers, and 
industrialists was that self-same group. As we will see below, sections of the “liberal 
movement” were keen to harness the general social power of the working and 
impoverished masses, but also deathly afraid that this force might become un-bottled 
and undo any further entrenchment of an industrial order. In any event, the general clash 
of social imaginaries about the future of German society was driven much by the axis 
between those social forces aiming to consolidate and retrench the powers of the feudal 
aristocracy, and those intent on deepening and expanding the transformation in the 
direction of industrial-capitalism. 
  
THE STRUGGLE OVER INDUSTRIALIZATION 
The struggle over industrialization was a conflict over the future shape of 
German society that began following the French Revolution. This is a somewhat 
purposefully ethereal way of amalgamating the different and often autonomous threads 
of social change underway in early 19th century German Central Europe described 
above. There are numerous other monikers for the kind of social change that was afoot 
during this period: modernisation (Wehler, 1987; Rostow, 1960), bourgeois revolution 
(Moors, 1991; Blackbourn and Eley, 1984) or a transition to capitalism (Byres, 1996) to 
name but several. Indeed, from an epochal-analytical perspective, discussing a transition 
to capitalism posits certain benefits when moving temporally past mid-century or 
analytically beyond the discussions of contemporaries; however, capitalism was not a 
term or concept used in the prevailing discussions in the early 19th century, and many 
aspects of state-formation and territoriality as well as of material reproduction can be 
intellectually disaggregated from capitalism conceptually in this era (cf. Lacher, 
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2006).45 The concept of capitalism would become ever more prevalent in the battle over 
the future direction of German social change, especially through the aegis of 
associations like the Verein für Sozialpolitik that arose during the “Great Depression” of 
the later 19th century (cf. Krüger, 1983; Barkin, 1970). Nevertheless, in the first half the 
19th century contemporaries were all acutely aware of the dramatic societal changes 
occurring around them  (Lehmbruch, 2001: 50), and for the most part, these changes 
were made sense of by refracting them through concepts of, and discussion about, 
“industrialization” (rather than modernisation, bourgeois revolution, or a transition to 
capitalism) (Maiwald, 2005). It bears stressing that this is not the 21st century scholarly 
appreciation of industrialization, as a definite theoretical concept for the analysis of 
history (cf. "molek, 2013). Rather, this was an amorphous, discontinuous and 
unsystematised appreciation of the appearance of novel technologies (steam engines, 
smelting, machines more generally), innovations in the organization of work (factory 
work, specialisation of tasks, wage-work), alterations to the rhythms of daily life, and 
transformations in geopolitical challenges (emanating from France and England) to 
name but a few. The concept of industrialization was also very precisely mobilised in 
relation to specific topical issues such as, inter alia, the construction of railroads, the 
introduction of new legal forms like limited liability companies, trade tariffs, and 
“economic” regulation. Consequently, the phrase “struggle over industrialization” is 
used here as a placeholder for a more generalised association between competing forces 
over social change in German Central Europe in the early 19th century. It does not rule 
out the analytical tracing of connections between historical developments and capitalist 
dynamics, or “modernisation.”46 Indeed, industrialization touched upon sociotechnical 
developments, political organization, social order and inequality, as well as economic 
issues (of acquisition, production, labour, etc understood in the terms of neoclassical 
parlance). Its analytical traction comes from the manner in which it stretches across the 
cleavages of different intellectual disciplines, or “spheres” and “domains” of social 
reality, and connected disparate concrete topical social struggles by being the referent or 
(indirect) object of practical activity. The potential to make connections between 
historical developments, e.g. financial transformation, and “the struggle over 
                                                
45 This is of course dependent on one’s understanding of capitalism (cf. Wood, 2002). 
46 And in principle, it also does not rule out connections with bourgeois revolution, although this 
concept seems stretched beyond repair. 
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industrialization” therefore affords a manner in which to decode the sociopolitical 
purpose of historical agency.47 
The different actors and collectivities in early 19th century German Central 
Europe—expressed by different classes, corporate estates, businessmen, sectoral interest 
groups—as well as state agencies, ministries, and bureaucratic coalitions held 
potentially different and competing conceptualisations about the desirability, direction, 
extent and form of industrialization. For example, the early “progressive” reformers in 
the Prussian state were intent on promoting an “aesthetic” rural industrialization, 
wherein “factory” was understood as a workshop of often not more than 10 or 20 people 
(in comparison to the large factories of 500 people or more later in the century (cf. 
Kocka und Siegrist, 1979). Bureaucrats like Christian Peter Wilhelm Beuth, the director 
of the Business Department in Prussia (1830-1845), battled doggedly against other anti-
industrial factions within the Prussian state in order to implement “industrial” reforms. 
He established Berlin’s Technical College as an attempt to provide training for 
entrepreneurs, gave subsidies for manufactories and aimed to assist in the early 
surveying and development of railroads. However, what Beuth understood by 
industrialization—aesthetically well situated small factories in rural milieus, serviced by 
horse-drawn rail carts—was vastly different than that of Prussian businessmen. The 
Rhenish businessman Friedrich Harkort for example envisioned a future industrial 
society where “smoking colossuses,” steam engines, crisscrossed and interlinked myriad 
conurbations  (Brose, 1993: 210). Their mutually exclusive conceptualisations of 
industrialization brought them into conflict over their object of social action, but also 
brought their autonomous activities (e.g. routine ministerial work versus quotidian 
business transactions) in relation to each other as they related to these sites of dispute.  
The triangular relationship between “different citadels of power” within the state 
(Brose, 1993) and between the state and market oriented classes (Diefendorf, 1980), 
highlights a primarily elite struggle. Working people and the lower orders of corporate 
society can also be incorporated into this intellectual scheme, even though they 
frequently did not often articulate, nor have the means to articulate, a conception of 
industrialization: agricultural day labourers who moved to urban areas in search of wage 
work in factories, peasants who had been freed under the agricultural reforms, or 
                                                
47 This is potential because not all social action was concerned with this struggle. This is the 
case in two ways For example, the activity of early entrepreneurs was in many ways very 
scientifically focused (cf. Kocka, 1975).   
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journeymen members of guilds whose formal education in trades put them at odds with 
the dreary division of labour in factories. In this way, it is clear that the material and 
socio-discursive struggles over industrialization applied equally to non-elite members of 
society, even if they couldn’t articulate it themselves. 
The struggle over industrialization provides us with the central fault line against 
which politics was fought during the early 19th century.  Older historiographical 
literature highlighted the clash between a backward agrarian elite—the Prussian 
Junkers, whose control over the German state was near absolute—and a modernizing 
bourgeoisie intent on dismantling feudal institutions (often for material benefit) (cf. 
inter alia Tilly, 1966; Eichholtz, 1962; Veblen, 1915). In this view industrialization was 
impeded by conservative anti-industrial forces, and forwarded by the positive efforts of 
an ascending bourgeoisie.48 The ideal-typical distinction between a modernizing class 
promoting social change and a conservative one attempting to preserve the status quo 
ante no longer seems accurate in light of the most recent historical scholarship (Brophy, 
2011). The state, and in particular the bureaucracy, was not monolithic in its 
sociopolitical interests, but composed of different factions. These were played out 
through different ministerial portfolios. Moreover, not all businessmen were entirely in 
favour of industrialization. There was a widespread public discussion about the merits 
of industrialization, and in particular about the threat to order presented by the rise of an 
urban underclass (Shilliam, 2009; Maiwald, 2005). Nevertheless, the key fault line 
highlighted by this view captures something important: “German” society was generally 
animated by an intensifying struggle over the shape of industrialization from 1789-
1848. The principal axis of conflict in this struggle was between those intent on 
establishing an industrial social order and those aiming to slow, or harness, ongoing 
social change to defend specific desired elements of the feudal social order. That is to 
say, it is now more widely recognized that conservatives aimed to make the most of the 
advancing forces of industry, e.g. by mechanizing agricultural production or taxing new 
businesses (cf. Torp, 2011).  
 
Industrialization is often cast as the outcome of a disembodied economic process 
carried out by structural forces of a spatially separate “economy.” This risks denuding 
the shape of industrialization processes of the historical agency that shaped their 
specific forms. Closer examination of the German case, for example, reveals that 
                                                
48 Compare the discussion in Brophy (1996: 1-22), Brose (1993: 1-8, 16-25, 250-265) 
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industrialization was charged with sociopolitical significance. That is to say, there were 
political stakes in the manner in which changes toward industrialization were enacted, 
and shifting, but nonetheless clearly competing coalitions of social collectivities 
attempting to advance or hinder different visions of industrial social change. These 
competing groups in the industrialization process conflicted over the nature of property 
forms, the extent of market dependence, the specific manner that innovative technology 
could be socially employed, the fashion in which institutional change could be properly 
introduced to a predominantly agrarian, rural society. The lack of clear division between 
“economic” and “political” under the feudal order helped to spread the potential 
transformative impacts of this social change unevenly across these “social spheres” (the 
latter understood analytically, rather than ontologically). The struggle over 
industrialization similarly exhibited no clear partition between these realms. Ergo, to 
fully appreciate the historical agency of contemporaries, no less for businessmen and 
financiers, it is necessary to break down the fortifications that have been erected for 21st 
century analysts to isolate behaviour that is “economic” from that which is “political.”  
The action of financiers in the early 19th century Rhineland, and German Central 
Europe more generally, was informed simultaneously by economic and political 
concerns. This was chiefly because in the course of carrying out financial business 
financiers in early 19th century Germany were also engaged in the struggle over the pace 
and direction of industrialization. Attempts to accumulate were not driven solely by 
chrematistic accumulative desires, but also by the aim to engender political reform and 
social change. Therefore the various activities of German bankers need to be understood 
in relation to a more basic associational logic that must be connected with this social 
environment in the midst of tumultuous change and articulated in terms of power. 
 
ORIGINS OF ABSTRACT UNIVERSAL BANKING 
 The financial institutions existent in German Central Europe at the beginning of 
the 19th century were predominantly private banking houses. These private bankers 
were organically tied in their financial practices to the sociopolitical orders that existed 
prior to industrialization: namely, that of feudalism. There were a minority of other 
financial institutions, many of which were inspired by the mercantilist traditions of the 
18th century. For example the Prussian Seehandlung, whose literally translated name 
means “overseas trading corporation” betrays its origins as an arm of government 
sponsored attempts to accumulate revenue for state-building. Similarly, there were some 
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mortgage banks developed in order to provide credit to aristocratic forces, the Prussian 
Landschaften, as well as a handful of Sparkassen, savings banks, established as quasi-
alms houses in order to provide assistance to the rural underclasses. Similarly few were 
the number of securities exchanges. A “modern” exchange can be dated to roughly 1800 
in Frankfurt (Ullmann, 1990). A lively exchange began to develop in Berlin as the 
Prussian state specifically attempted to sponsor a market for its debt during the 
Napoleonic wars (Spangenthal, 1903). This section compares the development of 
financial institutions in Frankfurt and Cologne during early industrialization. These two 
financial centres have been chosen because they represent financial institutions driven 
by competing social purposes in the struggle over industrialization. Frankfurt was the 
premiere centre for financing absolutist German states, while Cologne was at the heart 
of proto-industry on the Rhine. The comparative history here is presented 
propaedeutically, describing important background information for later chapters. 
Nevertheless, it also presents a different narrative for the establishment of abstract 
universal banking in Rhenish private banks, thereby highlighting the role of social 
struggle in the generation of the first necessary conditions for concrete universal 
banking to arise during the Kaiserreich. 
 
Frankfurt: pre-eminent financial centre of the German ancienne régime 
The development of Frankfurt as a financial centre, has roots that can be traced back 
almost 1000 years. The argument for locating this development so far in the distant past 
relates to the particular legal-political role that Frankfurt occupied in the Holy Roman 
Empire. Initially singled out as the location for the crowning of emperors, Frankfurt 
would develop special trade privileges as a result, making it a favourable location for 
the eastward extension of the Champagne fairs. This special political privilege was 
bolstered by the city’s position at the confluence of the great overland trade-routes of 
Central Europe. During the early Modern period, Frankfurt’s prominence as a location 
was largely determined by its role as a forwarding and distribution entrepôt, the position 
of which it had developed because of its special status in the Reich guaranteeing its 
freedom of trade (Holtfrerich, 1999: 90), before becoming a financial centre in the 19th 
century (Heyn, 1981). While the French revolution would incorporate Frankfurt into the 
Confederation of the Rhine from 1804 until 1815, Frankfurt would regain its privileges 
as a free city under the Congress system until 1866.  
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Throughout this period, the wealth and status of Frankfurt was attained through 
trade. Initially as a location for the staging of fairs that also served as an opportunity for 
the settlement of debts (and therefore as a rudimentary clearing centre). Subsequently, 
during the early modern period, Frankfurt’s position was bolstered as an essentially 
trade and distribution centre. In the 19th century Frankfurt would begin to specialize in 
financial transactions that would assist in bringing an international reputation to families 
like the Rothschilds, and making Frankfurt the location for the issuance of government 
debt. Throughout the entirety of the period, however, only slightly less so in the 19th 
century, finance remained essentially an accompaniment to mercantile activity.  
Holtfrerich (1999) argues that Frankfurt would begin already in the 18th century to 
differentiate finance from the other business activities of which it was an adjunct. 
Important mercantile firms like Metzler began to subdivide their banking business from 
mercantile concerns, by establishing separate distribution and banking firms already in 
the 1760s (Holtfrerich, 1999: 93, 95). Contrary to this position, Udo Heyn (1981) argues 
that during the early industrialization period, even the most powerful of the Frankfurt 
bankers were slow to give up their role in mercantile activities. In 1810, the Rothschilds 
(who were already on their way to “celebrity status” in 1815 within the international 
financial world) were “still storekeepers in the city,” with commodity trade as their 
principal capital source and listing, in their partnership contract, “current trading 
capital” (set at f1. 800,000) as consisting of “goods, accounts receiveable, mortgages, 
bills of exchange, bonds or cash”’ (Heyn 1981: 159).  Moreover, the Bethmann’s, 
Frankfurt’s number two banker, “though earlier in finance, left trade even later; in fact, 
the share of commodities in the Bethmann’s net assets…in 1833…generated as much as 
four to five per cent of their gross profits” (ibid: 159).  
The early development of a securities market, already in existence by the middle of 
the 17th century, assisted in stimulating demand for financial services. The initial 
activity of this security market was made possible by the acceptance of endorsements on 
bills of exchange. This practice, which allowed the carrier of the bill of exchange to sign 
his name on its back and thereby transfer it to another party allowed the initial holder of 
the bill to convert it into a means of payment. The bill was a means to facilitate trade 
that allowed a payee in one area to transfer funds to another, usually with a rate of 
interest included. With the development of an active market for bills of exchange 
already in the late 17th century (Kaufhold, 1994), Frankfurt merchants had ready access 
to liquidity in the event that they should need it.   
 81 
With the importation from the Netherlands of partible obligations by the Bethmann 
firm in the 1780s, the Frankfurt Bourse set in train a new path for the development of 
finance in the city. Partial obligations were particularly well suited to issuing 
unprecedentedly large loans. In this epoch, the needs of state finance were the principal 
agents seeking creditors that might be able to employ such a function, and the 
Bethmann’s issued their first such loan of partial obligations to the absolutist state in 
Vienna. The Dutch, who were the Masters of international finance in this era, had 
dominated the international market for state debt in the 18th century. Amsterdam 
continued to act as a centre for financing state loans right up until it was occupied by 
French armies in early 1794 (Kaufhold, 1994: 106). With the need to prepare for war in 
the face of the advancing levée en masse, the demand for state loans remained high, but 
their supply was now limited to Frankfurt, which became the chief centre for the issue 
of state-loans from that point until later in the 19th century (Holtfrerich, 1999; Gömmel, 
1992).  
While the primary market for state-loans remained a relatively small percentage of 
their overall business activity, they accounted for one of the most profitable single 
activities of Frankfurt bankers. That being said, the issue and underwriting of state 
bonds in the primary market could only ever provide transitory gains for banks through 
the commission fees, any difference between the par and issue price, as well as arbitrage 
between different markets.49 Once the securities were off the balance sheet, government 
debt was also a profitable business in the secondary market. Indeed, while the absolute 
level of profits from individual trades in the secondary market were smaller than 
underwriting and issuing, the high-level of turnover from brokerage commissions and 
speculation provided the regular income for Frankfurt bankers (Heyn, 1981: 300ff). The 
centrality of the government loan business consequently tied the private bankers of 
Frankfurt to social and political purpose of state in this period.  
Even though some Frankfurt bankers like Gebrueder Bethmann would make moves 
towards financing industrial companies between 1815-1850, these would be 
impermanent stratagems—exceptions that proved the rule. In the case of Bethmann in 
particular, their engagement in industrial promotions and foundations was an explicit 
reaction to their short-term inability to participate in the government securities market 
                                                
49 The arbitrage trading of government securities relied on large issues of government bonds that 
were issued simultaneously in different securities markets across Europe. The Rothschild family 
was one of the few firms that could take advantage of this particular measure of speculation 
with connections in multiple different European cities.  
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(Heyn, 1981). In 1808 the firm had invested heavily in real-estate in order to rebuild the 
city after the razing of its walls from French Revolutionary troops. The Bethmanns 
found themselves overextended during the 1810s, without the funds to float further 
government securities until the mid 1820s. This turn of events allowed the Rothschilds 
to leapfrog into the first position for floating government securities, and cut the 
Bethmanns largely out of this market. When the Bethmanns’ capital position had 
recovered in 1825 they attempted to break into the flotation of industrial equity 
believing that it was potentially more liquid than real estate because of their proximity 
to the Frankurt Bourse. Consequently, they issued securities for a steamship company 
on the Rhine, and railways in the area of Frankfurt. Following poor returns and inability 
to generate enough interest on the Frankfurt bourse they eventually returned to funding 
government paper.  
The development of Frankfurt as a financial centre in Germany demonstrates that 
financial practices were at first organically integrated with mercantile activities. In the 
pre-industrial period, commerce itself was driven by the exigencies of the feudal order, 
and thereby also steered financial dynamics and development. The development of an 
active market for government paper tied the social purpose of Frankfurt private bankers 
to the existing political order. 
 
Cologne: centre of Rhenish finance 
Similar to Frankfurt, the financial intermediaries of the Rhineland, and Cologne in 
particular, in the early 19th century were not yet really “bankers” in the sense of an 
institution specialized in the money business. Before the 1820s, most if not all of the 
firms that participated in financial activities were also involved in mercantile, as well as 
“proto-industrial” business activities:  long-distance freight shipping, wholesale trade, 
consignments and in some cases also simple forms of manufacture under the “putting-
out” system (Born, 1983; H. Pohl, 1982; M. Pohl, 1986a; Tilly, 1966: Chapter 3). These 
multi-purpose mercantile-entrepreneurial houses had origins in the 18th century, when 
they began advancing credit to their clients as a side-aspect of their shipping and 
consignment business. There was a concentration of such enterprises in Cologne in 
particular because of its special legal privileges as a transit and distribution point along 
the Rhine, as well as its position as a free city within the Holy Roman Empire 
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(Diefendorf, 1980).50 Geographical and legal-political reasons therefore gave the city of 
Cologne a similar, though less prominent, position within the Holy Roman Empire to 
Frankfurt during the early modern period. The more successful of these early mercantile 
enterprises began to specialize strictly in the money business (Ziegler, 2009: 161; 
Treue, 1980: 94). 
Numerically fewer in the Rhineland were the former “court bankers” (Hoffaktoren 
sometimes Hofjuden).51  The court bankers, who were mostly of Jewish religious 
descent, were charged with providing German Princes the furnishings, food, as well as 
general material trappings and supplies for courtly life. The need to often advance the 
cost of these goods, as well as the necessity of organizing their physical delivery to the 
court itself meant that the court factors straddled a similar boundary between financial 
and commercial activities as the other gentile merchant houses.  
In both of these cases, the business of financing, did not begin as a particularly 
profitable activity, which was demonstrated for the merchants by their maintenance of 
primary lines of business in shipping, consignment and in some cases industrial 
activities. Moreover, both had relatively restricted spaces of social mobility in the 
institutional and religious order of the old regime. The court factors in particular often 
looked to the business of royal supply as one of the few means of social advancement 
for religious minorities like themselves who might be ennobled for their services. What 
commission charges they could garner from distribution and credit activities were a 
meagre source of profit in comparison to what they would become in post-Napoleonic 
Europe. The pursuit and engagement in these financial practices was ultimately for 
purposes related to their own intra-class development and power vis-à-vis those better 
positioned in the rigid religious and institutional order of the Holy Roman Empire. 
The Eastward movement of the French Revolution’s consequences ended the basis 
of the Court Factors’ existence as servants to the German Princes. In the case of the 
most prominent financier to emerge from a background as a court factor, Salomon 
Oppenheim junior, this meant a change in city (Bonn to Cologne) as well as an 
expansion of his business into a similar territory as that of the gentile merchant houses 
                                                
50 The Rhine became ever more narrow and rapid upriver. Consequently, colonial and long-
distance trade goods needed to be withdrawn from ships at some point along their progress up 
the river. Goods on their way to central Europe were therefore off-loaded and warehoused at 
either Cologne or Mainz. 
51 The development of private banking through former “court bankers” was the predominant 
route in Southern Germany, especially in Bavaria (H. Pohl, 1982). 
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(Stürmer et al., 1994: 24ff.). The French occupation of the Rhine also provided the basis 
for the augmentation of capital reserves for the other major Cologne banking firms 
through real-estate speculation. This was only a temporary avenue of business (with the 
exception of Schaaffhausen which continued real-estate speculation up until its liquidity 
crisis in 1848). Beginning in the 1820s, Oppenheim as well as the other merchant 
financiers of the Rhineland had more or less begun to specialize strictly in financial 
activities. This process would be relatively complete for the six banking firms of 
Cologne by the 1830s.52 In moving towards specializing in finance, these banks 
mobilized the capital they had accumulated from multiple different avenues of non-
financial business into reserves for providing short-term loans. 
What is key to stress, is that while this group engaged more and more only in 
banking and financial functions, they did not initially conceive of themselves, nor did 
their contemporaries, as “banks.” Municipal records dating back to 1792 refer to 
Herstatt as a “banquier,” and documents from the Revolutionary period apply the same 
term to Oppenheim (Steimel, 1957: 74; Stürmer et al., 1994: 43). Yet, Herstatt 
continued to operate a silk and florette manufactory until the last weaving chairs were 
shut down in 1812, while Oppenheim continued to be involved in the procurement of 
goods on a mercantile basis that accorded him his other most frequent title of 
“négoçiant” during the revolutionary period. While they occupied a considerable part of 
their time with providing credit, they were not prohibited from starting new businesses, 
investing in real-estate, engaging in government securities lending, 53  founding 
newspapers, and generally becoming imbricated in almost every opportunity for 
speculative profit regardless of business sector.54  
Distinctive of the private bankers in the Rhineland by the 1820s, was their 
essentially “commercial banking” character. Despite speculating on numerous different 
fields of business activity, they principally engaged in short-term loans. Their chief 
                                                
52 Krüger (1925) posits that 9 banking firms were listed for 1835, of which 6 were worth 
mentioning, and four constituted the upper strata of the Cologne financial elite: JD Herstatt, JH 
Stein, Abraham Schaaffhausen and Sal. Oppenheim jun. & Cie were the top four, all with roots 
in the 18th century. The top six were rounded out by A & L Camphause and Seydlitz & Merkens 
53 This was given up before the 1830s. It is notable that Oppenheim however arranged to be 
involved in the transfer of reparations from France to Prussia shortly after 1815. While the 
Prussian state had envisioned large cargoes of specie being transferred from France to Berlin, 
they were furious to learn that Oppenheim had arranged the transfer as bills of exchange. 
Moreover, because of the amount of time that Oppenheim had arranged in order to execute the 
transfer, he was able to speculate on the different values of the transaction between its point of 
origin and delivery.  
54 Recall here Adam Smith’s quote from the beginning of the chapter. 
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financial instrument for such loans was the current account advance. There exist 
significant lacunae of primary evidence in relation to this period of time, but there are 
some details that are relatively widely accepted. In principle, current account advances 
consisted of loans made for a short period of time: 2 to 3 months––in exceptional cases, 
6 months, but no longer (Henning, 1980: 67). Loans were made at a “usual” or 
“traditional” rate of 5 or 6%, with most loans consisting of means of payment provided 
as an overdraft on the borrowers account (Perlitz, 1976: 148; Tilly, 1966: 83). In some 
exceptional cases, the rate of interest would be reduced to 4% for special clients, but 
this was rare (Krüger, 1925: 112-3). The interest rates charged on loans were not 
allowed to surpass the 6% mark because of the legal prohibition on usury. Remarkably, 
they did not fluctuate downward in connection with market rates. Even so, the interest 
rate was not what made banking a worthwhile economic pursuit. The profitability of the 
current account business arose from the commissions that the bankers charged for each 
turn-over of the current account overdraft. That is to say, every time the overdraft limit 
was reached and repaid, bankers would reckon their commission charges (Tilly, 1966: 
88 ff.). In many cases, the original account agreements would be figured with a certain 
number of turn-over minima to ensure profitability for the bankers.  The more often a 
loan was taken out and consequently repaid, the more profitable the account would be 
for the banker.  
The Cologne bankers also operated as the primary intermediaries for liquidity and 
payments in the Rhineland through their dealing in bills of exchange. While a Bourse 
had been founded in Cologne as early as the 17th century, the level of activity there 
remained negligible even towards the end of the 19th century. Conversely to Frankfurt, 
which had already developed an active secondary market for bills of exchange by the 
end of the 17th century, Cologne channelled all of its dealings in bills of exchange 
directly through its private banks (Kaufhold, 1994). The private bankers of Cologne in 
this period were the first port-of-call for discounting services, and because of this may 
have inhibited the growth of an active securities market (Tilly, 1966).  
As mentioned above and similar to the French case, Cologne bankers had operated, 
owned and founded early industrial establishments throughout the Rhineland. Cologne 
bankers were involved in this regard in the mining, metallurgical and textile industries 
along the Rhine (Krüger, 1925). There is evidence that these bankers had experience 
with government securities from as early as the Revolutionary period, but then turned 
away from this in the pursuit of financing trade and industry. The first activity in 
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relation to equity and investment began in the 1820s with participation in steamship 
companies along the Rhine as well as with joint-stock insurance companies (Krüger, 
1925; Stürmer et al., 1994). The Cologne banking houses were active participants in the 
industrialization of the Rhineland, and identified their sociopolitical interests with its 
continuation (Ziegler, 1997). 
Tilly argues that beginning in the 1830s the growing demands of capital for 
industry, in particular from railway companies, provided the impetus for Cologne 
bankers to begin floating securities on behalf of these companies in order to finance 
their large requirements for investment (Tilly, 1998; idem, 1994; idem, 1989). Despite 
the involvement of Cologne bankers in many different fields of business, their 
investments had always been short-term. Where they had had negative experiences, for 
example in relation to government securities, they turned away from this business 
branch. Why would a group of dedicated and rational financiers undertake the financing 
of railway companies that could represent their potential financial demise? Mainstream 
economic theory suggests that investing in railroad companies would not have occurred 
because financiers would not have had full insight into the business plans and intent of 
railroad company operators. Without knowing more about the potential of railroad 
companies—and railroad companies represented the epitome of untried and untested 
technology in the 1820s and 1830s, failing frequently—investment in these companies 
would not have occurred, representing a market failure. Mobilising the information 
asymmetry theory, Tilly posits that because the bankers of Cologne established short-
term credit relations through current account with their clients, they could get a better 
sense of the potential profitability of firms. Therefore, the combination of investment 
banking business—long-term, issuing of securities—with commercial, short-term, 
banking characteristic of universal banking was arrived at because of economies of 
scope in information.  
This account puts the cart before the horse. Railroad companies needed first to be 
founded before they could be granted short-term credit, yet Cologne bankers were 
involved in the promotion of these companies, often subscribing numerous shares of the 
companies themselves, before the first tracks or construction work had even begun. 
That is to say, the short-term current account relation could not precede, but had to 
follow, the issuing of securities. Tilly’s argument might be modified to suggest that it 
was on the promise of economies of scope that private bankers in Cologne helped 
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railway companies float securities; however, given the massive failure rates of railway 
firms, this would contradict the assumption of rational action on the part of the bankers.  
It is impossible to ascertain the “true” motives for why Rhenish bankers invested in 
railway companies. This is so philosophically because of the difficulties of intention, 
but also because of the paucity of the archival historical record. However, more 
plausible, and less logically contradictory than the information asymmetry account is 
that Rhenish bankers undertook the foundation of railway companies because of their 
role in the struggle over industrialization. It is known that the Oppenheims and 
Schaaffhausen were active members in public debates in the Rhineland about the nature 
and extent of industrialization, especially in relation to the perceived social problems 
that would ensue from industrialization as in England (Boch, 1991: 145, 275). They 
were openly in favour of a self-sustaining industrialization, in part because it would 
transform the basis of Prussian society, which in turn would strengthen their position 
and wealth within that new social order.  
In the struggle over industrialization Rhenish bankers were intent on bringing about 
a state of the world different from that which currently existed, but that would ex post 
justify the risks they had undertaken.  This was concretely expressed in relation to the 
practicality of liquidity in the pre-March period. The Rhineland was an area where 
monetary transactions were steadily increasing because of industrial activity, the 
Prussian state’s restrictive monetary policy constantly put Rhenish finance under a 
liquidity constraint. There was always a dearth of means of payment (see also Chapter 3 
here).  The railroad promoter Friedrich Harkort suggested how “the monetary pressures 
of the Rhineland’s industrial growth” could be relieved by the “very supply of assets 
which represented those pressures” (Tilly, 1966: 32).  Harkort highlighted the economic 
logic behind the role that railways could play in promoting self-sustaining 
industrialization when he posited that  
 
One significant element of railroad promotion was that the additional demand for money 
connected with the construction and operation of railroads could be largely offset by the 
creation of credit they would encourage. He was thinking, above all, of the fact that 
bankers would attract takers of railroad securities—as they had takers of other forms of 
debt—by making such instruments eligible collateral for bank loans, and thus increasing 
their liquidity to holders. This was just one link in a system of interaction; for as more 
and more savers and / or holders of idle balances became willing to cnvert the latter into 
such securities, bankers—and other lenders—became more willing to accept them as 
collateral for loans or to purchase them outright. (Tilly, 1966: 132) 
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This plan did not work entirely as conceived. In part because the Prussian government 
began to restrict trading on markets where railway securities were traded in the 1840s 
(see Chapter 3 here). Furthermore, almost without fail, railway companies never 
managed to come into being without significant cost overruns and delays (Then, 1999; 
Ziegler, 1996). Nevertheless, Rhenish bankers continued to promote railway firms, 
because railways represented a clear material manner to cement industrialism in the 
material fabric of the land (cf. Brose, 1993).  
 It should not be forgotten that when bankers founded new industrial companies, 
they could make exorbitant profits. Indeed, they did not engage in this activity for 
charitable purposes. Nevertheless, even with exorbitant potential profits, the risks of 
failed investments threatened the survival of private bankers because of the unlimited 
liability of private banking houses. In order to establish railway firms, there were 
several steps that needed to be followed: (1) obtaining a government concession, (2) 
fashioning a market for the firm’s securities and (3) collecting subscriptions for that 
equity (Tilly, 1966: 95; cf. Then, 1997). 
The potential to make the process more lucrative through speculation was available 
at each of these steps. Firstly, in order to found a joint-stock company in Prussia during 
the 1830s and 40s, the founders required a state concession. The granting of concessions 
in Prussia during our period was a privilege seldom handed out with ease, in part 
because of anti-industrial interests within certain citadels of the Prussian state. Indeed, 
the Prussian government often employed tactics to stall the delivery of concessions. It 
especially attempted to hamper railway, and more generally industrial, projects that it 
believed posed a threat to agricultural finance. Another tool was the great deal of 
authority exercised over the type of financial instruments that could be used in 
financing. For example, Teichmann (1995) illustrates how the Oppenheim’s 
participation in the Stolberg Zinc Mining Company (Bergbau und Zinkfabrikation zu 
Stolberg) was significantly influenced through the Prussian government’s refusal to 
allow au porteur shares in the incorporation of the company.55 In response Rhenish 
                                                
55 These were shares that did not require registration. They received a French designation in this 
period because of the influence of the Napoleonic code, but would later be called Inhaberaktien, 
what are today in English called “bearer shares.” Such shares were the property of whoever 
physically held them (a bit like bank notes); whereas the alternative, Namensaktien, literally 
“name shares,” or registered shares, had recorded on the share itself as well as in an official 
register the name of the owner. In order to sell such shares onward, it was necessary to apply for 
government approval. This is discussed further in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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bankers were effectively ruthless in their measures to influence the government in their 
favour for new industrial joint-stock concessions. These bankers employed “patriotic 
denunciations of foreign influence to the outright offer of participation in the profits of 
promotion. A combination of both of these extremes was used” in many cases of early 
railway companies (Tilly, 1966: 98). Opportunities for speculation arose in the 1830s as 
trading in interim certificates (essentially derivatives betting on whether a firm would 
be granted a concession or not) began to be traded on the Berlin bourse (Leiskow, 1930; 
Spangenthal, 1903). 
Once companies had a concession to operate as a joint-stock firm, they were 
required to subscribe shares for the nominal capital of the firm before the foundation 
would be legally completed (and the company had the necessary capital to begin work). 
Because of the lack of an active domestic securities market in the Rhineland, the 
collection of share subscriptions was conducted by private banks themselves, rather 
than directly on securities markets. Private banks like the Oppenheims, Schaaffhausen, 
Herstatt and Stein, all of Cologne, would guarantee the value of the initial public 
offering (IPO),56 the private banks would search for subscribers of the shares, while 
marketing the company aggressively in newspapers and financial journals. They would 
attempt to influence the prestige of the company by having it associated with a 
reputable name, or publish prospectuses, and information sheets, and even circulate 
rumours (Neidlinger, 1930). When there was a great deal of interest in the shares, the 
subscriptions could be sold above par. 
The Oppenheim and Schaaffhausen firms occupied a relatively privileged place in 
their ability to carry out these operations. The Oppenheims had made contacts with 
other private banking firms professionally, and in some cases tied themselves to other 
firms through marriage. In 1812, the Oppenheims became connected to the Fould 
banking firm of the haute banque in Paris through the arranged marriage of Salomon’s 
daughter. The Fould’s would later assist the Oppenheims in the placement of many 
railway and bank shares on the Paris market, in the process helping them manipulate 
that market and speculate on the price shares issued there.  
The engagement of Cologne bankers in the foundation of railway companies is 
therefore best considered as a speculative practice of finance.  
                                                
56 An anachronistic, but necessary term here for purposes of space. 
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Private banks strategies for acquisition were often intimately tied with their attempts 
to further expand the industrial order. The Cologne bankers for example also engaged in 
founding companies that would provide explicit up- or down-stream markets for firms 
that were already their customers. As Tilly puts it “a banker with sufficient connections 
could provide a new company with both customers and suppliers” (Tilly 1966: 108; cf. 
Born 1983: 90). For this specific reason, the Elberfeld banking firm of von der Heydt, 
Kersten & Söhne occupied this very role in relation to numerous Rhenish railways. 
Additionally, as Teichmann has speculated, this was most likely the reason for the 
Oppenheim’s participation in the Stolberg Zinc Company and also the Wurms Coal 
Unification company (Teichmann, 1995: 22).  
Rhenish bankers emerged in the 1820s as specialized financial institutions focused 
on the business of short-term credit. The question of the emergence of abstract universal 
banking, or the first combination of commercial and investment banking therefore 
requires answering why it is that these banks began adding investment banking 
activities. The asymmetric information answer is insufficient, because of historical 
evidence that contradicts the chronology of its narrative and underlying theoretical 
assumptions. A more decisive theory for why it is that Cologne bankers began adding 
investment financing to their raft of activities relates to their aim to industrialise the 
Rhineland, and greater Prussia/Germany. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The social order of the pre 1848 German states was one fragmented by large scale 
social transformation. This chapter has argued that this transformation is best 
understood in terms of a struggle over the direction and extent of industrialization. The 
business of credit, in the period to 1848, grew up in this environment of social 
transformation. Private banking practices developed as the ancillary activity of 
commercial activities from the feudal period: long-distance merchants needed to 
support their trade clientele, and religious minorities sought to curry official favour in a 
hostile social environment. In Frankfurt, finance specialized on providing government 
loans, and tied Frankfurt bankers to the social interests of the ancien régime. In 
Cologne, by contrast the first combination of “mixed-banking” or “abstract universal 
banking” was developed as the by-product of bankers aiming to foment social change 
through industrialization. 
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 This was above all a speculative practice. Under such conditions of uncertainty, 
the activity of the financiers is most profitably conceived of as a wager, or bet, on the 
future. It can only be conceived of as efficient if the probabilities and variance of the 
different states of the world can be ascertained. Not only did Cologne bankers clearly 
not have any means for calculating such probabilities, but their social purpose related to 
something beyond calculation itself: the transformation of society. The motivations of 
Cologne bankers for so speculating were simultaneously sociopolitical, and politico-
economic. They were sociopolitical insofar as the aim of founding new corporations—
especially in the case of railroads—was an effort to bring about industrialization, to 
transform German society. These aims were politico-economic inasmuch as they were 
concerned not only with material reproduction, or acquisitiveness, but also the 
aggrandizement of their economic power. Speculation when it is an irregular bet with 
the potential for large gain is not solely about reproduction, but about the production of 
new material social relations. Winners who win big have quantitatively changed their 
status to such a degree that their qualitative relationship to the other players has been 
altered. 
 The necessary condition for the emergence of universal banking arose as a by-
product of the struggle over industrialization, when Cologne bankers amalgamated 
commercial and investment banking. This combination took place inside the walls of 
private banking houses, with limited liability, and which did not collect deposits. For 
concrete universal banking to exist, as per theory, these latter conditions needed to be 
present. In the next chapter, the transmission of the Cologne Banks’ practice of “mixed-
banking” into the first joint-stock banks will be examined.  
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CHAPTER 3  
The Significance of early Joint-Stock Banking, 1848-1869 
The continuation of politics by other means 
 
 
“In 1848, when Germany was in the throes of a political 
revolution, an event occurred in Cologne that inaugurated a very 
different kind of revolution. This was the reorganization of the 
Schaaffhausen Bank. Few people realized at the time that this 
was a new type of financial institution and that it heralded a new 
era in the history of banking”.57 
 
“These founding activities can be interpreted as an attempt to 
institutionalize some form of cartel for those transactions which 
had become too large for a single banking house.”58 
 
“We cannot narrate the beginning of joint-stock bank development 
from their later transformation into institutions of monopoly 
capital. It was only after 1873 that this tendency took hold. The 
1850s were characterized by entirely different elements, as were 
the purpose and goals of their founders.”59 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The wave of German joint-stock bank foundations in the period between 1848-
1857, is typically taken as the first step towards the development of a distinctive form of 
German finance organized around universal banks (Born, 1983). Private bankers may 
have practiced a form of universal, or “mixed-banking,” in the Prussian Rhineland, but 
the universal banks that fuelled German economic take-off and transformed it into an 
industrial society, were all incorporated joint-stock banks. How did the speculative 
“foundation business” and “mixed-banking” financial practices of these comparatively 
small private banks become generalized across the corporate banking sector?  
As the previous chapters have argued there is a strain of the existing scholarship 
that has rather simply conflated the “mixed-banking” of the private banks with that of 
the joint-stock banks. This conflation obscures the temporal origins of “mixed-banking” 
and its roots in speculative practices aimed at social transformation in the struggle over 
industrialization during the 1830s and 40s in the Prussian Rhineland. Moreover, it far 
too easily imputes a linear developmental narrative of financial practice transposed from 
private to incorporated banks. The amalgam of these two analytically distinct aspects of 
                                                
57 Henderson (1975: 123), my emphasis added. 
58 Ziegler (1997: 137) 
59 Böhme (1965: 204), my translation 
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the later universal banking system––“mixed-banking,” and the legal form of the joint-
stock company—also obscure the geographical diffusion and spatial evolution of this 
system. Finally, failing to analytically separate these issues presumes what it seeks to 
explain when it comes to the evolution of the German system of universal banking. The 
emergence of a system of corporate banks engaged in every variety of financial service 
was not a foregone conclusion when businessmen and financiers first began 
contemplating the opportunities afforded by limited liability incorporation in the early 
19th century.  
This chapter argues that the first foundation wave of joint-stock banks in 
Germany is best described as the unintended consequence of ongoing political conflict 
over the shape and nature of social change in Germany. It also demonstrates that the 
adoption of “mixed-banking” financial programmes by the banks of the first wave were 
not as a rule premeditated, but developed in the direction of “mixed-banking” over the 
course of the foundation wave itself. That being said, the adoption of a “mixed” palette 
of financial services did not take on any systemic formula in its arrangement. While 
none of the corporate banks founded in the 1850s specialized in the way that English 
banks specialized their financial services, they nevertheless developed distinguished 
specialties of service.  Consequently, “mixed-banking” even after being assimilated into 
the corporate fold, must remain analytically distinct from the “concrete” universal 
banking that would develop in the Kaiserreich. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section delves into the key 
theoretical and methodological problems of the first foundation wave. This section 
highlights a peculiarly prevalent fallacy about the efficiency explanation, and 
underscores some logical problems with it. In the second section, the chapter examines 
the foundation of four key banks: the Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein, the Disconto-
Gesellschaft, the Darmstädter Bank and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. These banks 
have been principally chosen because they would all later become pivotal Berlin Big 
Banks (Berliner Großbanken) that stood at the centre of the corporate banking system.  
Moreover, their ubiquity in the historical literature helps to underscore the different 
significance attributed to them here.  In the final section, the chapter accounts for the 
development of these banks’ financial activities from the commercial and financial 
crisis of 1857 until the beginning of the second “foundation wave” in 1869. 
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THE FALLACY OF FOUNDING BANKS FOR EFFICIECNCY  
The existing scholarship outlining the rise of the first joint-stock banks in 
Germany has generally submitted to a type of circular, functionalist argument in order 
to explain the emergence of the corporate banks in the 1850s. This argument posits that 
during the 1840s and 50s the German economy had shifted from an agricultural towards 
an industrial developmental trajectory. In order for the transformation to an industrial 
economy/society to be completed, larger amounts of capital were required in order to 
finance the more expensive fixed investment typical of the most advanced industrial 
technology. Consequently, private bankers created joint-stock banks to mobilise greater 
amounts of capital and bring about industrialization. This argument has become the 
common explanatory touchstone in much of German financial history.  
The specific logic of this argument posits that the legal form of the joint-stock 
company, or corporation allowed banks to raise greater amounts of capital for their 
undertakings.60 Joint-stock, in contrast to private, banks could issue equity in order to 
increase their access to long-term capital. That is, by collecting smaller investments 
from many different sources in exchange for shares, they increased the overall amount 
of capital to which they had access. This legal form achieved historical significance 
during the period between 1840-1873, which also marks Germany’s first sustained 
period of industrialization (Brophy, 2011; Blackbourn, 2003; Wehler, 1987; idem, 1995; 
Henderson, 1975). German industrialization was led by the development of railways 
and those industries forward- and backwardly linked to them—metallurgy, mining, 
shipping (Ziegler, 2005b: 230-235; Sheehan, 1989: 733, 740-1; Fremdling, 1977; Tilly, 
1978). As the story goes, with the exception of shipping, the amount of money needed 
to found and establish new firms in these industries was very high. The private bankers, 
working only with their own accumulated capital, did not individually have enough 
resources for the astronomical amounts of fixed capital required for the scale of new 
industrial techniques or equipment. Consequently, in order to provide the capital 
necessary in order to establish the new industrial order, new (financial) institutions—the 
joint-stock banks—needed to be created (Fohlin, 2007: 19; Pierenkemper and Tilly, 
2004: 111; Deeg, 1999: 33; Ramm, 1997: 70; Ziegler, 2005a: 283). This position is so 
                                                
60 It is also sometimes implied that the limited liability of joint-stock companies was an 
additional factor motivating their necessity; however, during the 19th century limited liability 
was not already a fixed feature of the joint-stock company or corporation see Johnson (2010) for 
the debate in England, Ilgmann (2011) for Prussia. For an important historical materialist 
position on the historical significance of joint-stock banks see Bryan & Rafferty (2009). 
 95 
prevalent that it has been accepted into the survey literature and general histories of 
Germany during the nineteenth century (Blackbourn, 2003: 141-2; Sheehan, 1989: 736; 
Wehler, 1987: 102-3, 638, 652; Kitchen, 1978: 87, 92). 
This received narrative jars with other details commonly known about the time 
period. Three widely accepted facts about the operation of joint-stock banks and private 
banks during the 1850s and 60s contradict the “efficiency understanding”: firstly, banks 
like Schaaffhausen (the first joint-stock bank) were prohibited from increasing their 
equity capital until the 1870s; secondly, private bankers remained the (successful) chief 
financiers of industry during this period; finally, incorporation was only one 
institutional form chosen to deal with the issues of securities flotation.  
Discussed in greater detail in the next section, the Schaaffhausen’sche 
Bankverein was the first Prussian joint-stock bank foundation, and was also a “mixed 
bank” operating under the principles established by the Rhenish private banks. The 
Bankverein was established on the illiquid remains of the Schaaffhausen private bank, 
in the course of the revolutionary crisis of 1848. The transformation of the bank into a 
joint-stock company was undertaken in order to alleviate the payment insolvency of the 
bank (the bank had a positive balance of assets, but these were insufficiently liquid to 
pay off its creditors). Effectively, the debts of the bank were transformed into shares in 
the bank. Trivially, it is obvious that the Bankverein was not immediately founded in 
order to provide more capital for industrial undertakings. If, however, the bank would 
have served as a demonstration effect, or made use of its corporate legal status to better 
engage in collecting capital for industrial investment then it would have needed to 
increase its capital base to do so (as the transformation of its debts into shares only 
made its liabilities liquid, but did not give the bank any additional financial resources). 
Part of the condition of the Bankverein’s foundation was a seat for the Prussian 
government on the firm’s supervisory management. Using this lever, the government 
prohibited the bank from increasing its capital until the issue of the New Company Law 
of 1870 was promulgated (Tilly, 1966: 113).61 
                                                
61 Tilly uses this example to suggest the exact opposite argument: that the foundation of the 
Bankverein indicates rather the “successful adaptation of the “mixed-banking” principle to 
joint-stock banking” (Tilly, 1966: 113). The issue seems to be less whether successful 
adaptation after the fact occurred, and more what the reasons were for the amalgamation of this 
legal form with the financial programme of “mixed-banking.” Moreover, Tilly also replicates 
the “government interference” trope by suggesting that the Bankverein’s operation would have 
been “even more successful” had the Prussian government not prohibited the increase of 
Schaaffhausen’s equity capital. 
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Many scholars oddly also recognize that even after the emergence of the joint-
stock banks, private bankers continued to be the primary financiers of industry (inter 
alia Fohlin, 2007: 229, note 10; Ramm, 1997: 70; M. Pohl, 1982: 159). That is to say, 
the literature argues that private bankers were inadequate to the task of financing 
industry, necessitating the foundation of joint-stock banks, but nevertheless, private 
bankers remained the principal source of financing for exactly those industrial branches 
whose fixed-capital needs supposedly exceeded the private financiers’ means. This is 
especially problematic for the first twenty years of the joint-stock banks’ existence. Yes, 
Germany’s “take-off” to industrialization occurred during this period, and the joint-
stock banks played a major role;62 however, private bankers remained the chief patrons 
of industry during this period, financing firms despite their reportedly meagre 
finances(!). Either their financial means were not dwarfed by the growing needs of 
industry, or they found alternative solutions other than incorporation.  
If private bankers could employ alternative techniques—other than founding 
joint-stock banks—in order to finance new industrial concerns, then conceivably these 
techniques might also have been able to promote industrialization.63 One such method 
was the use of banking syndicates or consortia. Syndicates were organized on a 
contractual basis between legally independent banks, usually to undertake the flotation 
of new issues of securities. For private bankers this meant finding other private banks 
that would be interested in a share of a new equity flotation. The bilaterally agreed 
contracts with individual bankers allowed an amassing of financial resources 
comparable to that of a joint-stock bank, but lacked the organizational permanence of 
the latter. Moreover, the ad hoc nature of syndicates involved more negotiation in the 
mobilization of the necessary capital for a share issue.  The NIE and information 
theoretic approach suggest that syndicate banking “suffered” problems of coordination 
impeding its adoption as an institutional solution to industrialization (Burhop, 2006b: 
54; Ziegler, 1997: 137; Tilly, 1989: 191; idem, 1986: 119, 127-8). This sits uneasily 
                                                
62 Following a period of time when corporate banks began to be downplayed for their role in 
industrialization (e.g. Edwards and Ogilvie, 1996), they are once again—especially during this 
earlier period—being recognized as having been indispensible for Germany’s socioeconomic 
transformation from agrarian to industrial society. Burhop (2006a) has even demonstrated this 
using econometric techniques that had earlier helped to downgrade the role of large banks in 
industrialization. 
63 This is argued here in a counterfactual, but also in a comparative historical sense; one need 
look little further than France where private bankers in the provinces organized a cooperative 
organization in the form of the Societé Centrale des Banques de Province specifically in order 
to achieve these kinds of goals (Reitmayer, 2001b: 139). 
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with the historical record, which suggests that banking syndicates, were regularly used 
even by the first joint-stock banks (M. Pohl, 1989).64 Syndicates and consortia were 
even used following the relaxation of the government law on concessions for banks, so 
that the large Berlin joint-stock banks frequently used them in Germany’s “second” 
industrial revolution post-1870. Beginning in the 1880s the chemical and electrical 
industries, in a similar fashion to the railroads of mid-century, required external sources 
of finance that were beyond even the increased financial means of individual corporate 
banks with capital reserves fed by the shares of the joint-stock form, leading the 
Berliner Großbanken to form banking syndicates as their private banking predecessors 
had (M. Pohl, 1986a: 55).65 Clearly, the corporate form did not definitively resolve the 
problem of the quantitatively insufficient financial means of banks.  
For that matter, nor were syndicates so unwieldy that bankers shied away from 
employing them. The continuing existence of syndicates presents a problem to the 
institutional account for the rise of joint-stock banks. No lasting legal organizational 
form replaced the syndicate agreements used by the corporate banks post-1870. 
Therefore the received narrative presents a theoretically arbitrary justification for the 
rise of joint-stock banks on its own terms.  The difficulties of syndicates in the context 
of mid-century private banking represented market failure because a new organization 
emerged that functionally replaced private banking syndicates. Later, when corporate 
banks used the practice of syndicate banking during the second industrial revolution, 
this was not indicative of market failure, because no new institutional form replaced the 
consortia among the corporate banks. Consequently, the quantitative incapability of 
even the corporate banks to singularly provide the financial means asked by government 
                                                
64 For example the Darmstädter Bank für Handel und Industrie made use of a syndicate 
arrangement as early as 1860—just seven years after its supposed founding in order to 
circumvent syndicate arrangements amongst private bankers (!)—in order to issue shares of the 
Rhine-Nahebahn bonds (Knips, 1912: 150). Indeed, it was commonplace that the balance sheets 
of German joint-stock banks during the Kaiserreich maintained entries for consortia business 
(Konsortialgeschäfte): assets and liabilities of securities acquired and placed through different 
consortia (see inter alia Burhop, 2004). 
65 The foundation of AEG between 1883-1887, and the expansion of the Harpener Mining 
Company between 1888-9 are just two examples given in the literature (see e.g. Ramm (1997: 
74)). It should also be noted that government loans had similarly reached a proportion beyond 
the capacity of even individual joint-stock banks. Key examples in this regard were the 
“Prussian Consortium” established in 1859 between the Disconto-Gesellschaft and numerous 
private bankers like Bleichröder (also with the assistance of the Finance Minister von Patow 
(see Kleeberg, 1989: 166)) as well as the Rothschild Consortium (see Knips, 1912: 157). 
Further contextualization on the Prussian Consortium can be found in Stern (1977: 10, 108) for 
some details in a non-specialist account, or Reitmayer (1999b) and Stuebel (1935: esp. 30-33) 
for more scholarly treatments.  
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loans, as well as machine, chemical and electrical industries did not represent the 
necessity for a new institution, because no new institutions arose. Joint-stock banks 
were the highest form of institutional evolution in solving the quantitative collection of 
financial resources, therefore they must have arisen to solve this problem. Not only is 
this arbitrary, but it is also circular. 
 
The emphasis on the potential purpose of these banks to efficiently industrialize has 
principally underscored only those elements of their foundation concerned with the 
adjudication of profit, loss, and monetary transactions. Wider social forces, e.g. the 
state, play only a latent and exogenous role by hindering the full development of the 
pre-existing economic dynamic of institutional creation. Narratives of German finance 
delineate the novelty of joint-stock banking and its conflation with universal banking, as 
a contingent, but potentially foreseeable affair given the economic logic of 
industrialization. In Prussia, the joint-stock legal form required a concession from the 
state. The Prussian state’s anti-industrial agrarian interests made it highly reticent to 
award concessions for joint-stock banks. The first bank to be permitted the privilege of 
incorporation as a joint-stock company––the Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein—may 
only have been permitted to do so because of the extra-economic context of the 1848 
revolutions; however, the prevalent assumption in the extant scholarship is that this only 
consecrated an existing trend within the German political economy.  
“Mixed-banking” had already proven itself as the necessary instrument of a 
backward economy in need of capital, and the joint-stock legal form simply delivered 
the compulsory institutional form for the quantitative scope necessary for 
industrialization to take full effect.66 This widespread assumption overlooks two key 
facts about the pre-revolutionary period because of its teleological analysis of history. 
Firstly, there was a myriad of different types of joint-stock bank that were founded 
during this period: issuing banks, “mixed-banks,” and commercial trade banks. 
Secondly, this assumes intention where there was not always. Businessmen and private 
bankers in the pre-revolutionary period predominantly wanted to found banks that could 
issue banknotes, and believed joint-stock banks were the only feasible way to do so 
(Achterberg, 1984: 326). The predominant financial concern of the time was how to 
                                                
66 In this way, Tilly (1998; 1989; 1966) has maintained that the early vision of a “railway” bank 
drafted by Ludolf Camphausen in 1838-9 demonstrates that the “mixed-banking” programme 
had already been proven as the way of the future, and required only the greater capital strength 
of the joint-stock form. 
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improve the desultory dearth of liquidity and the payments system. The issuing of 
banknotes along the model of Scottish banks was the chief manner that financiers 
believed could solve the problem (Bösselmann, 1939: 78).  The desire to found joint-
stock banks for promotional investment purposes grew during the 1850s, but led only to 
a situation whereby there was a multiplicity of banking models undertaken by different 
corporate and non-profit financial institutions.  
The adoption of “mixed-banking” by corporate banks, and the foundation of 
corporate banks specifically for “mixed-banking” purposes is better understood in 
political terms. The joint-stock banks founded between 1848-1857 were related in 
complex, nonlinear ways to the intense social conflict of the time—the faltering 
hegemony of a feudal-aristocratic order, a dearth of liquidity, the fear of revolutionary 
masses, and geopolitical rivalry between different German states—all of which  were in 
turn autonomous from each other, but internal to the struggle over industrialization. The 
received narratives reduce the conflict over joint-stock banking to the resistance of 
Prussian regulation. That is to say, the state was capable of obstructing the secular 
economic forces driving the development of economic institutions; however, state 
action in no way played a constitutive role in the process of generating distinctive 
financial institutions.  
This view also implies that had the need for a political concession not been 
necessary, many more joint-stock banks would have been founded in order to satisfy the 
financial needs of an economy changing paths to industrialism. The received narratives 
effectively assume the existence of a generalised demand for corporate “mixed-banks” 
prior to the first contingent foundation of such a bank in 1848. For the history of 
Germany’s universal banking order, this presumes exactly what must be explained: how 
the relatively atypical practice of “mixed-banking” in the Rhineland was transformed 
from a peculiar regional anomaly into the accepted form for corporate banks.  
Theoretically the received narrative fails on methodological grounds for 
ontologically separating politics and economics into compartmentalized 
phenomenological social spheres. This view presupposes the interference of politics in 
the operation of the market. Here politics and power operate from a position regionally 
external to the economy. The genesis and generalization of German commercial 
banking on the joint-stock legal organization is explained strictly through the functional 
needs of the economy. These functional requirements are themselves constituted prior 
to all extra-economic forces. Relegating power and politics to a different register of 
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explanation as this does, suggests that these categories can have no fundamental 
constructive influence on lived “economic” history. These assumptions have helped to 
direct study of this important chapter of German financial history away from the social 
agency propelling its institutional changes.  
In contrast, this chapter highlights the paramount importance of state, (geo-) 
politics and society in the initial constitution of this new class of economic institutions. 
It endeavours to underscore how an agency considered principally “economic,” is better 
understood by a more complex narrative including the concerns of social and political 
history. These coalesce around the revolutions of 1848 in the German states. 
 
THE FIRST FOUNDATION WAVE OF JOINT-STOCK BANKS, 1848-1857 
Crisis began to manifest itself for the pre-March Prusso-German social order 
when crop failures and a downturn in the trade cycle coalesced between the years 1844-
1847 (Tilly, 1990). In the period leading up to the revolution, rapidly expanding market 
relations and a demographic boom had helped to ensure that there was an enormous 
proportion of German society living in near destitution—peasants, agricultural day 
labourers, craftsmen—(Wehler, 1987: 664), as well as a group of those engaged in 
marginal occupations and trades—small shopkeepers like grocers, taverns and print 
shops—that suffered a near permanent threat of falling into penury (Sheehan, 1989: 
638-9). The crop failures across Germany in 1845-7 not only reduced the overall 
amount of food available for those eking out an existence on the perimeters of society, 
but also increased the price of basic foodstuffs. This was disastrous for the 
aforementioned marginal and threatened groups who already spent the overwhelming 
majority of their income on such goods: the poorest in the countryside were reduced to 
eating grass, clover and potato peelings  (Blackbourn, 2003: 104-5). The downturn in 
the trade cycle added fuel to the fire of social discontent by pushing many marginal 
businesses into bankruptcy.  
The collective violence sparked by widespread hunger and privation was 
matched by the qualitatively new phenomena of labour unrest in industrial work. 
Incidents of unrest related to wages, timeliness of pay, hours and security of 
employment (Sheehan, 1989: 642). These latter typically “modern” forms of protest 
were also accompanied by social tumult perpetrated by artisans and craftsmen that were 
unable to compete with the new industrial production techniques. In its least intense 
expression, this took the form of political agitation for the reinstatement of the guilds. In 
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its properly violent manifestation, craftsmen would harass merchants and factory 
owners (or sometime just foreigners), as well as burn, smash or destroy industrial 
equipment.  Contemporaries in Prussia were only slowly recognizing the arrival of this 
“social malaise” as a result of the incompatibility between industrial society and the 
traditional order (cf. Jaeger, 1988: 85ff.).67 The increasing inability of the lower orders 
of German society to feed themselves, the demands of new industrial workers for more 
secure work, and the pleas of artisans for relief from industrial competition, may not 
have been glaringly obvious to contemporaries, but all helped to establish protest and 
rebellion as a nonetheless common feature across Germany in the period leading up to 
the revolution (Hamerow, 1958:84). 
Running concomitant with the periodic mayhem and upheaval prior to the 
revolution in the 1840s was the more formal political agitation of moderate liberal 
politicians. There was at this time a diversity of positions within German liberalism. To 
stylize the movement’s key political demands we could focus on the call for  
constitutional-monarchy, freedom of the press, the right to gather and form associations, 
and trial by jury (Henderson, 1975: 80). Beyond the overt political demands, central to 
social composition of the liberal movement were Prussian businessmen and financiers. 
In addition to their constitutional demands, they were locked in conflict with the 
Prussian state over the regulation of business practices. Of principal interest to this 
chapter was the conflict over the financial and monetary regulation in burgeoning 
securities markets and the Prussian state’s stranglehold over monetary matters. The 
latter resulted in a well-known dearth in means of payment in the late Vormärz period 
(Tilly, 2003; idem, 1966; Martin, 1967). 
The Prussian government had initially been very keen to spur the development 
of an active market for government paper allowing securities markets to trade in 
government paper. The fear of the government that unconstrained trading would divert 
capital from its own finances arose already in the 1840s. In the mid 1830s, forward 
transactions on Spanish state bonds began trading with particular intensity, feeding an 
inflationary dynamic in their prices. The Prussian state banned forward transactions of 
Spanish paper in 1836. This had the effect of shifting speculative dynamics to other 
foreign government securities. Consequently fearful that state securities from abroad 
                                                
67 The perception of a systemic problem often arose only obliquely: for example, the relatively 
late perception of growing shantytowns on the peripheries of industrial centres, like the 
“Vogtland” in northern Berlin (Clark, 2007: 453). 
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would soak up demand for their own paper, the Prussian government banned the trading 
of all foreign government securities in 1840 (Gömmel, 1992).68 At the same time as 
trading in government paper was growing, issues of railway company shares were also 
growing. The Prussian state had in part helped to influence the speculation in such 
securities by guaranteeing dividends on railway shares and interest rates on railway 
bonds (of 4%, which was higher than Prussian state paper at 3.5%). This was a type of 
half-way house between full private financing for railway development or complete 
government subsidization. The concession system in place however necessitated the 
request of potential railway firms to apply for a government concession. “Interim 
certificates” (Interimsscheine) were a type of security used to advance funds on railway 
projects that would be approved before the concession was granted.69 Of course the 
issue of an interim certificate was no guarantee that the project would receive a 
concession, so trade in these instruments amounted to speculation on the government’s 
administrative process. The amount of funds piling into trading of these certificates, and 
the mercurial fluctuations thereby generated for prices of railway securities, frightened 
state officials at the prospect of diverting resources from more stable investments 
(especially mortgage backed loans in Pfandbriefe that provided the backbone of credit 
to East Elbian estate owners), leading the Prussian state to ban the trading of these 
securities as well in 1844 (Bösselmann, 1939: 22; Lichter, 1999; Kubitschek, 1962; 
Leiskow, 1930).   
Securities market regulation was a thorn in the side of financiers, however, it did 
not compare to the more pressing matter of the lack of means of payment (Lichter, 
1999; Kubitschek, 1962: 75-6). The Prussian monetary system, like other Continental 
European political economies, was based on precious metals. Under such a system 
increases in the supply of money could only occur directly through increases in the 
supply of gold or silver, and indirectly through the increase in money surrogates 
(Sprenger, 1982).  While bills of exchange, and giro accounts, had been used with 
moderate success as surrogates in places like the Rhineland in order to ease the strain on 
the payments system (Tilly, 1966a: Ch. 3), such substitutes were ultimately founded on 
the flexibility of issuing bank notes that could travel in wider circulation. Bills of 
                                                
68 The effect of the ban was mostly to push the trading of these securities underground away 
from state certified Bourse brokers, and towards black market dealers “Puschmakler”  
(Kubitschek, 1962). 
69 In this sense, Interimsscheine operated like a futures contract on whether the railway firm 
would be founded or not. 
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exchange and other forms of credit were also limited in their usefulness by the Prussian 
decree of 1830 that any certificate to be used as means of payment needed to be 
licensed by the state (Kubitschek, 1962). Further, following a Prussian government 
decree in 1833 any institution wishing to issue banknotes was required to seek the 
permission of the government (H. Pohl, 1982: 82).70 So, money surrogates were tenuous 
replacements, and financiers were unable to concession banks of issue because of 
restrictions from the Prussian government. Consequently, the ability of financial 
institutions to generate liquid means of payment was severely limited.  
The problem of money shortages and liquidity was perhaps the central problem 
occupying Prusso-German financiers during the first half of the 19th century (cf. 
Berghoff, 2002: 57-61; H. Pohl, 1982: 83). Indeed, the question of liquidity creation 
through the issue of bank notes was seen as the definitive quality of “bank-ness.” It 
might be generalized that therefore the concept of “bank” was itself intimately tied to 
the idea of issue banking during this period (Schumacher, 1908: 10-25). The foundation 
of joint-stocks banks for contemporaries was therefore “right from the beginning, 
mostly concerned with appropriating the right to issue banknotes” (Achterberg, 1984: 
326).  
The problem of finding adequate means of payment worsened steadily between 
the Carlsbad Decrees and the early 1840s, as the number of monetary transactions 
steadily rose within Prussian territory (cf. Ziegler, 1997). When the Prussian 
government prohibited futures trading of railway shares in 1844 it anticipated that this 
would help to redirect funds back towards mortgages for East Elbian Junkers and help 
to reduce the interest rates on government bonds. The consequence of withdrawing huge 
amounts of liquidity from circulation was rather to bring the situation of means of 
payment shortages to near crisis proportions in 1846-7 (Kubitschek, 1962). 
   
The First Joint-Stock Bank—the Schaaffhausen reorganization, 1848 
 
“Questions of credit and revolutionary politics could not have been more tightly 
intertwined.”71  
 
                                                
70 This was even extended to the State-run Seehandlung and Royal Bank via cabinet order in 
1836.  
71 Böhme (1965: 199, my translation) 
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The transformation of the Schaaffhausen private bank into Germany’s first joint-
stock bank occurred in the context of the European social crisis of 1848. Banking 
history often recounts this foundation in passing as a contingent event, worth noting for 
how it would foreshadow the trend towards the foundation of other joint-stock universal 
banks during the early 1870s, and the Schaaffhausen’s position later as a Berliner 
Großbank. It is frequently assumed that all banks aiming to incorporate during this 
period of time sought to engage in the type of universal banking programme undertaken 
by Schaaffhausen (Tilly, 1986; idem, 1966). Rather, the actions and self-understandings 
of contemporary financiers suggest that short-term credit, and above all liquidity, was 
the conceptual and practical linchpin of their social action in the German political 
economy. Moreover, the general concern with liquidity for making payments that 
underlay the concerns of commerce and finance during the revolution would engender, 
in a completely unforeseen manner, the transformation of the Abraham Schaaffhausen 
Private Bank into a joint-stock company. 
In January of 1848, revolution broke out in Italy, before spreading to Paris in 
February and overturning the government of the French King Louis-Philippe. News of 
the French revolutionary fervour travelled from the Southwest of Germany and spread 
North and East practically carrying revolt with it. Tumult broke out first in Baden, and 
after travelling through Wurttemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony demonstrations eventually 
erupted in Berlin in March. Harvest failures had ceased in the Autumn of 1847, of 
course this was little comfort to those peasants who had already consumed their seed 
crop (Blackbourn, 2003), but the reduced demand for textiles—itself likely an outcome 
of the earlier crop failures—helped to spark a commercial crisis in England at the end of 
1847. The crisis in England was transmitted to Germany at the same time as 
unemployment and inflation had been mounting in German commercial centres. Despite 
this recessionary pincer movement, noticed mostly obliquely by contemporaries with an 
eye for expensive apartments left unrented in some city centres while there were 
growing numbers of homeless (cf. Clark, 2007: 460ff), the Berlin Bourse still managed 
to reach impressive heights in trading at the end of 1847. Indeed, even in January with 
the business climate deteriorating and unrest mounting amongst all groups with any 
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reason for opposition to the “semi-feudal” status quo, the “monarchical-bureaucratic 
condominium” failed to take notice of the mounting business crisis in Germany.72  
News of the revolution in Paris however changed this situation dramatically by 
influencing a sudden and widespread search for specie and “hard currency.” 
Subsequently, numerous businesses and banks were thereby forced into illiquidity or 
insolvency (Rachel and Wallich, 1939: 261-2), undoubtedly due to the poor 
opportunities for rediscount available (Ziegler, 1997: 138) and the institutional structure 
as well as strategies of many private bankers for dealing with such crises (Tilly, 1966; 
see also Ch. 4 here). 
The ruling elites in Central Europe were deeply unsettled by the economic 
chaos, threat of revolutionary violence, and the palpable expansion of the revolutionary 
crisis from popular constitutional, to generalized crisis of the politico-economic order as 
a whole. Karnival celebrations had delayed the influence of news from France setting 
things off immediately in Cologne, but already by the 3rd of March the leader of the 
league of Communists was calling for “[the] people to take up arms, protection of 
labour, unlimited freedom of speech and press” (Stürmer et al., 1994: 118). The 
Cologne City Council felt so threatened that it was forced to call in the troops. Indeed, 
the fear amongst the established bourgeoisie there was so palpable that Dagobert 
Oppenheim commissioned a private force of mercenaries to protect the properties of the 
Oppenheim brothers (those of the Cologne Bank).  In Berlin, the weather had become 
unseasonably warm on the 13th of March, and large crowds began gathering in an area 
North of the Tiergarten called “the Tents,” in order to read broadsheet newspapers, 
discuss the events of the revolution across Europe, make speeches and sign petitions 
demanding political change as well as governmental relief for the masses of 
unemployed (Sheehan, 1989). Frederick William IV understood the gathering of these 
crowds as a choice between channeling their energies into moderate reform or allowing 
them to erupt into radical revolution. After some indecision between these options, on 
the 17th of March the King agreed to proposals that met some demands of the opposition 
in order to avoid bloodshed: the immediate recall of the United Diet, a constitution for 
Prussia, initiatives to reform the confederation and freedom of the press (Sheehan, 
                                                
72 In 1846, the Finance ministry conducted a wide-ranging survey of the effectiveness of its 
1844 legislation prohibiting futures trading in railway shares via correspondence with all the 
major Chambers of Commerce across Prussia. The selective reading of the response is quite 
telling of the ostrich-like strategy of key members in the Prussian state administration (cf. 
Kubitschek, 1962). 
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1989: 666-7).  On the 18th of March, a crowd gathered to celebrate the promise of these 
reforms in the Schlossplatz outside of Frederick William’s palace in Berlin, but was 
very quickly fired upon by the Prussian military.73 Barricades were built and fighting 
carried on through the night before the ensuing violence had left 300 (the majority of 
which were craftsmen of some sort or another)74 dead. In an attempt to restore public 
faith in his reformist intentions, the King watched a funeral procession of all 300 bodies 
from his palace balcony while explicitly wearing a tricolour armband the following day. 
The royal display of contrition, the appointment of a liberal ministry,75 and the promise 
of a constitution had managed to diffuse tensions temporarily, but the underlying issues 
driving the upheaval were far from resolved. The business crisis continued unabated as 
liquidity remained frozen and the Bourses lifeless, while manufacturers continued to 
respond to their difficulties by cutting labour, and artisans and craftsmen continued their 
appeals for a return to the stability of guild life (Hamerow, 1958).  
The tensions wrought by the social transformation from an agricultural society 
founded in a legal order benefitting a feudal aristocracy to an industrial capitalist one 
with an “egalitarian” legal standing for all citizens were at their most acute. Social 
scientific and historiographical debate about the European revolutions of 1848, no less 
the transformation of German society in the 19th century continues to provide fodder for 
intellectual debate about the grander constitutive significance of these events (or their 
causal origins). What can be highlighted with more certainty is the professed self-
understanding and normative political goals of contemporary actors: monarchs, 
bureaucrats, businessmen, and revolutionaries. The conservative forces of the 
revolution––monarchs, aristocrats and state bureaucrats, were keen to preserve the 
agrarian basis of their power, but were also ardent about the fiscal advantages of an 
expanded tax base, and fearful about the uncertain extent, and violent potential, of the 
“social danger” animated in the dispossessed underclasses.  
                                                
73 The reasons for this outbreak of violence are lost to historiography, but are usually attributed 
to a mixture of antinomy from the Prussian Military (Blackbourn, 2003) the military’s 
misunderstanding of the nature of the gathering, interpreting it as less celebratory and more 
threatening (Sheehan, 1988), or perhaps simply the itchy trigger fingers of soldiers (Brose, 
2013).  
74 The most represented professions were cabinet-maker and tailor for some reason (see Hoppe 
and Kuczynski, 1964). 
75 Berlin first appointed a liberal Ministry headed by Arnim, which would last only 10 days, 
followed by the Rhenish contingent detailed below.  
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 Faced with similar choices, monarchs across German, no less all of, Europe 
were keen to provide tokens of their reformist intentions and invited members of the 
moderate liberal opposition to join government. In Prussia, Ludolf Camphausen and 
David Hansemann—two Rhenish businessmen and prominent liberal political figures 
were called forth as Minister of State and Finance respectively. They entered office in 
Berlin 10 days after the massacre, on the 29th March 1848. Accompanying the two 
Rhenish businessmen to Berlin was Gustav Mevissen, another Rhenish entrepreneur and 
financier who was sent on behalf of the Cologne Chamber of Commerce in order to 
influence and report upon the outcome of the proceedings (M. Pohl, 1982b: 44-5),76 as 
well as the banker August von der Heydt of Elberfeld who took a position under 
Hansemann in the finance ministry (Böhme, 1966a). All four of these men were key 
members of the Rhenish economic elite, 77  and pivotal figures in the Pre-March 
opposition movement against the conservative state. Despite some financial 
involvement in founding and supporting the Rheinische Zeitung, for which a young Karl 
Marx published radical articles against Prussian conservatism, these Rhineland liberals 
were emblematic of the liberal business elite: their chief political goals within the 
political movement of liberalism were largely to promote conditions conducive to 
business. Moreover, while they wished for significant change to the politico-economic 
regulatory order, they also feared the depths of social transformation that might be 
unleashed by continued unrest from social underclasses (Wehler, 1987). With their call 
to office, the forward movement of the revolution was for them essentially over 
(Sheehan, 1989: 668), and they wished to make changes enough to preserve their socio-
economic positions, but avoid the disruption to business engendered by violent unrest.  
Crucial to their actions while in office was their assessment of the politico-
economic terrain, and especially the roots of the crisis. Hansemann and seemingly 
Mevissen as well as, identified the key problem of the crisis as the lack of liquidity and 
short-term credit. As merchants and financiers of the industrially active Rhineland they 
understood the problems engendered by the lack of means of payment generated by 
Prussia’s monetary politics. Hansemann reasoned that the revolution itself was a result 
of this lack of liquidity: if short-term credit could be made available, e.g. through 
rediscounting, then this could be extended in such a way as to breath life back into 
businesses that could then rehire unemployed labour. Workers that were employed were 
                                                
76 Mevissen had no formal role in the government. 
77 Indeed, all of them could be named members of the Cologne financial elite. 
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unlikely to take to the streets, become involved in violent altercations or revolutionary 
fervor. While Hansemann’s interpretation of the crisis, and its potential solution, was 
more or less accepted––the quantitative extent of the means to solve the revolution 
through the provision of credit would not go undisputed. The eventual “solution” to the 
crisis––given its understanding, could not have been foreseen as it involved the 
innovative adaptation of a changing institutional environment. 
March 29th, the day that the liberal opposition entered office in Berlin, was also 
the same day that the Schaaffhausen Private Bank of Cologne78 was forced to stop 
payments to its creditors. The assets of the bank were greater than its liabilities on 
paper; however, after writing down several loans that had gone bad owing to the 
commercial crisis, and the illiquidity of almost 1 Mil. Thaler worth of assets locked into 
real estate, the bank was very clearly insolvent (Stürmer et al., 1994; M. Pohl, 1982a: 
55-8). The Schaaffhausen Bank’s relations of credit and debt were intimately, and very 
widely, interwoven with Rhenish industry: the yearly turnover of the Bank accounted 
for roughly 50 Million Thaler;79 the Bank was responsible for providing credit and 
advances to 170 different manufacturers and industrial operations throughout the 
Cologne region and its hinterlands accounting for roughly 40,000 workers. The possible 
collapse of the bank deeply frightened the bourgeois elite of Cologne, with the head of 
the Chamber of Commerce writing directly to Hansemann in Berlin to plea for 
assistance (Böhme, 1965).  
Concomitant with Schaaffhausen shutting its counters, the financial situation 
across Prussia was also deteriorating. The Berlin stock exchange suffered daily losses 
between 30 to 45% in the value of listed securities (Rachel and Wallich, 1967: 261). In 
that city, there were no bankers left offering discounting services, with only the Prussian 
Bank standing between the lack of short-term credit, a generalized crunch in liquidity 
and the likely implosion of all business activity requiring credit. By the 28th March, the 
Prussian Bank was effectively the only institution offering discounting services, and had 
been forced to increase its discount rate to 5%. On the 31st of March it was forced to 
increase again to 6%, as its available means had been reduced to 258,000 Thaler and it 
needed to protect its reserves (Rachel and Wallich, 1967). The liquidity situation was so 
                                                
78 See the previous chapter for the significance of this bank vis-à-vis early “mixed-banking.” 
79 One can get a sense for the quantitative relevance of such a figure from the average annual 
income per capita across the various German states from 1845-1850 which was about 233 Taler 
per year. I have calculated this statistic with information from Pierenkemper and Tilly (2004: 
14) and Ziegler (2014: 173). 
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dire that a group of 32 businessmen and bankers wrote to the Prussian Finance Ministry 
requesting a grant of 1 Mil. Thaler, that they would match with their own funds in order 
to establish a discount bank in Berlin that would provide liquidity for the ailing medium 
and small businesses for whom credit was too expensive (Böhme, 1965: 200). A 
different group, of the oldest, businessmen in Berlin wrote directly to the finance 
Ministry in order to demand that 5 Million Thaler be delivered immediately to the 
Prussian Bank otherwise the consequence would be the complete freeze-up of all 
monetary circulation (Rachel and Wallich, 1967: 262). The quantitative assessments of 
the extent of the crisis by Berlin businessmen fell on deaf ears in the royal cabinet.   
The aristocracy may have understood the dire need for funds amongst 
commercial establishments of its political domain, but its full quantitative extent was 
either not  fathomed, or respected. At the behest of Camphausen and Hansemann, on the 
30th of March the King agreed to provide an advance from the Treasury to the Prussian 
Bank of 2 Million Thaler over 6 months at 4%, and another 2 Million Thaler worth of 
Treasury Bonds were made available for 3 months (Stürmer et al, 1994: 120). With 
these finances Hansemann ensured that the funds were made available to banks in 
Cologne and Berlin immediately, while keeping 1 Million Thaler for the Prussian Bank. 
This residual sum Hansemann used to establish emergency banks in important 
commercial and industrial centres across the Rhineland—to cities such as Düsseldorf, 
Krefeld, Elberfeld, Barmen and Solingen. Crucial to his plan was also to use these 
emergency banks as centres to diffuse liberal political goals through his financial 
politics (Böhme, 1965: 201). Unfortunately for Hansemann, by the 6th of April the 
Düsseldorf Chamber of Commerce wrote to him to report that while his liberal 
“commissions” had been successfully established, the branches of the Prussian bank 
were almost entirely depleted. The grants and advances that had been made from the 
dispersed funds were little more than a “drop in the bucket” compared to the liquidity 
needs of the Prussian Rhineland. The Düsseldorf Chamber of Commerce further 
reported that there was no bank house in the Rhineland province that would provide any 
kind of advance, and consequently implored Hansemann to establish “local discount 
banks” that might alleviate the lack of liquidity (Böhme, 1965: 201). The Chambers of 
commerce in Elberfeld, Krefeld, Barmen, Duisburg, Cologne, Aachen and Memel 
similarly wrote to Hansemann to implore for the establishment of the latter, or even 
better for the foundation of permanent discount banks on joint-stock basis that might not 
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assist solely the reestablishment of the flow of short-term financing, but then also serve 
as more permanent institutional fixtures in the future (Böhme, 1965: 201) 
The relationship between the Chambers of Commerce and the Finance Ministry 
were conditioned in part by a certain reticence on the part of the former in demanding 
measures that might have truly solved the liquidity predicament of early April 1848. 
This can be inferred from a memorandum written by Mevissen and sent to Hansemann 
that exhibited a much more frank assessment of the crisis. Mevissen outlined what he 
understood as essential to solve the liquidity crisis, and did it in a clearly admonishing 
tone (Böhme, 1965: 200). The plan was adumbrated in six points: 
(i) “The immediate dispersal of 5 Million Thaler from the state 
Treasury to shore up the finances of the Prussian Bank” (M. Pohl, 
1982a: 54) 
(ii) “The use of the state railway fund in order to purchase railway 
shares in an effort to revitalize the value of securities: 1 Million 
Thaler should be made available for this purpose” (M. Pohl, 1982a: 
54).80 
(iii) “The increase of the Prussian Bank’s legally agreed maximum 
banknote issue to 5 Million Thaler above its current limit” (M. Pohl, 
1982a: 54). 
(iv) “The establishment of Provincial Discount Banks in Berlin, Breslau, 
Danzig, Königsberg and Cologne on a ‘Public-Private’ basis 
whereby 1 Million Thaler from the State’s amortization fund would 
be matched by 1 Million Thaler of private funds. The State’s 
contribution would be held liable for losses, and the private capital 
invested would be paid an interest rate of 6%, and the government 
would not be permitted to withdraw its capital” (M. Pohl, 1982a: 54; 
cf. Böhme, 1965: 201) 
(v) “The formation of mortgage banks in the Rhineland” (M. Pohl, 
1982a: 55). 
(vi) “The issue of banknotes payable to 1/3 the value of assets in 
mortgage and discount banks, as well as the full amount of cash 
deposits in private banks” (M. Pohl, 1982a: 55). 
 
The ambition and scale of the above plan was sure to fail royal approval. Despite the 
promise of a constitution, it seemed more and more evident that the conservative 
authorities of the Prussian state were in fact loath to grant a constitution to the uppity 
masses. More importantly, the letter from the Düsseldorf Chamber of Commerce had 
unsettled Hansemann about the reliability of using the established institutional structure 
of credit and debt relations in order to execute a solution to the credit-crisis as a way to 
                                                
80 This should be compared with Böhme’s delineation, where he suggests that Mevissen’s 
demand was in fact 2# Million Thaler (Böhme, 1965: 201).   
 111 
resolve the revolution. The Düsseldorf government wrote of the private banking houses 
“as the sole connection between the Prussian Bank and the needs of industry, the private 
banking houses had crystalized as insufficient and unreliable” (Böhme, 1965: 202, my 
translation). It would not be surprising to imagine that banks threatened with massive 
insolvency would have used the discount facilities created for emergency purposes in 
order to solidify their own balances without then passing this on to industrial clients.81  
Hansemann continued to be convinced of the necessity to solve the problems—
from the perspective of the liberal movement—of the revolution by reforming the credit 
system. However, the Düsseldorf message had made him skeptical about the ability of 
the private banking order to pass increases in liquidity on to industry. The majority of 
private bankers across the German lands were after all, unlike those in Cologne and a 
few other areas in the Rhineland like Hansemann’s hometown Aachen, ambivalently 
tied to the conservative cause: the bread and butter of most private bankers was the 
intermediation, negotiation, issuance and trade of government debt contracts and 
securities (Ziegler, 2005b; North, 1997). Hansemann did not trust such an interest group 
to properly forward the liberal cause in the post-revolutionary order—he saw this role as 
better carried out by those members of the opposition movement that had been 
mobilized by liberal rhetoric: the small factory owner, the trader, and the craftsman. 
Hansemann did not favour Mevissen’s strongly worded suggestions. Mevissen’s 
plan was unlikely to receive government financing, and risked undermining what 
Hansemann saw as the goal of the liberal movement’s revolutionary credit politics. 
Establishing joint-stock discount banks across five major cities, as well as pumping cash 
into the stock markets and opening the maximum note-issue of the Prussian bank was 
too expensive for a Prussian government still exercised with avoiding the promulgation 
of a proper constitution. Furthermore, the pleas of the major Chambers of Commerce 
for the establishment of discount banks risked simply turning more financial power over 
into the hands of the financial establishment: in all of these cities other than Cologne the 
reigning financial institutions were likely to either fail to pass newly created liquidity 
onto industry (using it to bolster their own balance sheets)—no less small and medium 
sized enterprises and entrepreneurs—or instead channel it back into the speculative 
purchase of government paper.  
                                                
81 Indeed, in our contemporary period, many banks did just this when receiving government 
monies in the wake of the 2007-8 “Credit Crunch.” 
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There was no tidy solution to the catalogue of problems confronting the Rhenish 
financial elite that had entered government. Hansemann’s ultimate decision reflected a 
certain level of postponement on some fronts. The commercial centres that had written 
to Hansemann requesting assistance would continue to be assisted through small 
amounts of grants and subsidies dispersed through emergency discount houses, their 
further rolling out approved on 15th April 1848. Simultaneously, Hansemann worked 
diligently with other members of the Finance Ministry in order to develop a new legal 
infrastructure for the concession of note-issuing banks. He would finally succeed in 
gaining approval for this measure in September of 1848.  The significance of this 
initiative was its attempt to solve the liquidity problem within parameters conducive to 
further industrialization. The new note-issuing banks would be limited in the amount of 
capital they could employ, the number of banknotes they could issue, subject to very 
stringent reserve requirements as well as prohibited from engaging in other “normal” 
banking or speculative activities (M. Pohl, 1982a). The aim was to both satisfy the 
liquidity needs of the major commercial centres, while also ensuring that these banks 
would avoid lucrative speculative activities and instead fulfill their role as providers of 
liquidity and discounting functions (Böhme, 1965: 207-8). 
Lastly, in partnership with Mevissen, Hansemann developed a special plan for 
digging Cologne out of its impending potential financial morass. Rather than establish a 
further temporary discount house there, the two Rhenish financiers decided to convert 
the Schaaffhausen Private Bank into a joint-stock bank and thereby solve the problem of 
payment stoppage (Böhme, 1965). By converting the outstanding debts of the bank into 
shares it became no longer necessary to repay those debts immediately in the short-term 
(for those creditors needing immediate liquidity, their shares could be resold without 
affecting the balance sheet position of the bank). Some creditors of the Bank were not 
entirely enthused by the idea (M. Pohl, 1982a: 59). Consequently, the 4.3 million Taler 
of shares were divided between two groups: share group A, for creditors of the bank, 
received shares guaranteed an annual dividend of 4.5%. Further, the government agreed 
to guarantee the value of these shares as well as the dividend payment until 1858, while 
10% of these shares were meant to be paid back annually to these shareholders (M. 
Pohl, 1982a: 59). Those in share group B, were the newly envisioned partners and 
owners of the Bank proper, who would receive a 2% annual dividend on their shares, 
while the value of their equity was allowed to fluctuate on the market.  
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The trade-off for the transformation of the bank was a role for the state in the 
operation of the bank. As the Minister of Finance, Hansemann used his governmental 
powers to block the possibilities for a “completely free unfurling of the bank’s 
capabilities” (Böhme, 1965: 205, my translation). Hansemann ensured that the 
government would have a right to determine quite a significant amount of the bank’s 
operations. It would be able to nominate the director of the bank, as well as the naming 
of a special “state inspector” for the bank. This state inspector would negotiate all 
interactions between the state and the bank, could ask any information of the bank’s 
director, and would be involved in all business of the bank’s administration and the 
annual general meeting. The statutes of the bank allowed it, much like it had previously 
done before it was transformed into a joint-stock bank (see Chapter 4), to engage in 
almost all banking activities except the issue of bank-notes—although its chief activity 
at the time of its “re-foundation” would be “the provision of credit for the ailing and 
distressed manufacturers along the Rhine” (Böhme, 1965: 206). That is to say, while the 
immediate purpose of the restructuring of the bank was to help solve the liquidity 
problems associated with the commercial crisis occurring simultaneously with the 
revolution, the pre-existing business policies of the bank were formally instantiated in 
the new joint-stock bank statutes. A Rhenish “mixed-bank” was officially, legally, and 
finally, made into the first German joint-stock bank by royal assent on the 28th August 
1848 (cf. Riesser, 1910: 507-8).  
 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft—a Joint-Stock Bank by other means 
 
“Hansemann…was able to reconcile the profitable with the eleemosynary.”82  
 
The agreement between creditors, Rhenish financiers, and the Finance Ministry 
(Hansemann) to transform the Abraham Schaaffhausen Private Bank into the 
Schaaffhausen Bankverein had been effectively concluded by the end of April (27th) 
1848; however, between the settlement over the form of the new bank and its official 
foundation in August 1848 the revolution continued to advance. In addition to the 
attempt to solve the crisis through the provision of credit, the Finance and Trade 
Ministries had been authorized to engage in a form of “demand stimulus” (avant la 
lettre), employing people to literally “move dirt” in large cities with unemployment 
                                                
82 Kleeburg (1989: 138) 
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problems like Berlin (Boch, 1991). Nevertheless, the liquidity crisis continued, and 
threats to the existing order from the “red spectre” (Hansemann, as quoted in Böhme, 
1965: 208) continued and threatened to become even more radicalized along lines of 
those “who had and those who wished to have” (von der Heydt, quoted in Böhme, 1965: 
200). Solingen reported to Berlin on the 12th of May 1848 that “the desperate situation 
of our workers becomes worse everyday, as does the threat of an outbreak of disorder 
and illegality,” while the city of Kempen reported that “masses of unemployed workers 
are moving by force into isolated farming communities and extorting money and 
victuals from the inhabitants” (Böhme, 1965: 208).  
At the same time, the conservative movement began to react against the early 
policies of the Camphausen-Hansemann ministry as the state subsidies, grants and 
advances distributed via the emergency discount centres threatened to drain available 
funds from the East Elbian mortgage market. The Landschaften were first established in 
1770 as a way to assist East Elbian farmers without charity. These institutions were 
mortgage banks the sole purpose of which was to make loans against the collateral of 
real-estate and transform these loans into marketable securities called Pfandbriefe 
(effectively mortgages) (Tcherkinsky, 1922: 9-13, 28ff.). Many elements of the private 
banking order, especially in Eastern Prussia had become more and more apt to purchase 
Prussian state, as well as foreign government, securities, especially as the Pfandbriefe of 
the Landschaften had appeared as safer investments vis-à-vis other securities beginning 
in the 1840s as the prices of other securities appeared more turbulent. The market value 
of the Pfandbriefe actually remained at par over the course of the revolution,83 but 
conservative elements within the government nevertheless felt threatened. The East-
Elbian region was the subsistence motor of the Prussian Monarchy, as well as the 
conservative movement within Prussia, and the system of mortgage credit represented a 
way “to maintain continuity in the ownership of land” (Brophy, 1998: 97).  The 
potential for falling purchases of Pfandbriefe might indicate the potential for greater 
fungibility in that land.  
The policies of Hansemann would ultimately lead to his dismissal from the 
Finance Ministry on the 15th September 1848, but not from his position as head of the 
Prussian Bank. In his capacity as the leader of the Prussia’s chief public credit institute, 
                                                
83 Indeed, as Brophy has shown (1998: 219, note 50), the Prussian cabinet would later employ 
similar arguments by mobilizing statistics showing the increased number of purchases of 
Pfandbriefe during the period up to 1851.  
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Hansemann would carry on a two-year political battle with August von der Heydt,84 the 
Prussian Minister of Trade, and Hansemann’s other successor,85 Finance Minister 
Rudolf von Rabe, over the nature of the future organization of private credit and debt 
within Prussia. Von der Heydt, like Hansemann, was a member of the “wild and radical 
Rheinlanders” who entered into government office in March of 1848 (Frankfurter 
Oberpostamts Newspaper, quoted in M. Pohl, 1982: 51). A banker by trade, from 
Elberfeld, and associated with the liberal movement, von der Heydt might have 
appeared to have been a supporter of reform and social transformation and the liberal 
movement more generally. Despite being an advocate for expanded political rights vis-
à-vis private property, he was counter intuitively a thoroughgoing supporter of the 
monarchy and the conservative order (Böhme, 1966a: 35). As Minister of Trade, von 
der Heydt managed to acquire the responsibility for the concession of all new banks 
under the new government, and with this aimed to prop-up the status quo relationships 
of credit provision within Prussia (Brophy, 1998; Böhme, 1965; Bergengrün, 1908).  
The new normative statutes for note-issuing banks worked out under 
Hansemann’s aegis as Finance Minister, and passed on the 15th September 1848, 
allowing the concession of joint-stock note-issuing banks provided the first points of 
struggle over the shape of Germany’s financial system during the post-revolutionary 
period. The responsibility for assessing the applications for concessions had prior to 
September 1848 resided with the Finance Ministry (which, under Rother and 
Hansemann, had also been the nerve centre for the Prussian Bank and the Prussian 
Overseas Trading Corporation). When von der Heydt took over the Ministry of Trade, 
he also appropriated the prerogative to assess new requests for concessions. As a 
supporter of the monarchy, and the traditional financial order in Prussia, von der Heydt 
voiced a keen “inclination to endorse” concessions for joint-stock banks that would 
benefit the traditional concerns of the private banking order (government securities and 
loans, as well as credit for larger commercial operations), and especially those that 
demonstrated a potential to increase the flow of funds to the lands East of the Elbe 
(Böhme, 1966a: 35). Von der Heydt turned down the opportunity to provide 
                                                
84 It was only after two months that von der Heydt was promoted to the position of Minister of 
Trade within the Cabinet.  
85 Hansemann’s immediate successor in the Prussian Finance Ministry was Gustav von Bonin. 
While von Bonin achieved little during his two months in office, it is erroneous to state, as 
Böhme does (1966: 34), that the Ministry of Finance remained empty before being occupied by 
von Rabe.  
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concessions for note-issuing banks in Krefeld, Gladbach,86 Ruhrort,87 Duisburg (all 
prominent industrial oriented cities along the Rhine and the Ruhr) precisely because 
“there was a deficit of banks” there (Böhme, 1966a: 36): in other words his aim was to 
starve those regions of credit. Despite having entered Berlin with the “wild Rhineland 
radicals,” von der Heydt’s Ministerial tenure was marked by a strategic operation in 
favour of the aristocracy and monarchy.88  Hansemann, aiming to continue his liberal 
political project of an industrial—as against a feudal order—collided head-on with this 
inclination. 
The new opportunity to concession joint-stock banks of issue was first taken 
advantage of by the Berliner Kassen-Verein.  The Kassen-Verein was essentially a 
discount bank, founded in 1824 as a private partnership by prominent Berlin Bankers 
(Rachel and Wallich, 1967: 238ff.), in order to assist the commercial groups of the city 
to find rediscounting opportunities by issuing banknotes. Following the restriction of 
the opportunity to issue banknotes imposed by the Prussian government in the 1830s, 
the business of the Kassen-Verein had become significantly limited as it was forced to 
discount with cash payments (H. Pohl, 1982: 42). The promulgation of the new 
normative statutes allowed the Kassen-Verein not only to apply to issue banknotes 
again,89 but to reorganize its private partnership as a joint-stock company.  
Even though Hansemann had worked quite hard in order to promulgate the new 
normative statutes, and similarly assiduously in order to establish other means to solve 
the liquidity difficulties that occurred during the revolution and had marked the 
commercial crises in the run-up to the revolution, he presented formidable resistance to 
the transformation of the Berliner Kassen-Verein into a joint-stock company with the 
ability to issue banknotes. In numerous memoranda, reports, official statements and 
writings, Hansemann outlined several arguments against the concession for a 
transformation of the Kassen-Verein into a joint-stock company: firstly, the 
                                                
86 Gladbach was renamed in 1960 to Mönchengladbach in order to distinguish it from another 
German city, Bergisch Gladbach  also in the vicinity. During our time period it was known 
simply as Gladbach.  
87 Ruhrort is today a district within Duisburg, having been incorporated in 1905, but during our 
time period was a distinct, and heavily industrialized, port city. 
88 Indeed, von der Heydt was also responsible for dealing with all railways that had received 
state guarantees, and became involved in a debilitating series of conflicts over the operation of 
night trains during his tenure (as a specific strategy to make certain railways unprofitable and 
thereby worsen their financial positions so much that the state might take them over and operate 
them publicly) (Brophy, 1998).   
89 Up to a maximum of 1 Million Taler.  
 117 
establishment of a second bank in the capital that could issue banknotes would provide 
too much competition for the Prussian Bank and would complicate the State’s overview 
of credit affairs in the capital and its surroundings; secondly, this would negatively 
impinge upon the overall circulation of money and capital; finally, that there was no 
incentive for the Kassen-Verein to dedicate any of its services to the small business or 
craftsmen during times of crisis (Böhme, 1966a: 37; Rachel and Wallich, 1967: 275). 
Rather than concession a further discount bank that would work only for the largest 
commercial ventures in the capital, and thereby further concentrate the financial wealth 
and resources in particular hands, Hansemann argued that it was finally time, especially 
in light of the events of the revolution, for an institution that could provide for the 
masses of small to medium sized craftsmen and traders of Berlin (Rachel and Wallich, 
1967: 275). Promoting as it did the advancement of credit for East Elbian Junkers, von 
Rabe and von der Heydt supported the application to grant a concession to the Kassen-
Verein, which was subsequently agreed and signed by the King on the 15th April 1850. 
Hansemann “attached a draft” (idea) for a different kind of bank to his 
arguments against providing a concession for the Kassen-Verein that would, without his 
intent at the time, germinate later into the Disconto-Gesellschaft (Rachel and Wallich, 
1967: 275; Poschinger, 1879: 227). Hansemann proposed that rather than allow the 
Kassen-Verein to be transformed into a joint-stock note-issuing bank that would only 
serve the further concentration of wealth in the region, it would be better to concession 
a new bank that would specifically serve the needs of craftsmen, small business and 
wage-workers (Böhme, 1966a: 40). Hansemann justified himself at length, stating that  
 
the solid small tradesmen find personal credit more difficult to come by, and much more 
expensive, as compared to the large tradesmen—sometimes they cannot even come by it 
at all. It would be a much bigger achievement [than the transformation of the Berliner 
Kassen-Verein] if this social ill could be remedied and thereby the rise of the small 
tradesmen encouraged, not through public charity (which as a rule brings aspiring people 
down rather than lifting them up), but brokered instead through a good business 
orientation. In the event that one could establish such an institution, it would also have 
the not undesirable advantage that solid tradesmen would not have guaranteed personal 
credit—as so often happens—removed or denied with the onset of political and 
commercial crises. (Hansemann, as quoted in Bergengrün, 1901: 663, my translation) 
 
The envisaged form of this new bank was similar to what we would today call a credit 
co-operative, and drew inspiration from the Belgian Union de Crédit founded in 
Brussels in 1848 (Kleeberg, 1988: 137). Hansemann envisioned his “Berliner Credit-
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Gesellschaft” as a joint-stock company whereby the share-capital of the members would 
constitute the working capital of the firm. Members of the association would be able to 
receive credit on current accounts up to the amount of the capital they invested in the 
institution, in the form of discounted bills of exchange, or on current account credits 
(Däbritz, 1931: 9; Bergengrün, 1901: 663).  Even though the revolution was clearly 
over by May 1849, Hansemann was still exercised to solve the political problems of  an 
industrial order for Prussia through credit. The desire to provide credit to craftsmen and 
“tradespeople” was to co-opt their allegiance, and incorporate them into a commercial-
industrial (capitalist) order, thereby solving the problem of the “social danger” (soziale 
Gefahr) (Böhme, 1966a).  
 By planning to found his new credit cooperative in the form of a joint-stock 
organization, Hansemann set the stage for a protracted battle with the Prussian 
bureaucracy. The first draft proposal of the bank’s statutes was only completed on 28th 
May 1850, a year subsequent to Hansemann’s original appendix against the Kassen 
Verein. Hansemann used his position as the chief of the Prussian Bank to reserve the 
largest conference room in the Bank’s headquarters for the first general meeting of the 
proposed credit institute in June 1850. The attendees confirmed the proposed statutes, 
and built a committee for the elaboration of business policies and plan (Däbritz, 1931: 
9). In May of 1851, a year after the submission of the initial proposal Rabe and von der 
Heydt issued their rejection for the proposal. They would only concede to allowing the 
new credit institute a 10 years concession, instead of the requested 25; secondly, the 
proposed acceptance of members’ deposits in return for interest payments was denied 
(Däbritz, 1931: 11). The latter, Rabe and von der Heydt with the Minister of State 
Flottwell argued would have put the bank at an advantage vis-à-vis the private bankers 
in Berlin who were not allowed to collect deposits for which interest was paid (Böhme, 
1966a). Hansemann responded by pointing out that the acceptance of deposits was a 
crucial factor for the existence of the credit institute (Däbritz, 1931: 11), because it 
would allow the institute the proper leverage to attract wealthy customers who would 
support the credit needs of the smaller and medium craftsmen. It was indeed 
the actual purpose of the association [the planned Berliner Kredit-Gesellschaft] to 
provide artisans, craftsmen and especially the small and medium sized tradesmen a 
facilitation in the terms of acquiring credit, in such a way that it would also inspire their 
industriousness, skill and their own acquisition of wealth. Indeed, the aim is to achieve 
such a facilitation under conditions where the small tradesman can access credit on 
proportionally similar terms as the large manufacturer or trader” (Böhme, 1966a: 47).  
 
 119 
At the same time that von Rabe and von der Heydt were attempting to shut down 
Hansemann’s efforts to open his credit institute in Berlin, Friedrich Harkort “the Father 
of the Ruhr”—who was an industrial pioneer and prominent member of the liberal 
political movement, opened an inquiry into the banking system in early 1851 where he 
praised the goal of Hansemann’s endeavour (Däbritz, 1931: 10). Von der Heydt, noting 
the popularity of Hansemann in Berlin (Bergengrün, 1901; cf. Bergengrün, 1908), as 
well as the need to pacify resistance to his various political projects in favour of the 
Monarchy and aristocracy, began granting concessions for joint-stock mining 
companies in the Rhineland and especially the Ruhr (Böhme, 1966a) in order to appeal 
to liberal businessmen on different, less problematic terrain. Furthermore, von der 
Heydt also reduced the level of taxation for mining companies by half, and eliminated 
royalties stemming from their operation.90 The facilitation of concession granting for 
joint-stock mining companies successfully helped to placate the members of the liberal 
movement. For example, Gustav Mevissen, who had been integral to the transformation 
of the Schaaffhausen Bankverein (and afterwards become its director) was of the belief 
that it was better for the advance of an industrial order to move forward with the 
building and construction of joint-stock mining companies. Indeed, the amount of 
activity that the Schaaffhausen Bankverein conducted with such companies over the 
1850s was tremendous (M. Pohl, 1982b).  
 Hansemann appeared to be effectively routed at the rejection of his proposal. 
Despite his popularity, the base of his support in the Rhineland was more or less 
placated by their new relative ease in obtaining concessions for mining companies, and 
private bankers—with strategic links to the East Elbian nobility—seemed bound to grab 
hold of the credit system to further entrench an agrarian feudal order. Shortly after the 
decision against his credit cooperative, Hansemann stepped down from his position as 
head of the Prussian Bank. Free from his obligations as a Minister, he devoted himself 
to establishing his institute. With the assistance of prominent lawyer Justizrat Geppert, 
Hansemann found the first of many loopholes that would allow him to pursue his 
project. Under Geppert’s advice, Hansemann established the company as a 
“commandite trading company” (Kommandit Handelsgesellschaft), which did not 
require a specific concession from the government, but would allow Hansemann to 
engage in all of the planned activities with the members of the co-operative (Brophy, 
                                                
90 Mining industries had previously been operated privately, but only by the indulgence of the 
crown. 
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1998: 99; Däbritz, 1931: 12). Organizing the company on this legal basis required that 
there be both “active” and “silent” partners in the firm. The active partners were the 
only ones with a “legal personality” as far as the law was concerned—that is to say, the 
active partners were the only ones that could be held legally culpable in an unlimited 
sense for the debts of the firm. The silent partners were only responsible for the cash 
equivalent that they had paid into the firm’s capital stock. Therefore, unlike a joint-
stock company, the firm would only exist legally so long as the active partners lived, or 
remained attached to the firm. Further, the active partners of the firm could be held 
responsible for any debts or financial obligations of the firm in the event of something 
like a bankruptcy. The similarity with the joint-stock company was that the “silent” 
partners were only legally liable up to the amount of their paid in shares.91 Hansemann, 
freed from his formal political obligations at the Bank of Prussia, agreed to be an active 
partner of the firm, where the “Direction” should have no less than 3 and no more than 
9 members; however, the unlimited liability of the endeavour was apparently a too 
heavy risk to take as Hansemann was the sole “active” partner at the firm’s outset. This 
nevertheless enabled the other 236 members who transferred from the original plan for 
the Berliner Kreditgesellschaft, to engage in this institution with limited liability.  
 The foundation of the company was completed, and business operations began, 
on the 15th of October in 1851, under the name “Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft.” 
The primary business of the Direction was the discounting of bills of exchange from its 
members, but it also accepted deposits from non-members (this was a further benefit of 
the legal structure that allowed it to circumvent the regulations for joint-stock banks) 
(Däbritz, 1931). Members could discount bills on favourable terms up to the value of 
their paid-in capital, while the deposits of non-members would help to keep the 
institution liquid for the membership.  
The response of the Prussian government was to instruct the Prussian Bank to 
neither recognize the Disconto-Gesellschaft as a credit institution, nor to discount any of 
its bills (Brophy, 1998: 99). To be sure, this action was one of political contempt for a 
project that symbolized a vision of the credit system not espoused by the government. 
The Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft had only 500,000 talers of reserves when it 
began, operated only on a membership basis, and was forbidden from any kind of 
                                                
91 This is “share” in the strictly proportional sense of paid in capital, not equity shares that were 
initially issued on a market, nor ones that could be transferred then via further sale on another 
market. 
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speculative activities (Brophy, 1998: 99). That is to say, it could not purchase, sell, or 
hold any securities: even in the event that it had wanted to (it was forbidden from doing 
so by its statutes), the amount of business that it engaged in via its members was hardly 
adequate in order to undertake such speculative endeavours. Therefore, it hardly 
represented any kind of threat to the established institutions of Prussian finance at the 
time. 
 The operation of the Disconto-Gesellschaft in its first years was not entirely 
successful. Business was circumscribed because of the restrictions on its ability to 
discount at the Prussian Bank, which “neared a boycott” from the latter public 
institution (Däbritz, 1939: 19).  While the number of members from the small and 
medium sized businesses grew, as well as deposits from wealthier clients, the actual 
amount of loans made at the institution remained well below a level that would turn the 
institution a profit (Dahlem, 2009: 122). The initial purpose of the redistribution from 
wealthy “non-members” to the smaller clients had been envisioned as a simple necessity 
to keep the business going. As the membership made relatively little use of the 
Disconto’s discount window, the proportion between the “special” membership and 
non-membership business required adjustment in order to balance the books.  
Hansemann was also no longer a young man, already at the founding of the bank 
61 years old, his health had begun to repeatedly fail from numerous ailments in the 
early 1850s. While in Bonn recovering from sickness in early 1855, Hansemann 
discovered that one of his representatives had made some disastrous choices leading to 
losses of 12,000 thaler (Bergengrün, 1901: 671). As the solely liable figure, this was a 
first wake-up call for Hansemann about the survival possibilities of the bank. Further, 
over the previous five years, Hansemann had remained the only active partner in the 
firm, having failed to attract any further interest from capable businessmen and 
financiers who might be able to lead the bank with him and accept the legal 
responsibility for the enterprise.  
Since the foundation of the Direction in 1851, the Prussian, and more generally 
the German economies had begun an economic expansion. Financiers in France and the 
Rhineland had begun to change the terrain of commercial and industrial finance with the 
foundations of the Crédit Mobilier and the Darmstädter Bank (for the latter see the next 
section). These two foundations, properly universal banks aiming at sponsoring 
industrial foundations, were brought to life against the backdrop of a decreased general 
need for liquidity and means of payment in the German economy. This owed in part to 
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the large discoveries of gold in California and Australia which loosened monetary 
constraints across Europe (Hobsbawm, 1975: 49-50). The increased supply of precious 
metals flooded the continent and helped to reduce the pressure on the payments system 
that had so characterized the pre-revolutionary political economy of Prussia and the 
German states. Furthermore, a general increase in confidence following the cessation of 
revolutionary violence assisted in doubling the number of deposits at the Prussian Bank 
over the first six months of 1851 alone (Kitchen, 1978: 87). These developments almost 
single handedly transformed the considerations of financiers interested in promoting 
new financial institutions. The dearth of liquidity might still become a threat, but the 
sudden relative ease with which railway and mining companies might be concessioned 
opened a new window to push towards the industrial future.   
In this context, and against the confluence of these influences, Hansemann was 
began contemplating the extension of the Direction’s business beyond simply 
discounting bills of exchange for small and medium sized businessmen (Bergengrün, 
1901: 671). Hansemann began working on a set of statutes, and new legal organization 
for the bank that would allow it to engage specifically in more “irregular” banking 
business (securities issuing and purchase) as a way to support the “special business” of 
the bank (its provision of credit to small and medium sized businesses), as well as 
attract capable businessmen to join the ranks of the active partnership (Bergengrün, 
1901: 671). It should be emphasized that despite the change in direction, Hansemann 
was still intent on supporting the institute’s original purpose of credit provision to the 
membership (Dahlem, 2009: 122-3).  
Hansemann was undoubtedly influenced in his thinking about the new shape of 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft by the business program of the Darmstädter Bank. Shortly 
after its foundation in 1853 the Oppenheims offered Hansemann the opportunity to 
serve as the new bank’s managing director. Thereby Hansemann’s familiarity with that 
bank’s design, as well as his familiarity with the Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein (M. 
Pohl, 1982a) and the highly publicized founding of the Crédit Mobilier helped to forge 
his thinking about the future of industrial finance. Together with his son (Adolph 
Hansemann), Justizrat Geppert I, and Karl Mathy, Hansemann worked out a new set of 
statutes (Bergengrün, 1901) that was presented to the annual general meeting of the 
membership on the 28th April 1855. The statutes would allow the bank to engage in all 
banking activities, including the purchase of state paper, securities and provide 
advances against equity paper as well as engage in business with non-members and 
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increase the maximum share capital to 50,000 thaler (Burhop, 2004: 84). Most 
significantly, while the bank had originally been founded as a “commandite trading 
company,” those working out the new statutes, undoubtedly influenced by the legal 
expertise of Justizrat Geppert I once again, decided to found the firm as a “commandite 
share company” (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien). This organization followed the 
same principles outlined above, but with the added benefit that silent partners could be 
attracted with resalable shares. The statutes were approved on 9th January 1856, and by 
the summer of that year the Disconto-Gesellschaft was, with the small proviso of 
Hansemann’s unlimited liability, a joint-stock universal bank.  
Hansemann’s reworking of the Disconto-Gesellschaft’s statutes transformed an 
institution that was, for all intents and purposes a credit cooperative, meticulously 
constructed to provide short-term credit to small tradespeople, into a credit institution 
capable of universal banking. The transformation of the Disconto-Gesellschaft into an 
institution capable of the full palette of financial services was driven principally by 
Hansemann’s desire to provide a reliable source of credit for small and middle sized 
industrialists: this was a political goal in the sense of aiming to bolster the 
transformation of Prussia towards an industrial society. 
 
Founding the Bank of Darmstadt  
 
“The appearance is, in this case, not the entire truth. The provision that the founders 
participate by pledging their own capital [and reputations], and thereby guarantee the 
majority of equity shares, is, when carefully scrutinized, only the guarantee of a profit. 
The rule is that the founders will for the most part sell their shares as soon as the share 
price has increased enough that they can make a tidy profit. They wouldn’t engage in a 
foundation if they did not expect a profit as reported by the general opinion of the 
Bourse.”92 
 
This new legal form offered many risks for Hansemann, as well as any active 
partners associated with the firm. Indeed, the legal form of the commandite bank while 
providing similar benefits as the joint-stock banking company might, had existed under 
the Code de Commerce of the Rhineland,93 but had not often been employed because of 
the risks associated for the full partners (Bösselmann, 1939). Hansemann was willing to 
engage these risks because he had experienced first hand the hostility of the Prussian 
                                                
92 Poschinger (1879: 208-9), my translation. 
93 The commandite form of company had also been widely used in France at the time that 
Justizrat Geppert advised Hansemann to deploy it for his credit company. 
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government in granting concessions to new banks in Prussia (Brophy, 1998: 99) and 
had become frustrated with the conservative politics that he saw as threatening the basis 
for an industrial-capitalist society in Prussia. Hansemann’s singular dedication to the 
political vision of an industrial order free from the “social danger,” as well as the failure 
of his own businesses in Aachen during his ministerial tenure, compelled him to pursue 
this project (Böhme, 1966a, 1966b), beyond the potential fiduciary gains that it offered. 
Other entrepreneurs had not been willing to take on the risks involved to found such 
institutions.  
Shortly after Hansemann had originally founded the Disconto-Gesellschaft in 
1851, Gustav Mevissen (who had been involved in transforming the Schaaffhausen 
private bank), and Abraham Oppenheim (a major partner of the Salomon Oppenheim 
private bank in Cologne (see Chapter 2 here)), had submitted a request for a concession 
for a further joint-stock bank in Cologne. Needless to say, in its avowed support for 
industrial—and not East-Prussian agricultural projects—the Prussian government 
rejected the proposal (Stürmer et al, 1994: 136). The business policies of this bank 
would later be considered those of the first Crédit Mobilier bank in Germany—that is to 
say the first universal bank intentionally founded as a joint-stock company. Indeed, the 
proposal put forward a bank that would ostensibly operate on universal bank principles 
without the simultaneous aim of issuing banknotes. In other words, without aiming to 
solve payments and liquidity problems, but specifically for the purpose of providing 
long-term credit to industry while also dealing with their short-term credit needs.94 
Despite declaring in the statutes the universal character of its intended financial 
practices, the aim of the bank’s founders was in actuality to sponsor the foundation 
business, and more specifically, to devolve the foundation business from their own 
private banking practices (Reitmayer, 2001a: 172). That is to say, the founders aimed to 
create an institution not unlike an investment bank. If the vision of this intent were 
successful, it would effectively provide for the specialization of their private banking 
business on short-term credit, while they could use their joint-stock bank to focus on 
large, irregular, and speculative financial ventures. This can be seen as a reaction to the 
changing political-economy of Germany at this time: the private financiers who wished 
to bring about industrialization were also concerned about maintaining their wealth in 
                                                
94 Although it should be noted that the original proposal included the possibility of the bank’s 
capacity to issue promissory notes, which in some ways might be considered similar to issuing 
money substitutes. Even after its successful foundation in Darmstadt, the statute remained 
effective but a dead letter (Cameron 1956). 
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that new social order. Tightly imbricated in the process of founding the new bank were 
therefore sociopolitical, as well as economic concerns: neither of which can be given 
precedence.  
The fragmented geopolitical order of German states would also play a role in the 
evolution of this new institution. Following their failure to secure a concession in 
Prussian territory, Mevissen and Oppenheim tried their hand at founding the bank in 
Frankfurt, a location that was outside of the regulatory remit of Prussia and its 
restrictive concession system and where the close proximity to the Bourse would allow 
them to engage in the flotation and foundation business that they envisioned as central 
to the bank’s activities. The Frankfurt senate in conjunction with the Rothschilds (who 
were a major power in the city), similarly turned down the request for a concession 
(Cameron, 1956: 119). This was in part because the statutes of the bank resembled very 
closely those of the Crédit Mobilier in France, as well as the “mixed-banking” statutes 
of the Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein. This principle represented a threat to the 
Rothschilds because it promised to dislodge their very profitable “old bank” ways 
grounded on the government loan business (Landes, 1956; cf. Chapter 2 here). At the 
end of 1852, the Cologne financiers were faced with opposition from both Berlin and 
Frankfurt, where the interests of the existing financial and politico-economic order 
founded on the government securities business mobilized their powers in order to block 
an institution that threatened its continued operation. 
December of 1852 presented Mevissen and Oppenheim with a solution to their 
location problem, when Moritz von Haber—a relative of Oppenheim’s through 
marriage—offered to sell his concession for a discount and issue bank valid in the 
Grand Duchy of Darmstadt (not 20 miles from Frankfurt) to them at a discount (Stürmer 
et al, 1994: 136; Hansen, 1906: 649; Knips, 1912: 24). Haber was unable to take 
advantage of the concession that he had been granted because he had been driven into 
liquidation proceedings during the commercial crisis early in 1848.95 By locating in 
Darmstadt, the bankers would be able to conduct business with relative ease in 
Frankfurt owing to its proximity, and thereby use the Bourse there in order to issue and 
                                                
95 It is interesting to note that the Haber private bank had not been catastrophically insolvent 
during this period. Rather, owing to its location in Karlsruhe, it had limited options for 
rediscounting and was forced to turn to the Rothschilds of Frankfurt for this purpose. The 
Rothschilds “arbitrarily,” but most likely because of their dislike of bankers that supported that 
supported industrial undertaking (cf. Landes 1956), refused the Haber private bank any 
rediscount facilities (M. Pohl 1982a: 68).  
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place stocks for the new companies that they aimed to found through the bank. 
Moreover, they once again evaded the strict concession system of Prussia, but being 
along its borders would be able to conduct business within it.  
On the 6th January 1853, Haber met with the two Oppenheim partners of Sal. 
Oppenheim & Cie bank, brothers Abraham and Simon, as well as the directors of the 
Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein Gustav Mevissen, Victor Wendelstadt and Wilhelm 
Ludwig Deichmann and concluded a contract for the transfer of the concession. The 
concession was itself not a legally fungible commodity, and required the acquiescence 
of the relevant authorities in Darmstadt.96 Mevissen worked out the new statutes for the 
bank drawing on those of Schaaffhausen and the Parisian Crédit Mobilier so that Haber 
could submit them to the government for agreement on the 25th January 1853 (M. Pohl, 
1982a: 69). Absolutely crucial to the speedy approval of the plans was the agreement of 
Prime Minister Dalwigk, who was an avowed opponent of Prussia (Seidenzahl, 1961: 
254). This opposition stemmed from the landlocked position of Hessen-Darmstadt 
between two larger pieces of Prussia and its essentially forced entry into the Zollverein. 
It was only with the agreement of the Hessen Parliament that the concession could be 
(1) transformed into two concessions—for both a joint-stock “mixed-bank,” as well as 
for a note-issuing bank—and (2) transferred from Haber to the Cologne financiers. 
Without this background of German geopolitical conflict it is possible that the 
concession would not have been agreed, or that less favourable terms might have been 
asked of the Cologne bankers. The statutes for the Bank für Handel und Industrie zu 
Darmstadt (commonly known as the Darmstädter Bank, or the BHI) were presented to, 
and signed by, the Grand Duke Ludwig von Hessen on the 2nd April 1853. 
This was not the end of conflict over the bank’s foundation. On 13th April 1853 
the government officially publicized the opening of the bank; however, despite the 
heavy secrecy of the process up to that point, the conservative banking clique around 
the Rothschilds in Frankfurt managed to get wind of the developing situation on their 
doorstep. Still fearful of the competition this new institution would afford, they began to 
arrange difficulties for the Darmstädter Bank. The group around the Rothschilds 
organized resistance in Frankfurt by cajoling those under their influence not to purchase 
any of the initial share offering of the Bank. Only the Bethmanns, long a rival to the 
Rothschild bank and one of the exceptional few cases of a Frankfurt private bank 
                                                
96 One aspect of the contract was the obligation of Haber to undertake all necessary efforts to 
ensure the transfer of rights from himself to the group of Cologne financiers.  
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adventuresome enough for industrial undertakings, purchased a relatively small portion 
of the initial share offering (but had difficulty in placing it in Frankfurt). The Rothschild 
group also contacted their sources in Berlin and helped to influence a relative lack of 
popularity for the shares of the bank there as well. Although, this was perhaps 
superfluous as the Prussian government attitude towards the bank was similarly 
venomous: “apart from the demoralizing commercial effect, which would eventually 
destroy prosperity…such a bank would undeniably also exert the most disadvantageous 
political influence” (Stürmer et al., 1994: 136; cf. Brophy, 1998: 92-3). The Prussian 
government consequently unsuccessfully attempted to prohibit the Schaaffhausen’sche 
Bankverein from participating in the initial flotation of shares through its advisory seat 
on the bank’s board (Stürmer et al., 1994: 136). 
The importance of share price increases also illustrates the central role of 
speculative activity in the foundation of the bank. Speculative profits could be accrued 
from the price differentials in the par and sale price of bank shares, as well as through 
the “founders rights” for preferential prices (usually at the original par value) on any 
shares issues from capital stock increases. In the same manner as founding industrial 
corporations, corporate banks provided an avenue for speculative gain97 that would also 
assist to institutionalize an industrial society: holding corporate shares effectively tied 
the interests of those shareholders to the fate of the bank, and to its project for industrial 
promotion. Nevertheless, this would only work if interest could be aroused in the share 
offerings of the bank. In the event that the founders could not place shares on any 
securities market, e.g. in Frankfurt and Berlin, the bank would not have any capital, the 
value of the shares would fall, and the bank might need to be liquidated. The endeavour 
would, in short, lose any purpose. The Oppenheims, who appear to have contemplated 
such an outcome from as early as 6th January 1853 from correspondence records (M. 
Pohl 1982a), decided to resort to their connections in Paris given the resistance for a 
joint-stock bank from the existing powers in Frankfurt and Berlin. Through the banking 
firm of B.L. Fould & Fould-Oppenheim, who were stockholders in the Crédit Mobilier, 
the founders of the Bank für Handel und Industrie arranged an adequate placement of 
shares to begin the company. The bank was founded with a capital of 25 Million 
                                                
97 The statutes of the bank are renowned for how they prohibited speculation in securities 
market transactions, but the background of the Oppenheim brothers as well as the early history 
of the bank, recounted below, indicates that the statutes of the bank projected an image different 
than its practice (Reitmayer, 2001a: 172). 
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florins98 broken into 100,000 shares at 250 florins a share. The initial share offering 
would see 40,000 of those shares offered to the public, whereby 4,000 were given at par 
to Gebrüder Bethmann in Frankfurt, 4,000 for the directors of the Darmstädter Bank, 
10,000 sold at par to the stockholders of the Crédit Mobilier and the remaining 22,000 
shares split half between the founders and the other half with one quarter each at par to 
Fould-Oppenheim and the Crédit Mobilier (Cameron, 1956: 121).  
Obtaining the assistance of their Parisian connections did not completely allay 
difficulties in issuing the stock however. The Rothschilds, who also operated a familial 
branch in Paris, organized a large syndicate of conservative private bankers who were 
opposed to the foundation of the Darmstädter Bank (cf. Riesser, 1912: 51). This 
Rothschild group orchestrated price turbulence on the Parisian and Frankfurt markets. 
This syndicate of financial agents would buy many small allotments of BHI shares. 
Subsequently, they would then combine these many small parcels into large blocks to 
be sold off simultaneously, at a financial loss to the Rothschild consortium, but 
successfully driving down the market price for the Darmstädter’s securities (Cameron, 
1956: 121-2; Stürmer et al., 1994). The Rothschild consortium also engaged in rumour 
spreading and negative word-of-mouth publicity about the Darmstädter, alleging for 
example that the entire executive board had resigned because of its lack of confidence 
in the venture––which similarly helped to depress demand for and prices of the BHI’s 
paper (Stürmer et al., 1994: 138).  This type of financial market competition was not 
unknown to the Bank’s Parisian associates, who established a course of action to deal 
with the Rothschild obstacle. This involved setting a high repurchase price for the 
shares, and waiting for the market price to respond to this bid. The Cologne members of 
the operation became panicked about the potential losses if they repurchased shares at 
higher than par and could not subsequently resell them. Consequently, they began 
selling short on the Parisian futures market in an attempt to hedge against potential 
losses, which helped to further depress the price of shares.  
The entire opening gambit ended only slightly in the black for the Darmstädter 
bank,99 but ultimately resulted in the dissolution of working relations between the 
Darmstädter leadership and the Parisian group. The first two years of the Bank’s 
operations did not prove to be especially profitable. The first year ending with a “smear 
                                                
98 Talers were the currency of Prussia, florins of Florence (a respected currency of account in 
precious metal poor Germany). The rough equivalent of 25 Million florins would be today about 
5 Billion Dollars US (author’s calculation). 
99 The net profit on the endeavour was just slightly above 300,000 Francs (Cameron 1956: 122).  
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of red ink,” while the second allowed the Bank to engage its relations with the Crédit 
Mobilier to piggy-back on certain issues of State paper and some railways. At the end of 
the second year, the remaining shares of the bank’s initial capital still remained to be 
issued, for which the initial contract signed with Fould-Oppenheim and the Crédit 
Mobilier were in force. Reticent to engage in the same kind of process, the managers 
secretly established a “silent partner” (Kommandit) in the Parisian firm Leiden, Primsel 
et Cie (Cameron, 1956: 125). This involved investing capital, on a long-term basis, in 
the firm such that the BHI was effectively a partner of the firm with a stake in its 
operation, but of which the public was not aware.  Such a partner gave them more 
control over the operations of their connection to the French capital market because of 
the pliable nature of this smaller firm vis-à-vis the Darmstädter. Nevertheless, the 
Darmstädter was forced to pay Fould-Oppenheim and the Crédit Mobilier 15,000 
shares at par to annul the original contract that it had made with them.  
The foundation of BHI demonstrates several important features of the 
foundation of joint-stock banks. Firstly, the principal aim of its founders reveals the 
intimate intertwining of political and economic goals, of which solving for potential 
“market-failure” can only be regarded as a crude metaphor for the power struggle over 
the shape of the credit system. The founders of the BHI were engaged in a speculative 
process—ironically to enhance and further entrench their possibilities for future 
speculative business—that is best understood in the terms of politics and power. This 
was competition that occurred in part through the medium of securities exchanges but 
extended beyond the anodyne, depersonalized realm of profit and loss calculations. It is 
difficult if impossible to disaggregate the political aim of social transformation from 
that of speculative gain. Indeed, to understand the speculative side of the founders’ 
operations, it is necessary to consider them in a political light: the high potential for loss 
was balanced by the potential gain to extend the basis of industrial society. Secondly, 
the otherwise “contingent” role of political geography was necessitous for the 
foundation of the bank. The instrumentalization of minor geopolitical rivalries owing to 
the fragmented nature of political space opened the door to a concession for the bank. 
Finally, the foundation of this important joint-stock “universal bank” was intended as 
more of an investment bank, to augment the speculative capacities of its founders while 
allowing them to maintain a secure toe-hold in the already existing industrial order 
through their short-term private banking practices.  
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The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft 
 
“[By 1855] the trend toward joint-stock banks seemed irreversible, and Prussian 
businessmen believed that their government would eventually capitulate and recognize 
such institutions as indispensable to industrialization and economic growth.” 100 
 
The foundation of the Darmstädter Bank für Handel und Industrie represented a 
certain danger to the politico-economic establishment in Prussia. The early problems of 
the bank were countered by growing success and the expansion of its promotional 
investment activities. The Prussian government had been traditionally worried about 
joint-stock banks of issue and their ability to channel sources of credit away from East-
Elbian agriculture. This new joint-stock bank represented a different kind of threat 
insofar as it was unconcerned with the issue of bank-notes, and seemingly poised to 
sponsor industrial projects that might menace Prussian agricultural finance in a new 
manner. In the words of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV “[it would] have an undeniably 
disadvantageous political influence” (Quoted in Brophy, 1998: 93). For the private 
bankers, especially those in Berlin and Eastern Prussia, this new form of joint-stock 
bank represented a potential challenge to their ability to collect and invest capital along 
the tried and tested channels of government securities and discounting paper.  
Nevertheless, the success of the BHI after its early tribulations, as well as the 
Crédit Mobilier in France, had begun to shift the tide of opinion amongst businessmen. 
This was also encouraged by the slightly more liberal shift in the policy of granting 
concession for joint-stock companies in the 1850s. This change of opinion is especially 
evident in the changing practice of former “old bank” financiers: the Rothschilds, who 
had so vigorously opposed the foundation of the Darmstädter Bank especially because 
of its threat to the “old banking order” (Landes, 1956), seem to have recognized that “if 
you can not beat them, you should join them.” The Rothschilds consequently began 
founding joint-stock banks of their own marking a shift away from their traditional 
focus on the flotation and issue of government paper and currency speculation, e.g. the 
Österreichische Creditanstalt in 1855 in Vienna, and then in 1864 the Société Générale 
pour favoriser le développement du Commerce et de l’industrie en France in Paris 
(Born, 1983). 
                                                
100 Brophy (1998: 93) 
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In February 1856, the struggle over control of European finance came to Berlin. 
The founders of the Darmstädter Bank (the Cologne financiers Oppenheim, Mevissen et 
al.) as well as the Crédit Mobilier, and the Rothschild house with its attendants P.L. 
Ravené and Gerson Bleichröder both submitted proposals for joint-stock financial 
institutions to be founded in Berlin (Brophy, 1998: 94). The publicity of the proposals, 
the prestige of the banking houses associated with them, and the important provision for 
the sponsorship of agriculture helped the proposals to receive an initially positive 
greeting from the Prussian state. The camarilla around the crown was divided over the 
potential of the banks, and months of debate about the merits of the proposals ensued. 
As David Hansemann had only in January of 1856 effectively transformed his 
Disconto-Gesellschaft into a joint-stock company by means of its conversion to the 
commandite form, it appeared to some cabinet ministers that the battle against joint-
stock banks had already been lost and that the concessions should be granted. As von 
der Heydt would argue: “it would be easier to control promotional investment banking 
with the direct government oversight provided by allowing concessions” rather than 
allowing joint-stock banks to be founded through the legal means of commandite 
companies (Brophy, 1998: 94). Eventually, the position of denying the concessions won 
out, again for fear of displacing financing for agrarian mortgage financing. By denying 
either group of applicants a charter the state “sent a powerful signal to the Prussian 
business class, and it was this decision that most likely convinced the financiers of the 
need to employ the commandite principle” (Brophy, 1998: 98). Subsequently, the two 
groups of financiers conjoined and founded a “trade company” (Handelsgesellschaft) in 
the commandite form.101 In July 1856, private bankers representing both the entrenched 
financial order and those from the Rhineland, aiming to sponsor industrial activities, 
founded the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. The statutes of the bank endowed it with the 
power to engage in financial activities of all kinds (Lüke, 1956: 15); however, its chief 
raison d’être would be to advance the industrial investment and promotional business 
(foundation activities) in the Berlin region (Dahlem, 2009: 165).   
Circumventing the concession system through the commandite company form 
alarmed the Prussian authorities. Within months of founding the Disconto-Gesellschaft, 
the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft had been founded, as well as several other banking 
                                                
101 The foreign parties left the proposal at this time, possibly because of their apprehension at 
the commandite form.  
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institutions in the commandite form.102 While the literature on German banking and 
finance has largely treated the acceptance of the commandite form as unproblematic 
amongst Prussian businessmen, it is actually the case that the Prussian state reacted 
allergically to the denigration of its regulatory authority. In the summer of 1856 the 
Prussian crown drafted a decree (Oktroi) to ban the use of commandite legal form 
(Brophy, 1998: 94ff.). The decree was never promulgated because forces in the court 
camarilla surrounding the crown successfully argued that the elimination of the already 
existing commandite banks would be too troublesome from a constitutional and legal 
standpoint (and would therefore hazard further unwanted attention from liberal forces) 
(ibid). Nevertheless, the intensity of debate, and the avowed threat that such institutions 
appeared to pose for the existing order was clearly apparent in the discussion around the 
issuance of this decree.  
The government was also highly reluctant to simply ease the way for legal 
circumvention of its concession policy because it had also liberalized the note issuing 
abilities of the Prussian Bank in March of 1856. A fraction of the financial elite had 
turned their eyes towards a form of “mixed-banking” in joint-stock form to sponsor 
industry. However, despite the increase in the supply of money, many other private 
bankers had continued with the project of founding banks of issue. In particular, 
because of Prussia’s already high use of foreign currencies, and the Darmstädter Bank’s 
instrumentalization of Germany’s political fragmentation, a trend developed whereby 
joint-stock banks of issue were increasingly founded in German states with borders 
contiguous to Prussia. These numbers kept increasing until there were 29 joint-stock 
banks of issue within wider Germany in 1856 (M. Pohl, 1982b: 155). In the eyes of the 
state, the use of foreign notes within Prussia’s borders risked its control over financial 
developments, leading the state (with August von der Heydt leading the internal 
struggle within the camarilla parts of which opposed such an augmentation) to increase 
the note-issuing ability of the Prussian Bank (Lichter, 1999: 201ff.).  
The foundation of the Handelsgeselschaft represents a convenient way to mark a 
significant change in the social configuration of the Prusso-German political economy 
of the 1850s. In relation to the development of German finance, it presents a 
pacification of the tripartite political conflict that had raged over the institutional 
configuration of finance in Germany during the middle years of the nineteenth century. 
                                                
102 These included institutions in Stettin and Königsberg, neither of which would survive long 
enough in order to be of continuing relevance for the development of German finance. 
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Whereas the struggle over the shape of finance had originally been between three 
parties—the state, “old régime” financiers engaged in issuing state securities, and new 
industrially focused financiers—the axis of conflict over the Handelsgesellschaft was 
reduced to that between the state and financiers as two coherent groups because of the 
consolidation of the two proposals for a joint-stock firm into one foundation as a 
commandite bank. The issue of the decree to ban commandite firms—but which was 
never promulgated—represents the last attempt of the Prussian state to control the 
political-economy in an authoritative manner (Brophy, 1998: 105). Furthermore, the 
successful evasion of the Prussian concession system highlights how members of the 
liberal cause managed to achieve socioeconomic goals without the need for further 
democratization, and through extra-parliamentary means. As Brophy (1998: 106) has 
argued, this is a concrete example demonstrating the socio economic interests behind 
the “aristocratization” of the German bourgeoisie, or their “betrayal” of the revolution.  
The establishment of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft is also an important 
historical moment because it identifies an uptick in the establishment of joint-stock, and 
commandite, banks across Prussia and the other German states. It was the refusal to 
charter joint-stock banks by the Prussian state that lead financiers in Hansemann’s 
footsteps to adopt the commandite principle and accept higher risk than in a typical 
joint-stock company for the added leverage that these associations provided for 
speculative activities (Brophy, 1998: 98). Consequently, hot on the heels of the Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft, commandite banks were opened in Breslau, Königsberg, and 
Magdeburg (Brophy, 1998: 90). Moreover, other joint-stock banks of regional 
importance were founded in 1856, like the Norddeutsche Bank in Hamburg, the 
Mitteldeutsche Credit Bank in Meiningen, and the Allgemeine Deutsche Creditanstalt 
(ADCA) in Leipzig (M. Pohl, 1986a: 35).103   Like the other foundations examined in 
the chapter, these banks exemplified the extant reasons for adopting the joint-stock 
principle: the Mitteldeutsche Credit Bank in Meiningen was founded principally as a 
note-issuing bank, in order to taking advantage of the joint-stock principle to facilitate 
its use of bank-notes. The Norddeutsche Bank, was something of a simulacrum for the 
                                                
103 The establishment of the Norddeutsche Bank in Hamburg is an interesting story insofar as it 
was also originally intended to be a note-issuing bank; however, in the long struggle to attain a 
concession from the senate of the free city of Hamburg, the interested parties were forced to 
concede the issue of bank notes as part of the bank’s programme. It was in the wake of the 
foundation of Schaaffhausen and the BHI that the bank’s founders decided to change their aims 
to one of more “universal” intent, much in the way that Hansemann was similarly influenced 
(see Ahrens, 1972).  
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German financial class as a whole. After a long struggle with senate of the free city of 
Hamburg to found a joint-stock bank that might issue bank notes, the founders of the 
Norddeutsche Bank relented on this aspect of their plan and adopted a universal banking 
avant la lettre (Ahrens, 1972).  Unlike the foundations examined in this chapter, these 
banks never managed to attain more than regional significance, and played only an 
ancillary role in shaping the further evolution of German universal banking. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL PRACTICES, 1857-1869 
 Just as the joint-stock bank foundations were becoming a popular trend among 
German businessmen, they came to a halt with the commercial and financial crisis of 
1857. Beginning in the United States with the collapse of the Ohio-Life-Insurance & 
Trust Company, a chain reaction of insolvencies was unleashed, spreading across the 
connections of American industrial and financial centres to England, and then to 
Hamburg (Wehler, 1995: 94-5). The crisis in Hamburg was brought about because of its 
role in financing the overseas trade of the German states, and its consequent relationship 
with England, which was the principal center of financing for world trade. The financial 
panic in London, which had resulted in an increase in its domestic discount rate was 
translated into a panic in Hamburg where the private banks specializing in mercantile 
financing were left less able to meet their own obligations because of the higher rates 
for acceptances. This resulted in the bankruptcy of 150 firms in Hamburg, among them 
some of the oldest and most distinguished banks (Henderson, 1975: 120). The panic in 
Hamburg was then passed on to multiple trading entrepôts across the German states. 
While industry was not the most severely hit, commercial firms suffered the highest 
bankruptcy rate, and many woolen manufacturers suffered failures.  
Simultaneously with the crisis, there was a drain in silver specie from the 
Continent. The heavy import of gold from the New World in the early 1850s had helped 
to increase the money supply and ease liquidity and payments problems on the 
Continent. The import of gold from Australia and California had thereby assisted in 
precipitating the economic boom; however, the increase in economic activity had also 
led to further imports from the Far East, which was on a silver standard (most German 
states had a dual gold and silver money standard during this period).  The increase of 
imported goods—like silk—from Asia was matched by a concomitant export of silver 
specie from the German states to pay for those goods. This ultimately led to a drain in 
the continental supply of silver, and again to decreases in the money supply (Henderson, 
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1975), leaving the German states in a similar, though less precarious position in terms 
of the liquidity problem. This helped to ensure that the foundation of joint-stock banks 
was not exclusively generalized on the “mixed-banking” model.  
The commercial and financial crisis of 1857 influenced very important changes 
of business policy for the joint-stock banks discussed above. As the previous sections 
detailed, with the exception of the Disconto-Gesellschaft, they were all principally 
motivated by the speculative aims of the foundation business.104 Without exception they 
were all empowered in their statutes to engage in banking business of any kind.105 In 
other words they all had the potential for a universality of financial services. 
Nonetheless, even though they were all nominally empowered to execute a “universal” 
range of financial activities, they were all influenced by the irregular nature of income 
streams from the foundation business. Income accrued from successful foundations 
could be extremely sizable, but it was also transitive, and tied to the specificities of 
specific industrial projects. After all, corporations are founded, or converted to joint-
stock companies from private businesses, only once.  That is to say any income accrued 
from the successful placement of equity can only be achieved for a particular firm once. 
Consequently, these “mixed-banks” balanced the proportions between the “irregular” 
investment business––foundations as well as other securities issuance business—and the 
“regular” business of providing commercial credit, in varying proportions. The crisis of 
1857 was significant in this respect, because it made the prospects for the further 
establishment of industrial joint-stock companies across the German political economies 
seem less likely. Moreover, the timing of the crisis was important because it occurred 
just as many of the joint-stock banks founded in 1856 were beginning to operate. For 
example, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, which might otherwise have become heavily 
involved in the foundation business, had only just effectuated the changes to its statutes 
enabling a universal palette of financial activities before the crisis broke out. 
Consequently, it engaged in so few industrial foundations as to not have been involved 
in it at all (cf. Burhop, 2004). The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, by contrast, even 
though it as well was permitted to engage in banking activities of every kind, had been 
founded with the explicit intention of favouring the investment side of the financial 
activities mix in order to advance the foundation business (Dahlem, 2009: 196; Lüke, 
                                                
104 And the Disconto-Gesellschaft had been moving in this direction in the year prior to the 
crisis.  
105 Banking business of any kind did not, however, include the real estate or mortgage business, 
as there were specialized intermediaries for this in Germany at the time.  
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1956). The crisis of 1857 made the future terrain for new corporate foundations seem so 
unpropitious, that the bank restricted itself to the processing of trade finance (Lüke, 
1956: 18). The Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein, which had been very actively engaged 
in the foundation business, especially in establishing mining concerns in the Rhineland, 
pulled back from this endeavour following the crisis (Whale, 1930: 12).106  
 The most drastic reaction to the crisis was the change in business policy of the 
BHI. Following write-downs from the industrial firms and participations in which it had 
engaged as the central plank of its financial activities during the 1850s, the Darmstädter 
Bank desisted and moved away from the foundation business altogether (Burhop, 2004: 
82; Reitmayer, 2001a: 172; Knips, 1912: 145, 148, 178). The BHI would continue to 
engage in the issuing business, and would further develop its short-term current account 
commercial credits, but it would shy away from further engaging in industrial 
promotions as a “founder.” Even as the promise of the foundation improved, for 
example during the early 1870s, the BHI shied away from engaging in the foundation 
business. 
Indeed, perhaps one of the most significant consequences of the crisis was that 
the securities market expertise of the Darmstädter Bank developed for the foundation 
business—organizing consortia to place and issue different stocks and bonds, the 
promotional control of information and strategic selling to influence prices—would now 
be used by the Darmstädter Bank for placing government paper of different kinds. 
During the period from 1858 until 1870, the BHI would be heavily involved in the 
issuing of bonds as well as loans, for the communes and states of southern Germany. 
The Darmstädter Bank for Trade and Industry was no longer involved in promoting 
trade and industry from the ground up as its original purpose had been. The BHI 
continued to float the securities of existing joint-stock companies, and conduct 
commercial credit operations for them, but withdrew from its active role in forging the 
industrial order. Compensating for the high, but transitive returns of the foundation 
business, the BHI partially moved into the safer field intermediating state securities—
the business segment of the “old bank” bankers from Frankfurt and Berlin who had 
                                                
106 Without then neglecting the firms it had already founded. Moreover, the Schaaffhausen 
would recommence its participation in the foundation business during the early years of the 
Kaiserreich (see next chapter). 
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traditionally provided the financial undergirding for the conservative agrarian forces of 
the German states.107  
This was a momentous change in financial activity for the Darmstädter, but it 
was not singular amongst the banks examined here. Both the Schaaffhausen’sche 
Bankverein and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft would begin underwriting securities 
for governments of all kinds. The Disconto-Gesellschaft, where the battle against the 
state had been especially aggrieved in Hansemann’s early struggles to establish that 
institution, would become so deeply involved in the issuance of government loans and 
securities that by the end of the 1860s it would become known as “the state and railway 
paper bank” (Reitmayer, 2001a: 164, my emphasis). In 1859, the Disconto became 
centrally involved in a consortium responsible for floating a loan to Prussia for potential 
mobilization as Austria and France battled in Piedmont. This was not seen as especially 
auspicious at the time, but would be the beginning of the “Prussian Consortium.” This 
group of private and corporate banks would become responsible for floating all Prussian 
loans, and eventually become synonymous with “German high finance” (Reitmayer, 
1999b). From the 1870s the Prussian Consortium would be effectively led by the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft, that would determine admission to the consortium’s ranks and 
quotas of bonds for those participating. By the end of the 1860s the Disconto-
Gesellschaft and the BHI would permanently give up on any active role in the 
foundation business, but would remain involved in both short-term credit provision and 
the flotation and underwriting of equity. By contrast the Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein 
would maintain its original programme, continuing to exhibit the traits that it had 
developed as a “mixed-bank” in the Rhineland, biding its time for a propitious 
environment in which to begin its campaign for industrialization. The Berliner Handels-
Gesellschaft would similarly go into waiting, although its array of financial services 
appeared much more heavily weighted to what would be considered an investment 
bank.  
By the end of the 1860s the corporate banks that had been founded in the 1850s 
were not yet standardized on a similar form of universal banking. Three of the corporate 
banks would operate a truly “mixed” palette of short-term and long-term finance, while 
one was moving towards specialization in investment services. Two corporate banks 
had given up entirely on the foundation business, while the other two postponed their 
                                                
107 And had attempted to prohibit the BHI from being founded in the first place. 
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engagement in industrial foundations for a better investment climate. Common to all of 
the joint-stock banks founded in this period was their high reliance on their own equity 
capital for their financial operations (Holtfrerich, 1981). This was similar not only for 
the four banks examined in this chapter, but also for the other banks (of lesser renown 
that would not go on to earn a place among the ranks of the Berliner Großbanken). The 
quantitative increase in funds available from the joint-stock corporate form belies the 
prevailing social purpose behind the foundation narratives of the banks: the political 
struggle to inaugurate social change towards an industrial order, played out between 
liberal businessmen and an agrarian state. Moreover the details of organizational 
foundation read against this struggle better illuminate the dynamics of universal 
banking’s development as an indirect consequence of social conflict. This conflict is in 
turn best delineated in terms of power rather than simply in terms of efficiency, cost, or 
profit.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The foundation of joint-stock and commandite banks was a process that 
involved much more than the creation of economic institutions to fix problems of 
market failure, or to minimize the transactions costs and coordination problems 
associated with issuing securities through syndicates. Private banks continued acting 
alone and through consortia even after the early foundation of joint-stock banks to 
provide finance for industry. This indicates that there was little threat of “market 
failure,” nor that the transaction costs of consortia were too high to prohibit their use in 
in the relative absence of joint-stock banks. Furthermore, joint-stock banks continued to 
mobilise issuing consortia because even their augmented financial means were 
insufficiently large in some cases for new share issues.108  
Central to the drive for incorporation, as well as the amalgamation of “mixed-
banking” with the joint-stock form, was the struggle over the shape of Prussian, and 
more generally, German society. Rhenish financiers, as well as liberal businessmen 
more widely, were concerned to industralise German society against resistance from a 
feudal-agrarian state.  The melding of the joint-stock corporation and universal banking 
occurred as the unintended consequence of attempts to solve liquidity problems during 
the revolution of 1848. The issue of liquidity in pre-March Germany was intimately tied 
                                                
108 This was especially the case in terms of government loans that could be considerably large in 
size. 
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with the attempt to inaugurate an industrial order, but it also represented one emerging 
strand of the contemporary common sense about how best to make financial operations 
most profitable. The fusion of Rhenish “mixed-banking” with the corporate legal form 
began to appear as a rewarding financial institution as the political economy of the 
German states was transformed over the 1850s. The successful foundation of the Crédit 
Mobilier in France helped to entrench the appeal of “mixed-banking” by demonstrating 
its promise for forwarding the production of an industrial order in a profitable manner. 
Schaaffhausen, and the Crédit Mobilier thereby revealed the potential of “mixed-
banking” as an instrument to spread industrialization by founding new corporations and 
institutionally and materially entrenching capitalist social relations.  This was the 
incentive behind the foundation of the BHI, and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. 
Hansemann’s Disconto-Gesellschaft had been founded for a different political 
purpose—but one which was all the same related to this overarching struggle (and only 
appears idiosyncratic insofar as this more specific conflict reflected Hansemann’s 
individual assessment of the role of credit for small and medium sized traders in the 
Prussian political economy). Nevertheless, the threat to his fledgling business presented 
by the antipathy of the Prussian Bank’s discounting policy, and the need to make the 
Disconto profitable enough to pursue his programme for credit influenced Hansemann 
to alter the Disconto’s official statutes in line with those that were slowly becoming 
conventional. This opened the door for Hansemann to engage in a more lucrative 
organizational form that might continue his specific project of sponsoring an industrial 
order in a manner proven more widely. 
The first foundation wave of corporate banks introduced the potential of 
amalgamating universal banking with the joint-stock company to the German states. It 
must be stressed that this was an unexpected development for contemporaries of the 
period. Moreover, it did not immediately engender the generalisation of “mixed-
banking” into all joint-stock banks. In 1860, more than 20 percent of the market in 
financial assets continued to be held by note-issuing banks (Burhop, 2011: 168, table T 
20). Liquidity, and the desire for note-issuing continued to remain one of the chief 
interests of actors involved in finance following the crisis of 1857 (Achterberg, 1984). 
For the history of universal banking, this episode highlights the generalized inscription 
into corporate banking statutes of the possibility for corporate banks to engage in all 
variants of financial activity. When the 1860s closed, most corporate banks had statutes 
that permitted any kind of financial activity. However, this generalized symbolic 
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codification was more a form of conventional parlance for bank statutes, and did not yet 
reflect a specific institutionalised practice. “Universal banking” was still avant la lettre 
for the banks that mixed commercial and investment banking—it did not incorporate 
deposit-taking, and the proportions of business share between commercial and 
investment banking were highly in flux—some of these “mixed-banks” appeared to be 
on developmental paths towards specialization in either investment or commercial 
banking.  The corporate banks that had been founded were firmly part of the Prussian 
and wider German political economies, but the differences in their business 
programmes—the different proportions of short and long-term lending, and their 
affinity for the foundation business—distinguished them from one another. At the 
beginning of the 1870s, the corporate sector of German finance continued to represent 
roughly only a tenth of all assets in the “German” financial market taken as a whole 
(Burhop, 2011: 168, table T 20; Guinnane, 2001: 81, table 1). Private banks continued 
to dominate the market for financial services in 1860 with 35.3% of the entire market 
share. The savings banks had a share of 12% and the special mortgage banks 16%. That 
is to say, the corporate sector—or those banks incorporated as joint-stock banks taken 
as a whole—barely made up 10% of the total banking sector. Even though the statistical 
material is lacking for rigorous analysis, we know at least that not all joint-stock banks 
were equal in their degree of universality. Ergo, the “universal banking” was in no way 
firmly entrenched in the German political economy. The formal-legal ideal of a 
permissibility of universality in financial practices had become more or less accepted as 
a norm institutionalised in German corporate finance; however, the practice of universal 
banking, as Gerschenkron described it and subsequent scholars have aimed to 
understand it, had not yet crystallized.  
As Helmut Böhme has written, we cannot understand the foundation of the early 
corporate banks from their later development (Böhme, 1966: 56). This does not mean, 
however, that we must recount this history as though there is no unifying thread. Each 
bank foundation was not an island of accidental historical forces coalescing in the form 
of an organization, but rather the (indirect) product of a larger sociopolitical contest 
over the shape of German society. 
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CHAPTER 4 
From Foundation Boom to Crash, 1869-1873  
The construction of a speculative imperative 
 
 
 “Never was economic euphoria among businessmen higher than 
in the early 1870s, the famous Gründerjahre (the years of 
company promotion) in Germany, the era when the most absurd 
and obviously fraudulent company prospectus found unlimited 
sucker-money for its promises. Those were the days when, as a 
Viennese journalist put it, ‘companies were founded to transport 
the aurora borealis in pipelines to St Stephen’s Square and to win 
mass sales for our boot polish among the natives of the South Sea 
islands.’”109 
 
“[I]t seems probable that the choice between the two methods of 
promotion has in fact been influenced by certain legal 
requirements which cannot easily be derived from the economic 
circumstances of which we have already taken account.”110 
 
“[B]anks were motivated both by the aim of paternally fostering 
newly established firms and by purely speculative 
considerations.”111  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The years of the German Empire, or Kaiserreich, 1871-1914 are one of the most 
studied periods of German financial historiography. This is partly because the 
establishment of a new national state and many consequent legal changes helped to 
introduce regulatory requirements of reporting for many financial firms that produced 
the archival substance that has served as the primary source material for later 
historiographical research.112  This period is also the focal point of a great deal of 
financial history because it is so often considered the decisive era in which the 
concentration of the banking industry occurred, the tight links between bank and 
industry developed, and—most importantly for our purposes—the practice of universal 
banking crystallized in the for-profit banking sector, and began to permeate the entire 
                                                
109 Hobsbawm (2006 [1975]: 62). 
110 Whale (1930: 41) 
111 Wellhöner and Wixforth (2003: 156) 
112 Although even for this period a full picture of banks’ business philosophies, balance sheets, 
and firm financing are an ongoing research desiderata. In many cases, the most important 
archival material has been lost owing to the take-over spree at the end of the 19th century 
wherein the records of many amalgamated banks’ were discarded. Moreover, where records did 
continue to exist they were often destroyed from the damage incurred during two World Wars. 
Nevertheless, this period remains much better researched than for example the preceding period 
of early industrialization (Wixforth, 2002: 16-8; M. Pohl, 1982a: 13-19).  
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financial architecture of Germany’s political economy systemically (Ziegler, 2005b; 
Tilly, 1998). This thesis on its own cannot do justice to the wealth of materials that have 
been produced on this singular period, no less even when restricted solely to the theme 
of German universal banking. Nevertheless, the aim of the next two chapters is to 
radically reframe the meaning of the Imperial period for German finance by recasting 
the emergence of “concrete” universal banking. They do so by connecting the 
emergence of the form of concrete universal banking, that bundle of practices 
infamously foregrounded by Gerschenkron, to the speculative culture of “mixed-
banking” that had developed before the Kaiserreich as a result of the struggle over 
industrialization. The present chapter picks up the narrative chronologically from 
chapter 3, and discusses developments in the German political economy from 1869 until 
1873. Chapter 5 follows chronologically with developments occurring from 1874 until 
the eve of the First World War.  
The relative weight given in this chapter to such a short period of time, owes to 
the importance of the “Foundation Years” in German history. Not only was the German 
Empire founded in 1871, momentously rearranging political authority in Central 
Europe, but a gargantuan number of corporations were founded between 1870-1873. 
Concomitant with this “Foundation Boom” (Gründerboom) was a speculative mania on 
the securities exchanges of the Empire. It was followed in 1874 by the “Foundation 
Crash” (Gründerkrach, or sometimes, “Foundation Crisis” Gründerkrise), which 
inaugurated a period of depressed economic activity and the elimination of many of the 
recently founded corporations. The Foundation Years are typically considered the zenith 
of “Manchester Liberalism” in the new Germany. Subsequent to the foundation crash, a 
deep-seated reaction against liberal ideals, especially in the political economy, helped to 
set the Empire on the path towards its historical terminus of “organized capitalism.”  
The Foundation Years carry an analogous significance for German financial 
historiography. Contemporaneous with the excitement of the Foundation Boom a 
“second foundation wave” of joint-stock banks rolled across the shores of Germany’s 
financial terrain. As feudal-agrarian laws were undone, the pent-up needs of 
businessmen to found corporate banks to propel industrialization were unleashed in a 
wave of optimism following war victory and reparations.  The “second foundation 
wave” is crucial for the narrative of universal banking in Germany, because it is 
typically held that the new corporate banks founded were all “universal” in their 
provision of financial services. Following the crash, universal banks became more 
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concentrated in a wave of rationalising takeovers as well as communities of interest 
(cartels) (M. Pohl, 1982a), their mix of financial services became the standard vis-à-vis 
other financial institutions (Deeg, 2003; idem, 1999), and the division of labour between 
universal banks and the state central bank became institutionalized (Tilly, 1999). 
According to these narratives, the practice of universal banking itself did not go through 
any further pertinent changes following the Gründerkrach. Universal banking had 
crystallized in the corporate banking sector on the form described by Gerschenkron, and 
any further developments were essentially about the diffusion of an established practice 
to other sectors of the financial industry and credit system more generally.  
This chapter takes issue both with the naturalistic, and psychological, economic 
narratives that have hitherto attempted to explain the speculative dynamic of the second 
foundation wave, as well as the notion that universal banking was finished evolving by 
the termination of economic optimism in 1874. It provides additional historical 
illustration to the point of earlier chapters that the establishment of joint-stock banking 
was not undertaken to efficiently solve market failures. Conversely, institutional 
development is better expressed through analyses problematizing the role of power in 
the political economy. In the first section of the chapter, the argument is made that the 
“second foundation wave” may have been fed by the psychopathology of mania on 
securities markets, but decisive for its institutional shape were important regulatory 
changes that, contrary to the received narrative, compelled financiers involved in 
promoting industry to incorporate or establish joint-stock banks rather than undertake 
these efforts as private bankers.  This argument upends the traditional thinking which 
posits that the role of legislation simply freed bankers, rather than forcing them, to 
engage in the most economically viable form of business. 
Developing on the institutional account of speculation on industry, the second 
section of the chapter argues that a system of corporate universal banking was not a 
foregone conclusion at the outbreak of the Foundation Crisis. This section outlines the 
constellation of financial institutions generated during the mania and bequeathed to the 
“Great Depression” period that followed the spectacular end to the foundation boom. 
The analysis posits that if history is an open-ended, non-deterministic process, then 
there is no way to read the later development of universal banking from this early stage 
of financial evolution: that is to say, not only had universal banking in its concrete form 
not yet arrived by the end of the second foundation wave, but there was indication to 
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contemporaries that the future developmental trajectory of German corporate financial 
institutions might be towards specialization, rather than further universalization.  
 
SPECULATION AND THE FOUNDATION BOOM  
Beginning towards the end of the 1860s, and continuing for two years following 
the establishment of the German Kaiserreich, the “foundation years” (Gründerjahre) 
are a socioeconomic milestone in all facets of German history (cf. Eley, 1992; 
Rosenberg, 1976; Wehler, 1985 [1973]). In the wake of the successful completion of 
war against France, and with company laws newly loosened to enable free 
incorporation, over 900 joint-stock companies were founded in the years from 1871-
1873, twice as many as in the previous decade (Reckendrees, 2013: 58). This short 
episode marks in many ways the pinnacle of liberal economic ideology in pre-WWI 
Germany, which had been tightening the grip of its invisible hand over the imagination 
of state and (civil) society since the revolutions of 1848. The conjuncture of the 
“foundation years” also marks an important transformational episode in the trajectory of 
German socioeconomic development. The beginning and end of the foundation period 
bookend two very different trajectories of social development:113 one where liberal 
politico-economic thinking was expanding its social acceptance, especially as reflected 
in key politico-economic institutions and forms of social power, and the other 
characterized by the backlash against this ideology (Jaeger, 1988; Rosenberg, 1976: 62-
77). The Gründerjahre therefore reflect a pivotally important episode of German history 
tout court.  
This significance is echoed in the history of the German universal banking 
system. Not only were incorporation laws liberalized, marking the seeming end of the 
conflict between state and financier inaugurated in the 1830s and 40s, but a second 
foundation wave of joint-stock banks was unleashed to roll over the German political 
economy. There are various quantitative assessments of the number of joint-stock banks 
founded,114 but they all largely concur that in the four years 1870, 1871, 1872, and 
1873, at least 100 new joint-stock banks were founded. Chief among this foundation 
                                                
113 This is also in part because of the concomitant founding of the Kaiserreich during this 
period, the end of a Germany that might include Austria, a vast constitutionalization of federal 
powers, and all of the expected consequences of formalizing nationhood across a political space 
while synchronously institutionalizing an industrial order materially through new company 
foundations and legally through the removal of the requirement for concessions. 
114 See Manfred Pohl (1982a: 107) for an overview within the historical literature. 
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wave were the three corporate banks that would come to epitomize German universal 
banking during the 20th century: the Commerz- und Disconto Bank (1870), the Deutsche 
Bank (1870), and the Dresdner Bank (1872). Following the Second World War these 
three corporate banks were far and away the largest banks in Germany measured by 
their balance sheets and market capitalization (Edwards and Fisher, 1994: 100, 101), 
and remained the three leading for-profit banks until the merger of the Dresdner Bank 
with Commerzbank in 2009 reduced this triumvirate to two (Detzer, 2014).  
Much historiography of German finance typically holds that the corporate banks 
of Germany had crystallized on universal banking by the end of the “second foundation 
wave” of joint-stock banks. This assumption is grounded in the observation that the 
commercial joint-stock banks that had been founded by the end of the second 
foundation wave specifically listed statutes in their corporate charters allowing them to 
engage in “banking business of any kind” (e.g. Burhop, 2014: 157; M. Pohl, 1986a: 51; 
Penzkofer, 1974: 52; cf. Bosenick, 1912: 60-74, for a list of the actual statutes). This 
assumption overlooks the emphasis put on different mixes of financial activities 
practiced by the various banks founded during this period. That is to say, the form of 
banks’ “universality,” or the concrete manner in which their array of financial practices 
were enacted.115 Banks like the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft were entitled under their 
statutes to engage in any line of banking business, and did indeed have a 
(proportionally) small number of current accounts on their balance sheets (Dahlem, 
2009; cf. chapter 3 here).  However, the Handelsgesellschaft was primarily an issuing 
and flotations bank (Burhop, 2004: 126-7; Riesser, 1910: 517-8). Even though its 
statutes empowered it to engage in both the long and short-term sides of credit 
provision, its bread and butter was the speculative business of floating securities on the 
stock markets (Dahlem, 2009: 166, 196). In comparison, the Disconto-Gesellschaft was 
more balanced in the assets that it held on its books, with a more uniform division of 
returns from commercial and investment business (Däbritz, 1931, 246-249); however, 
of the ventures in which it participated, the Disconto only exceptionally engaged in the 
                                                
115 Harald Wixforth has mentioned a similar point in relation to ongoing archival research for 
entrepreneurial history. Wixforth opines that the development of specific banks in the 
Kaiserreich has often been undertaken by projecting the assumed macro trends of banking and 
the financial sector as a whole on specific individual banks, leading to the impression that all 
banks pursued the same interests and business policies (Wixforth, 1997: 313-4). Wixforth 
himself however, has not used this insight to challenge our understanding of the development of 
universal banking, but rather simply to provide a more detailed specific history of the Dresdner 
Bank. 
 147 
foundation business as a principal founder. 116  As a further example, the 
Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein was equally as balanced in its holdings of commercial 
versus investment credits as the Disconto Gesellschaft; however, it concentrated a 
greater proportion of its efforts directly on the foundation of new enterprises (Burhop, 
2004: 128-9; Riesser, 1910: 508-10). The demonstrable record of variety in which 
commercial and investment banking were combined—not to mention involvement in the 
investment banking activities of founding new corporations—highlights how the 
assumption that the straightforward potential to engage all branches of financial 
services is not the same as an institutionalized practice of universal banking à la 
Gerschenkron.  
The second foundation wave of corporate banks occurred approximately 
concurrent with the foundation boom (Gründerboom) of the years 1871-1873. This 
massive and generalized upswing in economic activity is almost unanimously regarded 
in the historical literature to have been initiated by four key factors: (1) the introduction 
of the New Company Law on 11th June 1870, (2) the foundation of the German Empire 
in January 1871, (3) the speedy payment of French reparations following the Franco-
Prussian war and (4) the annexation of Alsace Loraine (and its heavy deposits of iron 
ore) (M. Pohl, 1986a: 291; Craig, 1978: 78; Kitchen, 1978: 132; Henderson, 1975: 
162).117 According to this narrative, the economic expansion began following the 
liberalization of the concession system for joint-stock company foundation initiated by 
                                                
116 The Disconto-Gesellschaft was the principal force behind the foundation of the Dortmunder 
Union, a mining concern in the Rhineland (Kleeberg, 1989: 220ff.). This was the only exception 
to its activities as a founder; however, the Disconto was associated with numerous foundations 
where it took a percentage of shares in initial flotations, even if it was not a principal founder 
per se. This is an important distinction to keep in mind, because accepting proportionally small 
numbers of shares to sell on to the market, or keep in its portfolio of securities, was a different 
activity than undertaking to found a new company from the outset. In that sense, figures like 
Friedrich Grillo, and Wilhelm von Born were more instrumental in establishing the initial firms 
of the Dortmunder Hütte and Neuschottland along founders’ principles (and were incidentally 
highly concerned with the substantive goal of establishing an industrial society through the 
means of mining corporations (Kleeberg, 1989: 233-40).  
117 Manfred Pohl’s earliest delineation of the causes for the Gründerboom also included the final 
liberalization of guild laws that enabled the free choice of profession and the free movement for 
all persons of the Kaiserreich. This had the effect of initiating a massive immigration from 
country to city with subsequent push for increased housing and the development of the 
mortgage banks (M. Pohl, 1978: 23). In a study focused specifically on the sources of the 
Foundation Boom, one might also engage with Charles Kindleberger’s depiction that includes 
international economic linkages in the form of miracle crop production in Austria (1990: 312). 
As our concern here is to place the development of the institution of universal banking against 
the sociopolitical background of the Foundation Boom, its delineation will be restricted to 
examining the qualitative social forces underpinning the second foundation of joint-stock banks. 
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the promulgation of the New Company Law in 1870. Under the New Company Law the 
old application process that had involved government oversight and final say in (a 
seldom granted) permission for corporate status was substituted for a simple registration 
of which anyone could undertake without exception or oversight. This legal move 
opened the floodgates to new corporate foundations as well as conversions of old 
private firms into corporate ones. Fuel was thrown on the manic speculative flames by 
the “feelings of optimism engendered by the foundation of the Empire and the victory 
over France” (Wehler, 1995: 98, author’s translation), which were then in due course 
materially bolstered by the payment of French reparations that flooded the young 
Empire with liquidity. Finally, the addition of iron ore deposits in Alsace Lorraine 
helped to spur forward production of Ruhr steel factories and added the material basis 
upon which the aforementioned excessive optimism was premised.   
Scholarship on universal banking historiography implies that the socioeconomic 
dynamics putatively responsible for the general upswing in economic activity occurring 
during the foundation boom were also responsible for impelling the second foundation 
wave of corporate banks (e.g. Burhop, 2011: 69, 188; idem, 2004: 11; Fohlin, 2007: 21, 
23, 224; Penzkofer, 1974: 58; M. Pohl, 1986a; idem, 1982c: 225-6; idem, 1978: 22-24; 
Tilly, 1999: 135, 1986: 123-4; Wixforth, 1997: 318). That is to say, the second 
foundation wave of corporate banks is agreed to have been ultimately driven by 
liberalisation and the positive psychological outlook engendered by war victory. Putting 
the familiar details of the second foundation wave into sociopolitical context, and 
examining the institutional terrain, helps to underscore a much different significance of 
this episode for the development of universal banking. 
 
Détente in the struggle over industrialization 
Following the commercial and financial crisis of 1857, a period of relative 
socioeconomic stagnation set in amongst the German states until Prussia’s victory over 
Austria in 1866 (Wehler, 1995: 95-6). The political economy of these nine years was 
stamped by the overcapacity generated during the 1850s boom as well as the 
geopolitical conflicts of the time (Wehler, 1995; Blackbourn, 2003). The Italian-
Austrian war of 1859 and the American Civil war from 1861-1865, both helped to 
dampen prospects as well as economic growth within those respective countries as well 
as reduce international commerce with them (Henderson, 1975). Of more direct 
consequence for the German political economies were the German-Danish war of 1864 
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and the Prusso-Austrian war of 1866. Both these conflicts ultimately exercised a 
destabilizing force on the climate for investment as well as growth; however, their 
effects were not unilateral across Prussia or the other German states. The prospect, and 
then actuality, of war undermined markets for consumer goods, but helped to spur 
demand for the railroads and their related industries (Wehler, 1995: 97ff.; Böhme, 
1966b). Consequently, this “leading sector” and its forward and backwardly linked 
industries—mining, smelting, etc.—continued to expand during the whole period 1859-
1866 in the face of a more general stagnation in the political economy. In 1866, there 
was a small-scale financial panic on the exchanges of Prussia and Austria owing to the 
Austro-Prussian war of that year (Berghoff, 2002). The termination of conflict in 1866 
opened a new phase of economic growth driven by the growth of the “leading sector 
complex of industries” that continued until the outbreak of conflict with France in 1870 
(Tilly, 1990: 78-83).  
One of the central factors driving politico-economic dynamics during these 
conjunctures was a shift in the interest-constellation of social forces propelling the 
struggle over industrialization. As we have seen in earlier chapters, during the pre-
March era an oppositional attitude to industrialization emanating from conservative 
forces in Prussian state and aristocracy, and often also widely exhibited across the other 
German states in familiar constellations, provided resistance against the plans of 
businessmen to introduce (from abroad) or produce (as substitution) the social forms of 
an industrial order (cf. Brose, 2010). The socio-material interests and self-conceptions 
of state, bureaucracy, aristocracy and owners of land principally located their power in 
ideas of, and traditions pertaining to, feudal-agrarian society. The “monarchical-
bureaucratic-condominium” (Wehler, 1987: 297) of the pre-March years derived its 
material and ideological sources of power from traditional agricultural society. The 
struggle to promote reforms and social transformation from groups favouring 
industrialization led during the 1850s to many compromises on the part of the German 
states’ administrations against the image of agrarian society: for example, in Prussia, the 
concession system for the incorporation in the mining industry was liberalized by 
Minister von der Heydt as a compromise to maintaining a restrictive policy over joint-
stock bank concessions (Friedrich, 1980).118 The increased activity in coal mining 
enabled the production of coal to more than double between 1850 and 1860, and then 
                                                
118 See also Chapter 3 here. 
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double again by 1870 (Torp, 2011: 343; Brophy, 2011: 186). Generally, the German 
states made enough concessions for reform during the conservative reaction following 
the Revolution of 1848 to help facilitate the conditions for the expansion of industrial 
activity. In the immediate reaction (early 1850s), however, they also initiated legislation 
to shore-up many aspects of the pre-industrial order. For example, to protect guilds 
against “the factory system.” During the 1850s Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, Baden, 
Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau and Bavaria all “introduced corporate reforms 
which seemed to promise a return to guild control of production,” control prices, and 
shore up the agrarian feudal order against advancing industry (Brose, 2013: 289). 
Owing in part to changes in government leadership and officials who were less 
reactionary, and in part to end the pleas from handicraft associations, almost all of the 
aforementioned states, retreated on these legislative initiatives by 1862, and 30 German 
states had introduced complete freedom of enterprise by 1869 (Hamerow, 1958: 239-
248). The transformation in attitudes towards freedom of enterprise was also 
importantly influenced by the international commercial context (Torp, 2011; idem, 
2010). The Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860 was the beginning of free trade between 
France and England, and the subsequent Franco-Prussian trade treaty of 1862—which 
effectively opened the entirety of the Zollverein to tariff-free trade with France—
extended the former agreement and essentially opened the German states to the world 
market (Brophy, 2011: 190). Related to international trade, the changing disposition of 
German states was also driven by the slow transformation of agrarian interests. While it 
has been commonplace to contrast the rapid change of industry, as against the stasis of 
agricultural life, agriculture itself was also in a process of transformation during this 
time period: it became more dependent on industrial technology,119 the introduction of 
new crops,120 and specialization of their operations on marketable products for profit.121 
In short, the material basis of agriculture became ever more industrialized during the 
1850s and 1860s, even though the many contemporaries lamented the moral, ideological 
and political consequences of the money nexus (Sheehan, 1989: 747-762). The 
increasing use of industrial products in agriculture helped to develop a constituency of 
                                                
119 The use of new farm equipment like threshers, and the use of fertilizers, like guano imported 
from Chile. 
120 Root crops in particular, potatoes, sugar beet, etc.  
121 This was supported and in part driven by the other two changes: the introduction of root 
crops for example often required that fields not lie fallow, which in turn meant less space for 
animal grazing. The reduced space for animals was bolstered by the diminished need for their 
manure secured by the import of guano (see Schißler, 1978; Sheehan, 1989). 
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free traders (as farmers could benefit from the import of cheaper foreign industrial and 
consumer products, while also gaining a vent for their products, e.g. grain—many 
producers of industrial goods, by contrast remained in favour of tariffs especially for 
products like steel).  
The 1860s can be seen in retrospect as a distinct, if somewhat temporary, détente 
between agrarian and industrial social forces over the continuing struggle over the shape 
of German society. Ultimately, this decade saw reserved consent for the social change 
implied by advancing industrial capitalism across the German lands.122 Anti-industrial 
social forces began to accept a greater place for industry in German society, although 
not without reserving the desire to have agriculture remain the chief power of German 
society (Barkin, 1970). The 1860s represent a confluence of historical change that 
inaugurates what some scholars have deemed the “liberal era” (Ullmann, 1995; Jaeger, 
1988). By the end of the 1860s, there had been a watershed in the conflict over social 
change in Germany insofar as “the German states had mostly recognized that 
industrialism was too important for their finances and the military establishment” to 
further restrict its expansion (Brose, 2013: 289; similar statements in Berghoff, 2002: 
85; Kitchen, 1978: 135). The changing socio-material basis of German life laid the 
foundation for persuasion by means of “Manchester liberal” arguments about market 
freedom.123  
 
New institutions for the liberal era 
Not only were old anti-industrial regulations overturned, but the changing 
attitude of the German states towards industrialization was encoded in the establishment 
of new laws and institutions. A new more liberal commercial code was passed in 1861 
(das Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB)) for the German 
Confederation. This general softening of law towards commerce provided the basis for 
many German states to remove the concession requirement for joint-stock companies.124 
In 1869 a Superior Commercial and Trade Court (Obersten Handelsgerichtshof) was 
                                                
122 One could add also that ongoing considerations over war and the constitutional conflict 
helped to distract from some of the more slow moving changes of the political economy.  
123 Foreshadowing the orgiastic change of commercial and financial regulation that would come 
later, Prussia rescinded its ordinance of 1843 which had prohibited the use of futures contracts 
on its securities markets (Berghoff, 2002: 84). 
124 The ADHGB enabled individual states to choose whether they would maintain or overturn 
the concessionary requirement. This was the case for example in Saxony, that already removed 
the concession requirement on the 15th June 1861 (Burhop, 2006b: 95, note 7).  
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concomitantly established to hear cases under the ADHGB (Berghoff, 2002: 85). In 
1867, a Trade Parliament for the discussion of commercial matters was formed for 
members of the Zollverein (Gömmel, 1992: 151).125 Finally, the system requiring 
governmental concession for the foundation of joint-stock companies was removed 
throughout the North German Confederation (i.e. in Prussia as well) with the 
promulgation of the New Company Act of 1870 (an amendment to the ADHGB).  
This has typically been cast in a fashion that underscores the element of 
“removal,” allowing the natural tendencies of the market and the commercial spirit to 
break free, in particular from the time consuming and uncertain process of seeking 
governmental concessions from the Prussian bureaucracy. There was a generalized 
recognition by financiers, industrialists and merchants that the removal of the 
concession system would lead to improved possibilities for business. The growth of the 
Prussian bureaucracy had not matched the growth in proportion to the number of claims 
that were increasingly being submitted. So, even though there remained a certain 
skepticism, on the part of the Prussian state about “stockjobbery,” and commensurate 
fears about speculative trends that might be introduced, the Prussian state and 
bureaucracy was keen to eliminate the concession requirement if only to alleviate some 
of the growing demands on its resources (Baltzer, 2013). Nevertheless, the state 
remained beholden to the agrarian social forces of the East, represented by conservative 
party members in the North German Parliament, that ultimately conceded the bill in 
exchange for a reduction in steel tariffs agreed by industrial groups (Böhme, 1966b: 
285-6); however, this concession was carried out in such a way that “stockjobbery” and 
speculation were still meant to be avoided (Hamerow, 1972: 342-3). The elimination of 
concession therefore still carried conditions, which were highly significant for 
constructing dynamics of the “second foundation wave” of joint-stock banks. 
The New Company Act of 1870 was indeed important because of its removal of 
the concession system. The continuing struggle of agrarian-conservative forces against 
an industrial system and its corresponding “stockjobbery” helped introduce two 
frequently overlooked details of financial regulation in the New Company Act of 1870 
that were highly significant for the foundation wave of joint-stock banks from 1871-
1873. Firstly, conservatives conceded the removal of constrictions on the type of shares 
                                                
125 Regardless of whether this institution served essentially as a rhetorical mouthpiece for the 
dissemination of the political ideal of liberalization, or whether it represents a more enduring 
material concession to liberal ideas about politico-economic organization is besides the point. 
Its establishment is emblematic of the growth of liberal power during this decade.  
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that could be issued in the course of a foundation, so that secondly, the addition of 
stricter conditions for subscription and paying up of shares prior to legally recognized 
incorporation might be enshrined in the law.  
The granting of government concessions for joint-stock companies had extended 
beyond the simple permission to incorporate, and into the legal minutiae of corporate 
foundations, stipulating not only whether a company might be founded, but also 
numerous other conditions for the admittance of the company to the commercial register 
(Bösselmann, 1939; Wolff, 1915). For our purposes here, one of the most important was 
the type of shares that could be employed in a primary issue for a new foundation. In 
Germany, two types of shares were common. Registered, or “name,” shares 
(Namensaktien) were issued directly to the specific individual who subscribed them. 
These shares listed the owner of the share directly on the document itself, the name of 
the owner was recorded in a government registry, and the transfer of the share needed to 
be formally arranged, approved and certified by the government before it could change 
legal possession (Gömmel, 1992: 150). Conversely, bearer shares (Inhaberaktien) were 
owned straightforwardly by the person who (physically) held them (in their hands). 
They did not require any formal governmental approval to transfer ownership. 
Financiers and investors typically preferred the latter type of shares, because they were 
more readily fungible and therefore easier to trade and liquidate. “Name” shares 
required much longer periods of time in order to officially secure the transfer of a share 
following a sale, and remained subject to the whims of the bureaucracy, causing delays 
that prohibited the liquidity necessary for a secondary market in such shares, and 
injecting greater uncertainty into business operations (Berghoff, 2002: 74). 
Also important was the form of foundation itself. By the early 1870s there were 
two legally recognized forms of foundations: “successive” (Suksessivgründung) and 
“simultaneous” (Simultangründung) (Bösselman, 1939: 97). Successive foundations 
involved advertising and accumulating subscriptions for new share issues, wherein the 
actual company itself would be founded in a legal sense before the potential placement 
of the first allotment of capital. That is to say prospective companies could become 
incorporated without having the entirety of their share capital subscribed (no less paid 
up). This was the process used for example by Cologne bankers in founding many 
railway companies.126  Simultaneous foundations were those where the entirety of the 
                                                
126 Described in chapter 2 here. 
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initial public offering (IPO) would be subscribed en masse by one underwriter (but in 
practice usually a syndicate of underwriting agents, led by one firm directing individual 
allotments and quotas of shares), who then accepted the legal obligation to make 
eventual payment on all the shares owned. Typically in this latter case a bank would 
underwrite the share issue, and sell parcels of its shares on to its other clients or directly 
to market traders (Burhop, 2006b: 95).  
Both forms of foundation provided opportunities for speculation through 
agiotage. That is to say, between the initial price for shares agreed by the foundation 
bank, and that at which it could sell shares on to the securities market. In the case of 
successive foundation banks would first agree the par value of the share package with 
the firm to be founded, while also agreeing to subscribe a certain number of shares for 
their own portfolio.  Importantly, subscribed shares did not require immediate payment, 
but represented rather an obligation to pay the value of the share. Subsequently, the 
foundation bank would aim to collect subscriptions for the remaining shares, with an 
aim to generate a good deal of interest in the shares. When demand for share 
subscriptions was larger than available supply, the shares would begin to be quoted at a 
premium as compared to the par value on securities exchanges. The more interest, or 
hype generated in a subscription, the more it was possible to positively increase the 
share value on securities markets where the shares could be sold on. The aim of (usually 
private) bankers was to hype shares enough that they could realize a profit between the 
par value they paid on share subscriptions, and that for which they could sell the shares 
onto the securities exchanges. This was similar for simultaneous foundations, except 
that here financiers subscribed the entire value of the share package all at once, 
necessitating that hype and price making for the share occur only via interest on 
secondary markets.  
The New Company Law of 1870 introduced a new political-legal pressure in 
relation to both of these facets of company promotion and foundation that was crucial 
for propelling the “second foundation wave” of joint-stock banks from 1871-1873. 
Firstly, the New Company Law removed the necessity to use “name” shares (Gömmel, 
1992 : 150). In Prussia the joint-stock law of 1843, its amendment in 1845, as well as 
the decrees of 1853 and 1856 had also demanded that the issuance of bearer shares 
require the full paying up of subscribed capital up-front—conditions that were similarly 
dropped with the New Law of 1870 (Weigt, 2005: 28). This had the unsurprising 
consequence that bearer shares became much more widely used, to the point that they 
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were the de facto form of equity. Bearer shares could be much more easily bought and 
sold, and encouraged the beginnings of secondary markets in securities (Buchheim, 
2002). In conjunction with the further relaxation of restrictions on the futures market at 
the Berlin exchange, as well the ease of access to trading on the “coulisse,”127 this 
provision wildly increased the number of entrants to the secondary markets for 
securities: “everyman” could, and many did, enter the Bourse in order to personally 
undertake their own securities trades (Baltzer, 2007: 15; Meier, 1992: 8). 
Secondly, the New Company Law stipulated that the full amount of a new firm’s 
IPO must be completely subscribed, with at least 10 percent of the nominal value of that 
capital already paid-in, 20 percent for insurance companies, before the firm could be 
legally recognized as incorporated (Baltzer, 2007: 32-33; Weigt, 2005: 25, note 118; 
Reich, 1980: 258).128 Additionally, “a prospectus, specifying a time period within which 
the subscriptions would take place, was required; and the opening general meeting of 
shareholders had to attract attendance of a minimum percentage” (Fohlin, 2007: 230). 
The consequence of these legal rules was to dramatically alter the legal basis for, and 
simultaneously reduce the number of, successive foundations (Bösselmann, 1939: 97-
8),129 as founders could not take the risk that any element of their IPO might remain 
unsubscribed and jeopardize the legal recognition of their firm (Whale, 1930: 41).130 In 
June of 1870 when the New Law was promulgated, this heavily favoured the existing 
joint-stock banks as agents that could pledge the entire value of a subscription up front 
(Fohlin, 2007: 230).  
 
Compelling freedom 
The first joint-stock banks had landed on the joint-stock legal form 
unintentionally as the result of political struggles in the 1850s (rather than because of 
                                                
127 All that was required was the demonstration of an “interest in trade” and a Bourse card for 
entrance (Baltzer, 2007: 14). 
128 The subscribers were also legally liable for 40 percent of the nominal value of capital they 
subscribed. Caroline Fohlin erroneously states that the 1870 amendment to the ADGHB had the 
same conditions for foundation as the much stricter 1884 amendment: namely, that at least 25 
percent of the nominal capital needed to paid in. Fohlin cites only the text of the 1884 law, and I 
have yet to find a further source that confirms her assertion. 
129 Although there did remain some joint-stock firms that were founded “successively.” Wolff 
tabulates 1,262 joint-stock companies founded simultaneously, and 116 founded successively 
between 1885-1892 (Wolff, 1915: 73ff.). 
130 Prior to such legal recognition firms would essentially be unable to do business. Other 
aspects relating to the publication of a prospectus, as well as certain formalities relating to 
quorum at General Meetings could also put a hold on the firm coming online. 
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the structural functional compulsions of industrialization). 131  The transformational 
possibilities of the joint-stock form for finance were not immediately apparent to those 
initially founded. It was only later that it became evident that this legal form afforded an 
opportunity to leverage limited liability and larger agglomerations of financial capital to 
pursue the most exceptionally competitive of cases in the foundation or government 
loan business (Bosenick, 1912: 17-22). For the majority of the issuing business in 
railroad securities, the joint-stock form of banking had not yet become a necessity. The 
promulgation of the New Company Law in 1870 shifted the balance of financial power 
in favour of joint-stock banks to continue the foundation business because of the terms 
that it heaped on the traditional “successive” form of foundation that had been so 
successfully pursued by the private bankers.  
When the New Company Law was introduced in 1870 the existing corporate 
banks engaging in the foundation business were given an advantage over the private 
bankers also pursuing industrial foundations. The larger capital reserves of the corporate 
joint-stock banks allowed them to engage in simultaneous foundations relatively free of 
existential (financial) hazard. They could pay the legally required 10 percent nominal 
capital for new issues, absorb the potential of 40 percent nominal capital loss in the 
event of a failed issue with the certainty that they would not be immediately bankrupted 
or made illiquid in the event that they could not find new buyers for the shares they had 
underwritten. In the event of such an occurrence, they could themselves produce new 
issues of shares in order to increase their available capital. Moreover, the joint-stock 
banks were themselves usually the product of networks of private bankers—which 
provided an immediate list of contacts to form underwriting consortia, or to serve as a 
client base for the onward selling of new issues.  
Conversely, the majority of individual private banks were put at a disadvantage 
in relation to the foundation business. They were not necessarily as well connected, they 
did not have the same magnitude of capital, and were personally liable for losses in 
ventures that failed. The growth of the secondary markets also made it less necessary to 
mobilize interest in IPOs via prolonged subscription periods. In order to compete with 
the existing corporate banks, private bankers (that had not already founded joint-stock 
banks themselves, and had previously practiced successive foundations), were now 
compelled to found joint-stock banks of their own in order to partake in the fruits of 
                                                
131 See Chapter 5 here. 
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foundation deals. Otherwise, they would be relegated to taking marginal shares in 
underwriting consortia where they could no longer themselves help to steer the course 
of the foundation and issuing business.132 
It is important to underscore that it was only the new legal provisions of the 
1870 law that made the advantage of the joint-stock form for banks pursuing the 
foundation business decisive. Again, whereas the greater certainty afforded by a larger 
capital base provided an opportunity for corporate banks during the 1850s and 60s, it 
was not yet at that time an imperative for private bankers to initiate corporate banks. 
The successive method of foundations used by private bankers had been very lucrative 
and successful for them up until the New Company Law. Indeed, private bankers—and 
not corporate banks—were responsible for financing the bulk of the railway boom in 
Germany, and they did so using principally successive foundations and name shares 
(Fohlin, 2007: 229, note 10; Then, 1997: 131-140).133 That is to say, there was no 
necessity for bearer shares, simultaneous foundation, or corporate banks in order to 
progress along the path of industrialization. The New Company Law of 1870 made it 
unfeasible in many situations to continue with the tried method of successive 
foundations, which could require a long waiting period to accumulate subscriptions and 
injected too much uncertainty about whether the efforts of foundation would be fruitful, 
go to waste, or cause existential financial ruin.  
None of this is to say that the private bankers were undone with the stroke of the 
legislative pen. Private bankers had other business segments that they pursued outside 
of the foundation business. Indeed, as earlier chapters have discussed, the private 
bankers—as a group across Germany—pursued a diversity of financial practices, so 
much so that across the German states the category “private banker” can only be unified 
as a category through its legal standing as a set of banking organizations with unlimited 
liability (Reitmayer, 2003: 11). The private bankers as a group were involved in every 
aspect of finance, but individual private banking houses specialized overwhelmingly in 
trade finance or the issuance of government securities (North, 1997). Only the private 
bankers of Cologne during the 1830s and 1840s (Chapter 2 here), and then in small 
                                                
132 Unless they were willing to take on the always uncertain venture of a flotation on their own 
shoulders, which indeed some very wealthy and well connected private bankers did do. See 
below. 
133 Moreover, England financed its entire stock of railway in this manner, and continued to use 
successive subscription as the principal manner in which stocks were issued even into the later 
19th century (Whale, 1930: 39; Burhop, 2006b; Then, 1997). 
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numbers in Hamburg (Burhop, 2014: 157-8; M. Pohl, 1986b) and Berlin (Berghoff, 
2002; Spangenthal, 1903: 80-1) beginning in the mid to late 1850s, integrated industrial 
foundations as part of their principal array of financial services. The majority of private 
bankers across the German states continued to neglect the foundation business 
altogether. Most private bankers continued to play similar roles in the German financial 
system following the New Company Law of 1870 as before. That said, as the balance 
sheets of joint-stock banks grew, and these new corporate entities began to take over the 
traditional business segments of the private bankers, the role of the latter became 
increasingly smaller as they were slowly pushed from acting as principal financial 
intermediaries into the niche market of personal financial management for small groups 
of highly wealthy clients in the 1930s (Ziegler, 2009; Wixforth and Ziegler, 1994).134  
The important point to underscore at this juncture is that during the foundation 
years 1870-1873, the role of private bankers that were engaged in the foundation 
business was channelled into the group effort of founding joint-stock banks that could 
pursue foundations under the legal regime of the New Company Law of 1870. Private 
bankers playing a principal role in the foundation business became key actors in the 
transformation of their own private banking institutes into joint-stock banks, the 
creation and foundation of other joint-stock banks, or in the secondary role of syndicate 
membership of a larger bank founding a joint-stock bank (M. Pohl, 1982a: 158).  
Some very wealthy and well-connected private bankers could still manipulate 
the successive foundation method for founding new corporations. The Berlin private 
banker Bleichröder, renowned for his connections to Bismarck and the Rothschilds (see 
Stern, 1977), together with the Hamburger private banking house L. Behrens and Sons, 
were the principal sources in managing the foundation of the Royal United Laura Mill 
for Mining and Smelting works—the Laurahütte (Vereinigte Königs- und Laurahütte 
AG für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb) (Wixforth, 2002: 20). The success of this venture 
was built on the basis of their connections to other banking institutions, and their ability 
thereby to mobilise a good deal of interest in the shares in advance of the opening of 
subscription (Burhop, 2006). That is to say Bleichröder and Behrens were capable of 
                                                
134 This process is best characterized as one of a struggle for institutional power, wherein private 
bankers had originally intended that the joint-stock banks they created should serve their 
interests, but were slowly excised from important decision making and control in the new 
corporate big banks by the a cadre of professional managers (Reitmayer, 2003: 12-3; cf. M. 
Pohl, 1982a: 158-9, who states exactly this, but fails to incorporate any theoretical role for 
power in his analysis of banking concentration).  
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accepting the (minimal in this case) uncertainty of a failed flotation, and speculated that 
their ability to promote the venture would help to generate proportionally large profits 
on the operation. Indeed, not only was the issue vastly oversubscribed, but the success 
of the Laurahütte once it came into operation helped to generate huge profits for the 
firm resulting in large dividend payouts in its first two years of operation. The massive 
dividend payouts helped to push the value of the Laurahütte’s shares 162 percent above 
par as they became an object of speculation on German bourses (Wixforth, 2002: 20).   
This example demonstrates that the successive foundation method could still be 
used, but where it was employed (successfully), was a measure of the social power of 
the banks that mobilised it. In the case of the Laurahütte, the oversubscription of the 
shares allowed Bleichröder as the leading banker to dictate how many shares would be 
apportioned to subscribers: those subscribing as many as 10 shares were allotted 1 
share, those who subscribed between 11 and 40 shares were allotted 2, and those who 
subscribed over 40 shares were allocated 5 percent the nominal value of the total issue 
(Gömmel, 1992: 154). Bleichröder was able to promote a new company foundation in 
such a way as to generate hype that had already raised the worth of the shares before the 
subscription period was even finished. The personal discretion reflected in the arbitrary 
rules that he was able to outline for the issue of share quotas equally indicate the 
dimension of power held in the hands of his firm.  Other private bankers, who did not 
stand at the apex of a long-developed network of personal connections to other banking 
firms, held less capital, or who were untried/insecure in their promotional abilities were 
no longer in a position to undertake such operations owing to the existential uncertainty 
they now posed. The ability of Bleichröder as a private banker to deploy the successive 
method of foundation provides the exception that demonstrates the rule. 
 
* 
The New Company Law of 1870 is typically presented as a liberalisation of the 
economy from the draconian restrictions of an antiquated feudal regime. In this 
portrayal the unleashing of previously caged economic forces caused them to spill 
forward in a natural and uninterrupted manner, without restriction. The discussion 
above highlights that it is instead important to emphasize the constructive force of the 
new institutions and regulations introduced in generating the speculative forces driving 
the second foundation wave rather than simply the emancipatory release of the 
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restrictions that were removed.135 The regulatory codex of the New Company Law 
applied unilaterally and equally for the entire North German Confederation,136 indeed 
simplifying the procedure for, and “freeing,” social forces to found industrial joint-stock 
companies with greater ease. Nevertheless, it decisively imposed a new constellation of 
regulations for the financing of industrial enterprises, shifting the way in which 
financial praxis was institutionalized and financial power was exercised in relation to 
the specific legal forms of company promotion. Previously, successive foundation had 
been the chief form of foundation for private banks because of the manner in which it 
allowed them to finance securities’ issues without tying up too many resources, and it 
had provided a way for leading private banks to help drive the prices of as yet unissued 
shares higher before their introduction to active trading. By contrast, simultaneous 
foundation had presented uncertainty because it required the possibility of the 
underwriter being forced to hold on to shares that could not readily be further passed to 
a securities exchange for trading.  
Following 1870, this calculus of power was reversed. Successive foundation 
became unfeasible for the majority of private banks owing to the timeliness required to 
expeditiously subscribe all the shares of a new issue, and producing the uncertainty of 
an existential threat should the entire issue not be subscribed. It remained an 
opportunity for the most powerful, assured, and well-connected financial institutions to 
manipulate the subscription process for their advantage, but simultaneous foundations 
became the de facto and near compulsory form of foundation as the difficulties in 
establishing joint-stock banks were reduced to a simple registration. In this way, while 
the foundation years were indelibly marked by the liberalisation of restrictions on 
foundations of industrial corporations, the New Law of 1870 helped to positively 
construct a new regulatory context that constitutively shaped the social relations 
underpinning the “second foundation wave” of joint-stock banks that rolled over the 
German political economy during the Gründerzeit. Unlike the mainstream economic 
history literature, it should be clear that this outcome is best described as the result of 
relations of power, rather than those efficiency. 
 
 
                                                
135 For the theoretical basis that helped to motivate the analysis behind this insight see Knafo 
(2012; 2009).  
136 It was implemented less than a year before the proclamation of the new Empire, but was 
carried over unproblematically to apply similarly to the Reich in 1871. 
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PRACTICES AND ORGANIZATION IN GERMAN FINANCE, 1869-73  
The New Company Law of 1870 generated a positive force shaping the nature of 
corporate bank foundations. It was crucial for the stimulation of the “second foundation 
wave” of joint-stock banks between 1870-1873 as it forced those private banks that had 
been engaged in the foundation business to incorporate in order to continue in their 
established fields. This compulsion needs to be contextualized in two further important 
ways. Firstly, it must be set against the continuing diversity of alternative forms of bank 
and financial institutions during this period (that is to say against other financial 
institutions that were not incorporated). Secondly, it must also be juxtaposed to the 
various business programmes, i.e. types, of joint-stock bank that were founded during 
the “second foundation wave.” Not all banks were involved in speculative practices on 
securities markets, but as we will come to see, the foundation business constitutes the 
driving force beyond the other stylized forms of corporate bank foundations.  
It is important to highlight the continuing diversity of financial institutions in the 
political economy of the Kaiserreich because it underscores that the history of universal 
banking was still in progress, and in no way yet a fait accompli as the assumption of a 
common adoption of “universality” in bank statutes implies. History is an open process, 
and German finance was not yet locked-in on a path towards a universal banking 
system. Indeed, despite the central importance of the speculative foundation business as 
the central social purpose of German finance during these years, the different shape of 
“mixed-banking” undertaken by other corporate banks highlights the still present 
possibility that the German banking system may have developed towards specialization 
rather than become ever further universalized at this still early point in time.  
 
The pillars of German finance 
By the end of the 1860s the corporate legal form was beginning to gain in appeal 
amongst German financial circles. Nevertheless, joint-stock banks made up only a small 
portion of financial assets in the German financial system at the beginning of the 
frenzied period of the second foundation wave. The other important “pillars” of the 
German financial system were private bankers, note-issuing banks, savings banks, and 
credit co-operatives.137 The former three were all for-profit “private” institutions, while 
                                                
137 We could also add the categories of mortgage banks and “other.”  The latter would include 
the state-run Overseas Commercial Bank, as well as the Landschaften, a group of banks focused 
on providing credit to agricultural groups that also had a public charter, and invested in 
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the latter two were public institutions, operated by municipalities and their members 
respectively. The savings banks had been established early in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries in order to help the “under classes” of German society, and slowly 
transformed into institutions meant to instill the savings motive in the growing number 
of wage labourers (Jachmich, 1997: 133; H. Pohl, 1987: 15-6). The credit co-operatives 
were also a response to the industrial transformation of German society: they were 
founded by liberal social reformers intent on promoting “self-help” amongst small 
businessmen through the co-operative principle (i.e. they gathered their operating 
capital from members and loaned to members only).138 The credit co-operatives had a 
greater rural presence than the savings banks, although they existed in cities as well, and 
their clientele was principally small farmers or businessmen (Guinnane, 2001). The 
assets of these different groups of financial institutions were all denominated (at least 
following the foundation of the Empire in 1875) in similar currency; however, these 
monies all circulated in large part within relatively distinct and compartmentalized 
circuits of financial relations. 139  The savings deposited at the Sparkassen and 
Genossenschaftsbanken were reinvested for the most part in municipal or sometimes 
state level loans, but did not overlap with the assets and liabilities of the for-profit 
banks.  In other words, at the foundation of the German empire in 1871, the different 
pillars of the German financial system could only claim commonality as institutions of 
the financial sector insofar as they were all organizations that handled “money.” 
                                                                                                                                          
Pfandbriefe, essentially mortgages for Junkers. I do not detail their quantitative growth here, 
other than to say that these two groups alone made a not inconsequential proportion of financial 
assets, because their relevance would diminish over time. As their political role becomes 
important for the qualitative change of universal banking practices they will be mentioned in 
turn, but otherwise they represent a class of financial organization that would not be 
incorporated into “universal” banking practices (as the savings banks and co-operative banks 
later would). 
138 This was in part the principle mobilized by David Hansemann in his initial founding of the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft in 1851 (See Chapter 3). 
139 There were points of contact between these circuits in the early 1870s, insofar as the wages 
paid to workers in large industrial enterprises may have arisen in the first instance from loans 
made by a joint-stock bank that had founded that enterprise in the first instance. Nevertheless, 
the assets of the German financial system were relatively segmented by clientele: the private 
bankers and joint-stock banks served large enterprises, wealthy agrarians and the federal and 
state governments; the savings banks catered to the lower and working classes, while the credit 
co-operatives assisted the Mittelstand or medium sized firms and agricultural enterprises (cf. 
Deeg, 2003; Tilly, 1986). This would begin to change in the decades before WWI, and it was in 
part this process of an increasing competition for similar clientele that would help to foment 
changes in the structure of universal banking. See the discussion below. 
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In 1860 private bankers held the lion’s share of financial system assets, followed 
by note-issuing banks, mortgage banks, savings banks and co-operative banks (Burhop, 
2011: 168).140 These figures would change dramatically by 1880: private banks’ share 
of financial assets decreased by half, the savings banks doubled and the co-operatives 
increased by 22 fold, while the corporate banks’ share of financial assets barely changed 
(Burhop, 2011: 168). The decline in significance of private bankers’ share of total 
financial assets was continued in 1900, wherein that of the joint-stock banks nearly 
doubled while the savings banks and credit co-operatives more or less maintained 
roughly the same share of assets. On the eve of the first World War the joint-stock 
credit banks had increased their share of total financial assets to roughly 25 percent of 
the total. The other credit institutions, namely the savings banks and credit co-
operatives, maintained their shares of financial assets proportionally in relation to the 
whole; however, by 1913 the total amount of financial assets had itself increased from 
roughly 125 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 169 percent. That is to say, 
even though the proportions of financial assets held by the savings banks and credit co-
operatives remained the same, their overall nominal value had increased dramatically.141  
At the centre of this expansion were the joint-stock credit banks, the most powerful of 
which had developed into the Berliner Großbanken by the eve of the First World War: 
they were among the largest corporations in Germany as measured by their financial 
assets; Germany’s three largest incorporated enterprises were Big Berlin Banks; finally, 
17 of the top 25 largest enterprises in Germany were joint-stock banks (Tilly, 1986: 
113-4). Crucially, of the 22.04 billion Marks in financial assets held by the joint-stock 
credit banks, fully half of that was concentrated in the five largest Berlin Big Banks 
(Tilly, 1986: 114). Nevertheless, even after the enormous concentration of financial 
wealth and power in the hands of several Big Berlin Banks just before WWI, the total 
volume of assets controlled by this category of financial institution indicated no 
                                                
140 It is a curious fact of statistics for this period that there are no figures for the year 1870, 
although I have consulted as wide a variety of the available sources as possible. Convention has 
it to list the share of financial system assets every twenty years from 1860, with a final balance 
in 1913 (see Pierenkemper and Tilly, 2004: 115; Deutsche Bundesbank, 1975: 53-67; Guinnane, 
2002: 83; Fohlin, 2007: 328).  
141 The value of assets commanded by the savings banks as a sector of the financial industry 
increased from 9.45 billion Marks in 1900 to 22.56 billion Marks in 1913. The credit co-
operatives assets increased from 1.68 billion to 6.17 billion marks. The joint-stock banks 
increased their assets from 6.96 billion to 22.04 billion Marks. That is to say the increase in the 
nominal value of assets was 239 percent, 367 percent and 317 percent respectively for the 
savings banks, credit co-operatives and joint-stock banks (Pierenkemper and Tilly, 2004: 115, 
table 37; author’s own calculations).  
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monopoly over the financial system as a whole wherein equal proportions of financial 
assets were controlled by the savings banks and credit cooperatives, which were not yet 
practising any form of universal or “mixed” banking. So, even though over the entire 
period of the Kaiserreich there was a growth of financial clout amongst the largest 
joint-stock credit banks, the financial system was still characterized by a diversity of 
institutional forms, and a variety of financial practice.  
 
The diversity of corporate banks 
It is also important to consider the diversity of financial practice within the 
category of joint-stock banks, especially at the beginning of the Kaiserreich. In doing 
so, it is necessary to distinguish between the existing joint-stock banks (those discussed 
in Chapter 3) and those established during the “second foundation wave,” all of which 
can be disaggregated into several forms based on the focus of their financial activities. 
Almost without exception, all joint-stock banks were allowed by their statues to engage 
in every kind of financial activity (cf. Bosenick, 1912); however, the weight that 
different institutions placed on different segments of the credit business varied, even if 
their balance sheets all had some combination of commercial and investment items. To 
reiterate an oft-made point in this thesis, the business programme of these “mixed-
banks” did not yet correspond to the theoretical representation of universal banking. 
Propelling the entire corporate banking sector in its financial activities, either directly or 
indirectly, was the social purpose of industrialization, itself fuelled by the speculative 
tint of the foundation business. Amongst the joint-stock banks we can roughly 
distinguish three different general tendencies as per the emphasis of banks’ weighting 
on the foundation business.  
Firstly, there were the foundation banks that were established by private 
bankers, and other joint-stock banks, who were engaged in the business of starting new 
industrial corporations (Gehr, 1959: 18-19). These banks were founded largely in the 
image of those joint-stock banks formed during the 1850s that had been established in 
order to forward the industrial order and take advantage of the gains from IPOs and 
“founders’ rights” (Blume, 1914: 73-86). In their combination of financial activities the 
“foundation banks” were not dissimilar to the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, insofar as 
their emphasis was on the organization of the financial side of founding new corporate 
enterprises, principally in the underwriting of new issues, although in some cases they 
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leaned towards the early model of the BHI in their balance of financial services,142 as 
they sometimes also acted as cashiers for the industrial firms that they represented. The 
“foundation banks” were the key figures of the “second foundation wave” of joint-stock 
banks, and were heavily concentrated in Berlin and the booming securities exchange 
there (Schulze-Gaevernitz, 1922: 34),143 although some were also established closer to 
financial centres like Frankfurt, e.g. the Frankfurter Bankverein (Burhop, 2004: 97-8), 
or closer to the industrial areas that they aimed to serve, e.g. the Rheinische 
Effektenbank (M. Pohl, 1982a: 129, note 73). This was the category of joint-stock bank 
that had been pulled into existence via the New Company Law of 1870. 
The “provincial” joint-stock banks comprised the second most important 
propensity of the “second foundation wave.” Joint-stock banks were founded in many 
regional centres in order to take advantage of the opportunity to provide shorter-term 
commercial credit to industrial firms. Despite being focused more heavily on the 
commercial side of financial activities, the driving force of the “foundation business” 
was also evident in the establishment of these “provincial” joint-stock banks. This can 
principally be demonstrated through the reciprocal relationship between those banks 
founded near financial centres like Berlin and Frankfurt, and this second most important 
group of joint-stock banks founded in “the provinces.” Foundation banks were 
established in financial centres to facilitate the introduction of securities from new 
foundations to the securities exchanges in those centres. In turn, these “foundation 
banks” established provincial joint-stock banks with emphasis on the “regular” banking 
business closer to the industrial clientele that had been created to cover their needs in 
the regular banking business. This was particularly the case in areas like Dresden and 
Leipzig in Saxony which was the second most developed industrial region following the 
Rheinland-Ruhr. Dresden, for example, had the second highest number of new joint-
stock bank foundations following Berlin (M. Pohl, 1982a: 130). The Dresdner Bank, 
which was transformed from the former private bank of Michael Kaskel in 1872 
principally to serve the industrial financing needs of Saxony, is perhaps one of the best 
                                                
142 The reader is reminded that the Darmstädter Bank engaged heavily in the foundation 
business prior to 1857 (see Chapter 3 here), but then withdrew from foundations in the 
aftermath of that crisis, thus distinguishing an “early” from a “later” variation in its marriage of 
commercial and investment banking.  
143 Of the 107 new joint-stock banks founded during the foundation years, 40 new foundation 
banks were established in Berlin alone (M. Pohl, 1982a: 122).  
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known examples of such a provincial joint-stock bank (Reitmayer, 2006; Wixforth, 
1997; Kaskel, 1983).144 
During the Foundation Boom, the emphasis of the provincial joint-stock banks 
on the regular banking business could very well have developed into a division of 
labour between foundation banks in financial centres specialized in investment banking 
and provincial banks in the periphery focused on commercial banking (cf. Whale, 
1930). In France a comparable starting constellation led to a specialized system of 
banks by the end of the 19th century. Such a path could conceivably have occurred in 
the financial evolution of the Kaiserreich, and is evidenced by the way that German 
“provincial joint-stock banks” undertook the establishment of “foundation banks” in 
financial centres like Berlin and Frankfurt in order to facilitate the securities issuing 
necessary to found further industrial concerns (M. Pohl, 1978). The engagement of the 
provincial corporate banks in initiating further foundation banks is a testament to their 
desire to maintain their focus on the business of short-term credit, as much as it is 
evidence of their being propelled by the speculative imperative of the foundation 
business.145 A similar division of labour between centre and periphery banks developed 
in France over the 1860s and 1870s, wherein the French provincial banks were “mixed,” 
engaging in some securities business but principally specializing in commercial credit—
that is to say, these banks did not entirely correspond to the specialized practice of 
“commercial banks” à l’anglaise (Lescure, 2003). Following a financial crisis in the 
1880s the provincial banks, especially the Crédit Lyonnais, began to entirely refrain 
from any further securities focused business whatsoever. The result was a system of 
national banking organization in France comparably specialized in its operation to that 
of the English commercial and investment banks (ibid: 117-8). The “provincial” joint-
stock banks in the German Kaiserreich similarly dug their heels into the “regular 
banking business” following the financial calamity of the Gründerkrach.146 These same 
                                                
144 Although it should be noted that because it was founded so close to the outbreak of the 
Foundation Crisis, it was unable to begin engaging in the foundation business itself. 
145 This is evident in a comparison of the social purpose driving the operation of English 
commercial banks, and the German provincial joint-stock banks that had a high proportion of 
commercial credit on their books (i.e. might have developed into commercial banks). English 
commercial banks that aimed to expand their business by taking on existing clients, or awaiting 
new firms that were aiming to found themselves (cf. Collins, 1991). That is to say they awaited 
a demand for their services. The German provincial joint-stock banks aimed to create the 
conditions for their commercial credit services by founding the firms that would demand it (cf. 
Tilly, 1966). 
146 As did the more speculatively oriented foundation banks in the financial centres. 
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provincial corporate banks, however, began to expand and engage more heavily in the 
securities business again already in the 1880s. By the 1890s their attempts to engage in 
the speculative side of the securities issuing business lead them into cartel arrangements 
with the Big Berlin Banks before they would go on to merge with them following the 
First World War (Reitmayer, 2001b; M. Pohl, 1982a). That is to say, the German, 
provincial, “mixed” corporate banks became more universal over time, while the 
French, provincial, “mixed” corporate banks became more specialized. This is a further 
indicator that the “second wave” of joint-stock bank foundations cannot be understood 
as the culmination of universal banking within the corporate banking sector of German 
finance during the Foundation Years.  
Finally, there were numerous “special purpose” joint-stock banks established 
during the “second foundation wave,” whose incorporation was very particularly 
focused on specific politico-economic goals.  Included in this category were the ample 
foundations of further note-issuing banks that were established by entrepreneurs who 
were concerned with the (now less pressing) problem of liquidity, and a great number of 
banks specializing purposively in the financing of new urban building. 147  Most 
important, however, for the later development of universal banking were the handful of 
banks founded principally for nationalistic reasons and aiming to advance German trade 
finance. England dominated the market for international trade finance in the 1860s, and 
German businessmen were eager to free themselves from the “humiliating” necessity of 
drawing bills of exchange on London (or Paris, Nantes, and Bordeaux for that matter) 
(Seidenzahl, 1970: 5). Special corporate banks were established to take advantage of the 
joint-stock form in order to finance German exports directly, without the assistance of 
enemy foreign powers, or to found subsidiaries in key trade entrepôts over which 
German control could be maintained (Kobrak, 2007).148 The first foundation in this vein 
was the Internationale Bank in Hamburg January 1870, followed by the Deutsche Bank 
                                                
147 Mortgage financing had always been separated from “regular banking business” and was 
often discursively denounced as too risky for “normal banks” to undertake. A more complete 
history of this particular financial institution would also examine the manner in which the chief 
form of financing for the agrarian power centres of Eastern Prussia were reliant on a type of 
mortgage financing called Pfandbriefe, and the way in which legal restrictions on this type of 
financial instrument helped to secure cheap credit for agrarian landholders (see Seabrooke, 
2007; Tcherkinsky, 1922). In the midst of the rapid urbanization of the early 1870s the 
sprouting of building societies that neglected the forms of finance favoured by the universal 
banks was an exceptional phenomenon, but not one that had significant consequences for the 
institutional form of universal banking.  
148 The use of joint-stock capital to found further banks abroad in order to promote trade finance 
links even these special purpose banks to the foundation business. 
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in March 1870 and then the Commerz- und Disconto Bank in April 1870.149 The 
Internationale Bank went into liquidation in 1879, but the latter two institutions would 
become not only members of the Berliner Großbanken during the Kaiserreich, but 
nearly synonymous with the idea of the German universal bank in the post-WWII 
period.150 That two banks founded to engage in short-term trade finance, would become 
the epitome of universal banking specialized in particular on providing all of the 
financial needs for industrial clients (i.e. not merchant clients), surely can not be read 
from the institutional foundations established already by 1873. 
Some aspects of the foundation narratives of these specialist banks, further 
underscore the point of earlier chapters, that the social logic leading to the widespread 
establishment of joint-stock banks cannot be reduced to an economic logic of efficiency, 
or teleological-functional logic of industrialization. Moreover, despite going on to be 
two of the most renowned universal banks engaged in industrial financing, it would be 
wrong to imply that the intention of the founders of the Deutsche and Commerzbank 
was to establish an institutional solution to market failure by means of the joint-stock 
legal form. Despite being permitted “to engage in any and all banking business” the 
Internationale Bank and the Deutsche Bank were not originally conceived as (“mixed,” 
or) universal banks (Burhop, 2004: 91, 93-4; M. Pohl, 1982: 109-112).  As with other 
corporate banks, the permissive character of their official statutes did not reflect their 
early business practices (Gall, 1995: 29). Ergo, they were perhaps universal banks in 
promise, but not universal banks in practice in their opening phases of business activity 
before the outbreak of the Gründerkrach. Neither really engaged in any issuing business 
of any significance, and remained, as per their intent to sponsor trade, focused on the 
short-term side of commercial lending. While they did exceptionally engage in several 
foundations, these were the establishment of overseas partner institutions (e.g. in 
London) to ply their intended purpose of sponsoring German overseas commerce.151 
                                                
149 From hereon in I will refer to the Commerz- und Disconto Bank simply as the Commerzbank. 
This was a title that it did not attain until the 20th century, but which simplifies the task of 
writing without causing undo historical anachronism. 
150 In addition to the Dresdner Bank, the Commerzbank and the Deutsche Bank would become 
the top three for profit banking institutions by financial assets in Germany during the 20th 
century (Edwards and Fisher, 1994: 100). 
151 It could be argued that founding a bank specifically to assist in trade financing was indeed a 
reaction to market failure. If businessmen could not attain credit at all on favourable terms 
because of the geopolitical distribution of commercial financing houses, then this would 
constitute a market failure, and the establishment of a bank to alleviate this problem would 
qualify as an institutional solution to that failure. However, in the case at hand, trade financing 
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The Commerzbank is something of an exception in this sense as it is generally 
reputed to have been founded with the intent of being a universal bank, servicing not 
only the needs of Hamburg merchants for trade credit but also intending to engage in 
the issuing and foundation business as well (Burhop, 2014: 157-8; Kurzrock, 1970: 44-
5). Two points need to be made in this connection. Firstly, in the first three years of its 
operation, the balance of its financial activities lay in the “regular banking business,” 
and its investment in the establishment of a branch bank in London to promote better 
conditions of trade credit for Hamburg merchants: only 6 percent of its balance sheet 
was dedicated to the issuing and foundation business during these years (Burhop, 2004: 
133), whereas the Disconto-Gesellschaft had roughly 33 percent (Burhop, 2004: 112) 
and the Handelsgesellschaft 70 percent.152 Its balance of commercial and investment 
                                                                                                                                          
was available from English and French sources: the issue was rather the nationality of the credit 
itself.  
Therefore, if we were to examine the strictly economic motives, this would need to be 
considered a case of market competition. Nevertheless, the nationalistic and geostrategic 
motives were primordial in the reasons for founding the Deutsche and Internationale Bank, as 
just mentioned. Consequently, NIE theorizing which presupposes that strictly economic motives 
of transaction-cost reduction are the essential factors in the establishment of economic 
institutions cannot explain the foundation of the Deutsche or the International Bank where non-
economic reasons played an important primary role in constituting the drive to establish the 
bank. 
152 The percentage for the Handelsgesellschaft has been determined using the author’s own 
calculations with figures from Bosenick (1912: 262-3) for the years 1871-1874. Burhop 
includes an average percentage of foundation and issuing business for the Handelsgesellschaft 
as well, but for the years 1869-1879, creating an unrepresentative picture of the 
Handelsgesellschafts’s intended mix of commercial and investment banking. Owing to the 
massive losses incurred from speculation during the Gründerkrise, the Handelsgesellschaft 
withdrew from the issuing and foundation business dramatically from 1875-9. Consequently, 
providing an average for the earlier years as I do here highlights the character of the bank as a 
“first class issuing and foundation bank” (Riesser, 1912) better than the average until 1879 
which leads Burhop to classify the Handelsgesellschaft as a bank primarily engaged in 
commercial business, while noting paradoxically its heavy role in issuing (Burhop, 2004: 126-
8).   
As a more general point, using balance sheet records of issuing business in many cases 
is not a surefire indicator of the proportions between commercial and investment banking 
because often successful foundations and IPOs would be further sold on to other clients without 
making it onto the books at the end of the year. Moreover, banks like the Frankfurter 
Bankverein held roughly half of its balance sheet in current accounts, but the credits and debits 
on these accounts were used principally for the bank’s clients to purchase or sell securities from 
the bank itself: i.e. even with a high proportion of current accounts (typically commercial 
business), the balance sheet deceivingly suggests a bank with a heavy emphasis in regular 
banking, but the social purpose of these current accounts indicates a speculative-foundation 
bank (investment business) (cf. Burhop, 2004: 118-9). Balance sheet figures can be compared 
with revenues and profits from different business segments, and while this gives a good 
indication in certain cases, e.g. the Disconto-Gesellschaft (cf. Bosenick, 1912: 210ff.), it fails to 
highlight those speculative-foundation banks that were unsuccessful in their attempts. In 
general, organizing the banking practice of the different banks into particular categories is best 
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activities gave it the character of something between a “trade” and “provincial bank.” 
Moreover, where it did engage in foundation activities, it followed the principles of 
securities issuing established by the dominant joint-stock banks of the time. That is to 
say, at most the intent of the founders might have been to copy the image of the “mixed-
bank” engaged in the foundation business that was popularized by the BHI, and copied 
in Hamburg by the Norddeutsche Bank (see chapter 3 here). More likely, however, is 
that the founders were intent on distinguishing their new bank from the other two 
international trade banks (the Internationale and Deutsche Banks) that were both 
founded shortly before the Commerzbank in 1870, both of which were more highly 
specialized in financing trade. Therefore, despite the declaration in the statutes to 
engage in all aspects of banking business, categorizing the Commerzbank as a joint-
stock bank intended to become universal is highly problematic: it misses the actuality of 
the bank’s financial practice; it risks anachronism in the periodization of universal 
banking amongst the corporate banking sector; finally, it overlooks the dynamics of 
competition prevalent between the founders of the specialist trade banks, all contending 
for share subscriptions to fill out their equity capital and complete their foundations 
within months of each other.153   
 
CONCLUSION 
The existing scholarship on universal banking development has problematically 
characterized the “second foundation wave” in two principal ways: firstly, it has averred 
that the massive establishment of new joint-stock banks that occurred simultaneously 
with the speculative groundswell from 1871-73 owes in no small part to the “freeing” of 
financiers from the constrictions of the pre-industrial regulatory system. Secondly, it has 
assumed that because, most, if not all, the corporate banks founded could engage in a 
universal mix of financial services, all the corporate banks that were founded were 
exemplary of an entrenched praxis of universal banking à la Gerschenkron. This chapter 
has problematized both of these key assumptions vis-à-vis the historical narrative of 
universal banking. 
Examination of the social forces and context behind the second foundation wave 
of joint-stock banks illustrate that the choice of corporate form for engaging in the 
                                                                                                                                          
achieved not only by the quantitative elements of their balance sheets and profits, but also by 
placing these in relation to the social context of their founding, and the development of their 
financial services. 
153 Compare the analysis of Barth (1995: 18, note 19). 
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foundation business is best described in terms of power. Choices for private bankers to 
incorporate were highly influenced by the existing institutions for founding corporate 
enterprises and their concomitant methods of speculation on the latter. While the New 
Company Law of 1870 did “unshackle” the process of founding new joint-stock 
companies from explicit government oversight, this “freeing” had the paradoxical effect 
of compelling that which had hitherto been an opportunity. Banks that had been 
engaged in the foundation business were not now released to incorporate should they 
want to freely develop their economic potential, but were rather compelled to do so in 
the event that they wished to continue in their established business segment. This 
reversal in the status of incorporation—from opportunity to imperative—tied together 
private bankers’ relation with an uncertain future (speculation), calculations of profit 
and loss (efficiency), the legal system (state) and the persuasive promotional ability of 
bankers’ rooted in their social networks of clients (social power). The tried and tested 
method of successive foundations that had allowed middling private bankers to tame 
uncertain futures, and leverage their relatively small capital reserves through their 
persuasive ability to promote and generate interest in new issues so successfully in the 
railroad industry was undone by the New Company Law of 1870 and its de facto 
requirement to use simultaneous foundations. The logic of this reversal might be 
deemed “economic.” After all, it could be said that the majority of private bankers 
engaged in the foundation business could not “afford” to subscribe entire IPOs at once 
and therefore made decisions to establish incorporated foundation banks so that they 
might diversify liability and increase their capital. This ignores the pre-1870 social 
context wherein private bankers successfully founded numerous railway companies 
without the need of the joint-stock form. In both cases steering price dynamics through 
the hyping of IPOs was a strategy to generate successful speculation. That is to say 
despite profit and loss being a chief motivating concern, financiers were assured that 
rather than the “underlying value” being decisive, their promotional abilities as 
exercised through social networks, rhetorical-persuasive power, and marketing to hype 
new issues were the definitive measure through which they could exercise their 
financial power. This contrasts starkly with models of investor behaviour that posit 
information and its analysis in relation to “underlying values” of securities. In the latter 
case, the reality of securities’ prices is static, and traders “discover” pre-existing 
efficient prices. The practice of the foundation business was premised on the uncertain 
nature of future prices, and bankers’ ability to influence these.  
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This chapter also highlighted how the variety of financial institutions bestowed 
on German society following the foundation crash demonstrates that the organizational 
evolution of universal banking was not at an end in 1874. While banks that were 
incorporated to engage in the foundation business were at the centre of the “second 
foundation wave,” they did not represent a singular form of financial practice in the 
early Kaiserreich. Instead they represented the social purpose that motivated the 
establishment of a network of foundation and regular business banks. These two 
principal forms of corporate bank were emblematic of a growing division of labour 
between money-centre and province, where banks near securities exchanges engaged in 
irregular speculative deals, and provincial banks were founded in order to take-over the 
necessary close contacts for regular credit business. Under different circumstances (for 
example had the American railroad industry not imploded in 1873), even if the 
speculative wave could not have lasted forever, it is conceivable that over a longer 
period of time this division of labour might have become entrenched in the existing 
corporate banks.  
The foundation of the special purpose banks—the continuing foundation of 
note-issuing banks, the establishment of building banks, and most importantly the 
creation of specialized trade banks—indicates that there was no “iron law” behind the 
genesis of economic institutions. Indeed, trade banks were founded in part for 
“(geo)political” or nationalist purposes.  
Even though the speculative compulsion established by the New Company Law 
drove the foundation of money centre banks, and indirectly thereby many provincial 
joint-stock banks, there was no monolithic set of motivations behind the “second wave” 
of bank incorporations during the Foundation years. Both the provincial banks and the 
special purpose banks illustrate this. Crucially however, where existing narratives have 
highlighted the necessity in the foundation of all corporate banks, but underscored the 
arbitrariness and contingency of speculation, this chapter has reversed the emphasis. It 
was the speculative impulse at the centre of German finance that generated a 
compulsion to found joint-stock banks owing paradoxically to liberalization, and the 
corporate banks that were founded for regular banking business that were the product of 
the contingent exercise of (political) agency. When the “euphoria” of the Foundation 
Boom was greeted by the sober reckoning of the Foundation Crash, the corporate banks 
of the German financial system were all nominally “mixed-banks” in promise, but were 
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not yet commensurate with concrete universal banking. This would require the 
introduction of deposit-taking. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Betting on Social Change, Speculating on Deposits, 1874-1914 
Interest associations, financial regulation, and organized capitalism 
 
“Success typifies the banker; failure reveals the speculator.”154 
 
“In the early years of the Deutsche Bank it might have seemed as 
though the banks were going to divide into two classes, like the 
French banques de dépôts and banques d'affaires; but this did not 
happen. The Deutsche Bank adopted the industrial policy of the 
other banks, and the other banks the special features of the 
Deutsche Bank.”155 
 
“Industrialization had changed almost everything and eliminated 
nearly nothing.”156 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Foundation Crash bequeathed a configuration of financial institutions to 
Imperial Germany that, despite having been burned by their speculative orientation, 
remained unafraid of the heat of speculative endeavours. By contrast, financial 
historiography has typically recounted the sudden, lasting change in attitudes of the 
surviving banks, as well as regulators of financial markets, following the crisis (e.g. 
Wixforth and Wellhöner, 2003; Gehr, 1959: 28-30).  This literature avers that there was 
a commensurate change in financial strategy enacted by the banks that were now loath 
to continue speculating on foundations. Alternatively, some scholars have suggested 
that the only banks that survived the crisis, were those that did not engage in 
speculation. That is to say, there is a prevalent understanding in the historical literature 
that only those financial institutes that did not fail in the Foundation Crisis were banks, 
while those that did collapse must have done so because they were speculators. This 
assumption works in tandem with the prevalent suppositions about universal banking: 
many scholars maintain that all the corporate banks had cemented into the practice of 
universal banking by the end of the second foundation wave, the banks that survived 
were universal banks, and therefore not engaged in speculation (e.g. Hardach, 1995: 
914-5). The result is an implication that concrete universal banking’s lineage of 
uninterrupted institutional reproduction can be traced to the Gründerkrach. 
This was far from the case. This chapter highlights how during the Kaiserreich 
the corporate banks’ combination of commercial and investment finance remained in 
                                                
154 Pohle (1995: 30) 
155 Whale (1930: 25), my emphasis. 
156 Fairbairn (2008: 80). 
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flux until the final years before the First World War. Further, it argues that the 
developmental path of corporate banks towards becoming universal providers of patient 
capital was set in train by engaging in speculative financial activities. Indeed, it is 
during the Kaiserreich that the technique of participating in new industrial foundations 
would be transformed from a speculative endeavour onto a more cautious and risk-
averse footing commensurate with the concrete form of universal banking. That is to 
say, it is only during the Kaiserreich that the financial practices of universal banking as 
described by the information asymmetry account definitively emerge. 
It is only possible to appreciate this significant transformation if we recognize 
that the institution of universal banking was still in development during the Kaiserreich. 
The necessary conditions for its crystallization and reproduction on the concrete form 
were present—the amalgamation of commercial and investment banking, the joint-stock 
legal form, and deposit-taking—albeit not in all the corporate banks. Conversely, Tilly’s 
information asymmetry account suggests that universal banking was already a 
coherently established and cemented financial practice amongst the corporate banking 
sector by the outbreak of the Gründerkrach (1873). Tilly avers the only important 
changes in universal banking during the Kaiserreich occurred in monetary policy and 
the regulatory environment. The Prussian Bank was transformed into the Reichsbank in 
1875, and given expansive powers of discounting to support the payments system. This 
institutionalised a lender of last resort for universal banks (according to Tilly, the 
Prussian bank had already provided this function since 1846, which we have seen is 
difficult to justify from the historical evidence). Consequently, when financial crises 
erupted, or runs on the banks occurred, the universal banks could discount illiquid 
securities they held and avoid becoming payment insolvent. Additionally, new financial 
regulation, ostensibly targeted at the speculative practices of the banks, unwittingly 
helped to consolidate universal banking as the accepted institutional form amongst the 
Great Berlin Banks (Tilly, 1999; idem, 1998; idem, 1994; idem 1992; idem 1989; idem 
1986).  
For Tilly, these central developments of the period are driven by the change in 
politico-economic ideology brought about by the Foundation Crisis. Following the 
discrediting of liberalism, there was a distinct push by government to turn away from its 
laissez faire approach to government regulation, especially as concerned financial 
markets (Tilly, 1999: 137-8; idem, 1994: 304; idem, 1992: 135-6; idem, 1989: 195; 
idem, 1986: 124-5). This led in 1881 to the stamp tax law, in 1884 to the tightening of 
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the New Company Law, then in 1896 to the Bourse regulation, and Deposit Laws. 
These regulations imposed long waiting periods before the equity of founded firms 
could be introduced to a securities exchange and even higher minimums on the issuing 
of new equity for foundations (minimum share prices of 1000 Mark per share) (Fohlin, 
2007; Horn, 1980), the increased (transaction) costs of which made participation on 
German exchanges prohibitive for independent stockjobbers and smaller banks. 
It is hard to dispute that the new financial regulations passed during the 
Kaiserreich were incredibly important for universal banking. Nevertheless, their 
significance is not entirely appreciated by asymmetric information theory because of its 
assumption that universal banking was already institutionalized amongst corporate 
banks by the end of Foundation Crisis. These financial regulatory changes were crucial 
for the further development of universal banking because they provided a legal 
compulsion for banks to alter the basis of their securities issuing. The transformation of 
equities issuing ended its speculative basis, and endowed it with a “patient” character.  
Moreover, often left unsaid by the information theoretic scholarship is that the New 
Deposit Law of 1896 crucially paved the way for the expansion of the Great Berlin 
Banks into the Provinces because of the restrictions it placed on voting shares held with 
the money centre banks. This hinterland expansion was undertaken initially to maintain 
advantages associated with investment banking. By absorbing shares in Provincial 
banks, the Berlin Banks were thereby legally enabled to vote on behalf of equity shares 
deposited with them for safekeeping. The additional working capital to be accrued from 
the extent of the deposit business in the provinces was seized upon by the Deutsche 
Bank. Moreover, the Polanyian fashion in which regulatory changes are depicted by 
Tilly as the result of a society wide shift against liberalism fails to account for the 
dynamics of struggle between promoters of an agrarian state and those continuing to 
agitate for the further expansion and consolidation of an industrial state (cf. Fairbairn, 
2008: 69; Barkin, 1970).  
The chapter is divided into three sections. The next section outlines the 
Foundation Crisis, and its aftermath. Against this background it argues that the 
speculative orientation of German financiers concerned to advance German 
industrialization environmentally shaped the adoption of deposit banking by the 
Deutsche Bank. The third section outlines the shift away from liberalism, but highlights 
how, despite Imperial Germany often being held as the cradle of “coordinated 
capitalism,” bank practices were slowly transformed not by coordinated non-market 
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activities, but rather through intense market competition. This section sketches the 
growth of pressure groups, who favoured German society’s continuing development 
either in the direction of an agrarian or industrial society. Against the background of 
these ever more vehement struggles over the developmental direction of German 
society, anti-capitalist agrarian groups campaigned successfully for stricter financial 
regulation. The final section delineates the competitive pressures that crystallized out of 
this regulatory lobbying. This section charts the “politicization” of the large corporate 
banks, and their organization into the Central Association of German Banks and 
Banking Sector (Centralverband des deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, CVBB). In 
spite of this coordination mechanism to lobby for the interest of the large corporate 
banks, competition between the banks over deposits only further intensified to the point 
where the state was forced to settle an agreement between them. The end of this battle 
in 1909, highlights the culmination of concrete universal banking and the path towards 
institutional reproduction of universal banking for the 20th century. The chapter 
underscores how it was principally innovations undertaken in order to maintain 
competitiveness in an environment of speculative financial activity that led to the 
distinctively non-speculative institutional character of German universal banking. In 
other words, the unintended outcome of attempting to reproduce the financial 
environment led to its radical transformation. 
 
FOUNDATION CRISIS AND THE END OF THE LIBERAL ERA, 1874-1879 
The momentous “Foundation Crash” (Gründerkrach) followed the Foundation 
Boom in May of 1873. Similar to the next great financial calamity that would 
inaugurate a “Great Depression” in 1930, the collapse of 1873 began in Vienna, where 
alone from the 9th until the 15th of May the value of the Viennese Bourse dropped by 12 
percent (Meier, 1992: 10). Wehler (1995: 100) reports that from May until July the 
value of key high-quality stocks dropped from 280 to 10 florins (and even at this low 
price often still without the prospect of being sold). Contagion had spread to Germany 
such that by the end of July 1873, some firms with shares listed on the Berlin Bourse 
were forced to stop payments; however, in Berlin as in Vienna, a period of relative price 
stabilization set in on the Bourse until September (Gömmel, 1992: 155). This was the 
figurative calm before the storm. When Jay Cook & Co., a New York bank that had 
been a key node in the nexus of relations for issuing American railway company shares 
on foreign exchanges, collapsed, the subsequent crisis on the New York stock exchange 
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further reverberated on the Berlin market (Wehler, 1995: 100). Beginning in early 
October 1873, there was a series of spectacular bankruptcies in Berlin which initiated a 
period of gradual, but continually worsening depreciation of securities’ values across 
the German exchanges (Meier, 1992: 10). From the highpoint of listed values for 444 
German firms in 1872, until the end of 1873, their quoted prices dropped by almost 50% 
(Wetzel, 1996: 32; cf. Gömmel, 1992: 155-6). By 1877, the value of all shares on the 
Berlin exchange had dropped on average by 60%, and many had been made completely 
worthless: 61 banks, 4 railway companies, and 115 industrial corporations were forced 
into liquidation or bankruptcy (Meier, 1992: 10). By 1880, 100 of the 186 newly 
founded joint-stock banks had disappeared (M. Pohl, 1982c: 227). 
The Gründerkrach was followed by a period of decreased optimism about 
markets, slower wage growth, lay-offs, the end of dividend payments (until the 1880s), 
and decreasing prices—in short slowed economic activity—lasting until roughly 1895. 
Contemporaries knew this as “the Great Depression” (Wehler, 1995: 579), although in 
order to distinguish it from the even larger crisis of the 1930s, this period is now 
referred to as “the Great Deflation” by historians as decreasing prices were its hallmark. 
Indeed, even though there were an enormous number of business failures during the 
crisis of 1873-4, and market relationships did not expand at the same pace in the 
aftermath of the Gründerkrach, Net Domestic Product (NDP) actually grew at an 
average pace of 1.22 percent year on year during this “Great Depression” (Torp, 2011: 
339).157 
The crash of the early 1870s is another landmark of German history, and again, 
no less for German financial historiography. A large proportion of the new corporate 
firms that had been established during the foundation years went bankrupt in the drastic 
and sudden deterioration of prices for securities on exchanges in Berlin, Frankfurt and 
Vienna (Baltzer, 2007). Many of these firms were fly-by-night operations founded by 
                                                
157 A “depression” as opposed to a “recession” is not a term with a fixed meaning either for 
government statistical agencies, professional economists, or journalists. Often a “recession” is 
characterized by two quarters of negative growth; however, the specific definition of such terms 
has fluctuated over the course of the 20th and early 21st century as statistical agencies and 
politicians attempt to manipulate definitions for political gain. In our case here, the most 
important point is that “the Great Depression” of the late 1800s is better characterized as a 
period of deflation because “the economy” nevertheless continued to expand and at no point 
reached a point of negative growth (Holtfrerich, 1981: 20, note 27). Nevertheless, it should be 
pointed out that this overall expansion is a statistical depiction that masks the “structural crisis 
of agriculture” (Wehler, 1995: 56-58), a sector which actually suffered stagnation and nominal 
decline during the period (Fairbairn, 2008: 81, note 5).  
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intentionally duplicitous groups, that had no prospects of running viable businesses 
(Blume, 1914; cf. Rosenberg, 1976); however, there were also a great many other firms 
that had been established for legitimate industrial purposes that were simply made 
insolvent by the abrupt and unexpected drop in equity prices, and their consequent 
inability to make payments because of a lack of short-term credit. This was for example 
the case for some joint-stock banks that had been set-up to engage in the foundation and 
issuing business, but were forced into liquidation when the value of their securities 
portfolios dropped (M. Pohl, 1982a).158 This is also suspected to be the case where the 
Deutsche Bank took over the Berliner Bankverein as well as the Deutsche Unionbank 
and of the Dresdner Bank’s take-over of four other banking institutions—the Sächsische 
Bankverein (1873), the Dresdner Handelsbank (1874), the Sächsische Creditbank 
(1877), and the Thüringischen Bank (1878)—during and in the wake of the Foundation 
Crisis (M. Pohl, 1982a; Wixforth, 1997: 324-5, see also note 43 there).  
 
Organized capitalism and the reaction against liberalism 
The public outcry against the fickleness of the securities exchanges, markets and 
capitalism more generally, following the Gründerkrach has led historians and political 
economists to rightly characterize the subsequent period as one of intense ideological 
change in the German political economy (cf. Lehmbruch, 2001). Problematically, this is 
often portrayed in terms of a sudden social backlash against liberal economic ideas, 
very much akin to a Polanyian pendulum swinging against the rule of the market. In this 
vein, the Foundation Crisis is by and large often held accountable as a key temporal 
marker for the shift from a political economy of “Manchester Liberalism” to the 
typically German variant of “organized capitalism,” “corporatism,” or “coordinated 
market economy” (Torp, 2011; cf. Abelshauser, 2005). Typically, this reasoning is 
grounded in the 1879 shift away from free trade brought about by the “coalition of iron 
and rye” and the growing number of trusts and cartels that were formed in the political 
economy in order to avoid the deleterious effects of market competition in international 
                                                
158 The distinction between “cash-flow insolvent” and “balance-sheet insolvent” is useful here: 
cash-flow insolvent companies are those whose assets would allow them to pay all of their 
creditors, but are prohibited from doing so because their assets are not liquid enough; balance-
sheet insolvent firms are those who do not own enough assets overall in order to discharge their 
liabilities. There were some banks that had been founded as more than simply institutions of 
swindle, that is to say would have potentially been viable businesses, but were made on balance 
cash-flow insolvent from the market crash. This recalls the predicament of the Schaaffhausen 
Private bank described in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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and domestic markets (Torp, 2011: 349; Hentschel, 1978: 9-22). There was a 
remarkable process of corporate consolidation enacted by the firms that survived the 
Gründerkrach, many of whom—especially amongst the joint-stock banks—liquidated 
each other enacting a heretofore unseen level of concentration within the corporate 
economy (Tilly, 1990; M. Pohl, 1982a).  
Historians have begun to challenge many of the assumptions of the “organized 
capitalism” paradigm for the Kaiserreich. The coalition of “iron and rye” has for 
example been demonstrated to have been led as much by grassroots agrarian interests, 
as by the large Junker dominated estates of the East (Fairbairn, 1991). Rather than a 
sharp backlash resulting in the sudden reversal of politico-economic order, the period 
following the Gründerkrise is better characterized by the slow gestation of new 
socioeconomic forms. These new forms had only really crystalized across the political 
economy in a manner reflective of “organized capitalism” shortly before the outbreak of 
global war that would undermine them (Torp, 2010). This is especially so in the case of 
banking and finance (Reitmayer, 2001b).  
In the field of finance, the existing joint-stock banks are often presumed to be 
universal banks by this point, but are also assumed to have organized the rationalization 
of industrial firms into cartels by exercising their power through interlocking 
directorates and ability to grant credit (e.g Abelshauser, 2005; Henderson, 1975; the 
locus classicus Hilferding, 1910). A great deal of research has disputed the assumption 
of an often omnipotent power of the banks to manipulate industrial enterprises into 
unwanted cartel arrangements (e.g. Wellhöner, 1989). More importantly here, is the 
often implied but unexamined characterization of the joint-stock banks both as universal 
banks already following the Gründerkrach, and as so concentrated that their 
competition with one another no longer resembled the ideal of a “liberal” segment of 
the German political economy. Indeed, it is readily apparent that only following the turn 
of the twentieth century did the for-profit financial sector begin to enact cartel-like 
arrangements in order to reduce elements of competition (cf. Hardach, 1995: 915-6).   
 
Betting on Deposits: the Deutsche Bank aims to universalize 
The constellation of financial institutions that had coalesced in the gravity of the 
speculative imperatives of the Foundation Boom were, following the Foundation Crisis, 
bequeathed to a much transformed Imperial German political economy. The Foundation 
Crash (Gründerkrach) undermined an enormous number of newly established 
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corporations—industrial, commercial, financial and otherwise—a good deal of which 
had been fraudulent, but a number of others which were simply made insolvent by the 
sudden withdrawal of credit and liquidity as bankruptcies interrupted the chain of 
payments that made the ongoing inflationary dynamics of the boom possible. In the 
corporate banking sector those banks that had been focused on the foundation business 
were extremely hard hit by the crisis. Almost none of the new speculative banks that 
had been founded during the boom still existed in the 1880s (M. Pohl, 1981; idem, 
1978). Established corporate banks, like the Handelsgesellschaft, that had heavily 
emphasized the foundation business survived the turmoil, but suffered heavy losses 
from their failed speculations (Blume, 1914) 159  and refocused their business 
programmes on the regular banking business (Wixforth, 2002: 22-3 Gehr, 1959: 28-
30).160 The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft had retreated so far into current account 
business between 1874-1879 that when its balance sheets are considered over the 
decade of the 1870s, it appears on average a bank concerned only with current accounts 
and the “regular banking business” (Burhop, 2004: 126) (!). 
The implementation of deposit-taking by the Deutsche Bank appears as a 
prescient business policy decision against this background. As the other banks were 
retreating from speculative investment banking and securities issuing, the Deutsche 
Bank was expanding its ability to collect external capital through deposits for the more 
reliable “regular banking business.” This ex post facto correlation belies the peculiarity 
of the Deutsche Bank’s decision to adopt deposit banking when it did. Indeed, the 
Deutsche Bank implemented the collection of deposits already in 1870 shortly after its 
foundation: a full three years before the financial landscape would crash and burn in the 
Gründerkrach, and at the height of speculative mania in the foundation business. 
Moreover, following the Foundation Crisis, the principal shareholders of the Deutsche 
Bank aimed to reduce its capital, in line with the grim economic outlook occasioned in 
the wake of the crash. The business policies of the Deutsche Bank, especially its 
decision to pursue deposit banking, reflect the speculative character of the extant 
German banking culture even if they did not mirror its technical practice in the issuing 
of securities for foundations. Betting on social change, the Deutsche Bank speculated 
on deposits.  
                                                
159 Compare Dahlem (2009), and also Lüke (1956) for the case of the Handelsgesellschaft.  
160 For the specific details of how this relates to the Handelsgesellschaft, see Burhop (2004: 
126). 
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Deposit banking is typically considered to be the antithesis of speculative 
financial activity. 161  It requires sustained calculation, disciplined and continuous 
scrutiny of time limits, and a geographic network of branches. It is the quintessential 
activity in the “regular business of banking” because it consists in matching savings 
(credit) with investment (debt) and making a profit from the interest rate differentials 
accrued from the regular turn-over and repayment of these credits and debts 
(Sgambatti, forthcoming; Verdier, 2002). In the German context, the culture of the large 
corporate banks against which the Deutsche Bank competed (the Disconto-Gesellschaft, 
the Handelsgesellschaft, the BHI, the Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein, etc.)  principally 
focused their profitability on the analysis of sporadic opportunities for foundations and 
large securities issues that required the transitory and discontinuous assessment of 
profitable arbitrage, as well as localized issuing arrangements. The foundation business 
was oriented around singular and specific opportunities for intermittent, but highly 
lucrative one-off deals (Burhop, 2006b; idem, 2004). Crucial to this speculative 
orientation was the social purpose of forwarding industrialization, which justified the 
uncertainty of such deals, and propelled business strategies into a highly uncertain 
future (see Chapter 4 here). Rather than the meticulous optimizing agents depicted by 
theories like the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), German financiers did not 
undertake sophisticated calculations based on mathematical models of risk. Instead they 
lived by the more general maxim of “weighing and wagering” (wägen und wagen), 
which suggested a primitive form of optimization, but crucially not one that was solely 
concerned by the monetary pay-offs to optimisation problems (Reitmayer, 2001a; cf. 
Pohle, 1995; Seidenzahl, 1960). This principle guided the Deutsche Bank’s 
unconventional strategy, making it a speculative tactic, but also entirely in keeping with 
the financial culture of German finance (Reitmayer, 1999a). 
The Deutsche Bank adopted deposit banking as a speculative strategy in this 
sense—it was a gamble for the Deutsche Bank to implement deposits in a banking 
culture premised on the opposite principles of profitability. Everything about being 
successful as a financial centre corporate bank suggested involvement in investment 
banking and foundations. Furthermore, it was a wager on the part of the Deutsche’s 
                                                
161 Indeed, the model of deposit banks is often considered the essential kernel of “the regular 
business of banking” (Sgambati, forthcoming). This was also the case for German banks in the 
19th century, even though deposit banking as combined with the joint-stock legal form was often 
considered to be as fraught with socially deleterious consequences as unbridled securities 
market speculation (Schumacher, 1908). 
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managers that the structure of German society would change to provide the terrain to 
make this financial practice lucrative. That is to say, given what was known at the time, 
it is difficult to conceive of this action in any way other than as a gamble on an 
uncertain future. The implementation of deposit banking did not make economic sense: 
it made political sense, given what was assumed about the transformational direction 
assumed of German society, and the determination of the Deutsche Bank’s managers to 
create a demand for these services. 
The Deutsche Bank had first begun collecting deposits in July 1870, shortly 
before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war. The drive to introduce deposit-taking 
originated from the management board of the bank (Verwaltungsrat),162 in particular at 
the insistence of Georg Siemens, one of the banks’ directors. By the end of December 
1870, roughly 22,000 Taler remained in deposits (a very small sum in comparison to the 
operating capital of the bank). Despite the relatively poor initial showing, after the 
conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, a special deposit office was established in 
Berlin’s Burgstraße, separate from the headquarters of the bank in 1871 (Helfferich, 
1923: 302-3). Relatively poor results flowed from this tiny deposit office as well, but 
the bank continued to justify the potential of the deposit office in spite of the evidence 
suggesting that it would not be as profitable as the established business branches of 
German finance. 
The recalcitrance of the Deutsche Bank in relation to its small deposit business 
stemmed in part from its manager Georg Siemens. Siemens had spent 1867 in London, 
working to establish the Indo-European telegraph company on behalf of his uncle 
Werner Siemens (of Siemens & Halske renown). Georg Siemens’ experience in London 
exposed him to the successful operation of deposit banking there. From this experience 
he reputedly gained the insight that banking consists in “making money from other 
peoples’ money” (Helfferich, 1923: 302). Siemens understood the English financial 
system to be more developed than the German: he seemed to reason that if German 
finance was developing in a similar path, it would eventually manifest the 
characteristics of English finance (Helfferich, 1923). Consequently, betting on deposits 
early would eventually result in profitable outcomes following development 
(Motschmann, 1915: 71; Helferrich, 1923: 303).  
                                                
162 The term standardised following the amendment of the New Company Law in 1884 was 
Vorstand, as compared with Aufsichtsrat. The former is a special management board, involved 
in day-to-day decisions, whereas the latter is an oversight committee meant to voice and guard 
the concerns of the firms’ owners. 
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In 1870, the institutional structure of German banking and finance resembled 
very little that which prevailed in England. Indeed, there was a ready clientele of 
customers willing to leave their money with commercial deposit banks in England. Not 
only was there an institutionalised habit of leaving money with banks, a role occupied in 
Germany by the savings banks (Sparkassen) and not the corporate banks, but customers 
of English banks could also effect payment by cheque. Paying by cheque allowed banks 
to settle payments ultimately via clearing operations, without requiring as much hard 
cash on hand, and thereby not affecting their reserves. In Germany there was no habit of 
leaving money at banks on deposit. Moreover, there was no chequing system for 
making payments. Reflecting the speculative character of the large corporate banks at 
the time, the director of the Reichsbank Robert Koch, wrote in 1878 that most of the 
German corporate banks were not stable enough for such a payments system 
(Motschmann, 1915: 68, 93). For the deposit business to be similarly viable in 
Germany, these institutions would need to be approximated.  
Siemens did not envision that the Deutsche Bank would be a passive observer 
waiting to see whether such institutional change would spontaneously arise on its own. 
Instead, he saw the role of the Deutsche Bank as engendering the social change 
necessary for the proper clientele to arise. In this vein he set about on a campaign of 
propaganda (Motschmann, 1915: 74-78) and blanket advertisement (Helfferich, 1923:  
303) to educate people about the advantages of deposit accounts.163 Nevertheless, it 
took more than 20 years for the deposit business to develop any significance for the 
Deutsche Bank. 
The implementation of the deposit business was used as a pretext for the 
expansion of the bank’s activities. This was expressed in a form of circular logic by the 
directors of the Deutsche Bank in their efforts to become a universal bank. Shortly 
following the establishment of the bank in 1870, the managing directors of the new 
institute came to realise that the ability of the Deutsche Bank to financially sponsor 
trade was insufficient. In 1875, this situation came to a head, when it became clear that 
the bank could not operate on exchange transactions alone. The managers argued to the 
shareholders, that in order to expand the exchange business (i.e. continue pursuing the 
original remit of the bank’s planned operation), they would need to extend the deposit 
                                                
163 The idea that this was an “educational” process is important. It demonstrates that this activity 
was about creating demand for a service, and not about convincing customers as to a better 
service between existing alternatives. 
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business; however, in order to pay the interest required by the deposit business they 
would also be required to extend their operations into the issuing of securities (Gall, 
1995: 30).  
This argumentation emerged in relation to an internal conflict within the bank 
following the Gründerkrise, between the interests of the bank’s professional managers 
and the interests of the supervisory board (also the shareholders’ representatives).  In 
the aftermath of the crisis, the shareholders of the Bank wanted to reduce its capital in 
proportion to the financial devastation and what they believed were the ensuing 
possibilities for business (Helfferich, 1923: 279-287). Many of the shareholders of the 
bank were also simultaneously private bankers, or shareholders of other corporate 
banks. That is to say, they wished to reduce the scope of the Deutsche Bank so as not to 
come into competition with it, especially in view of the grim prospects augured by the 
financial crash (Seidenzahl, 1970). The managing directors of the bank argued 
conversely that reducing the capital of the bank was a drastic mistake (Gall, 1995: 30). 
They suggested rather taking over two other banking institutions and thereby increasing 
their access to capital, as well as adding a ready clientele to their existing customers. 
These banks were the Berliner Bankverein and the Deutsche Union-Bank. The 
shareholders of all three banks aimed to resist this manoeuvre, and called several special 
general meetings to order (M. Pohl, 1982a: 134-6). While the private banker 
shareholders of the Deutsche Bank had worried about potential competition from their 
own creation, the possibility of amalgamating all three banks risked the creation of an 
institution that would threaten the shareholders from each bank. After a prolonged letter 
writing campaign, the social persuasion of different important groups of shareholders, in 
part by conceding that any involvement in the securities issuing business would be 
“cautious,” and the principal aim of the bank would continue to be the overseas business 
(Gall, 1995: 30; M. Pohl, 1982a: 135) the deal was concluded and the Deutsche Bank 
became, by measure of its balance sheets, one of the three largest corporate banks in 
Imperial Germany (Reitmayer, 2001a: 165).164 
Despite its comparable size to the other Berliner Großbanken, the Deutsche 
Bank would not become involved in floating companies in the same manner as the other 
corporate banks had done prior to the Foundation Crash. Firstly, as mentioned above, 
part of the terms for accruing the support at the general shareholders’ meetings where 
                                                
164 In competition with the Disconto-Gesellschaft and the Darmstädter Bank. 
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the takeover was concurred, was that the Deutsche Bank would not become involved in 
“speculative” deals, except those where there was a “maximum of security” (Gall, 
1995). Secondly, in 1874, an important change in the external financing of industry was 
introduced when the Prussian Overseas Trading Corporation (Seehandlung) underwrote 
through a syndicate, the placement of a 22.5 Million Mark loan provided in the form of 
a bond to Krupp. The issue of bonds, rather than equity, became more popular during 
the later 1870s, and 1880s. Entrepreneurs often preferred this form of financing because 
it allowed them to keep personal control of their firms, or at least within their own or 
families’ hands (Kocka, 1975). Bonds were much more like a traditional loan, with their 
chief benefit that they could be traded on secondary markets. The Deutsche Bank 
participated in several further flotations of bonds before engaging in its first industrial 
foundation financing in 1890.  
The Deutsche Bank’s adoption of deposit banking was a speculative endeavour, 
premised on the ongoing transformation of German financial relations. Moreover, the 
implementation of deposit banking, as well as the business policies more generally in 
the 1870s were enacted against resistance. That it was a struggle to carry out these 
reforms, and that deposit banking needed to be promoted speaks to the role of power in 
the operation of institutional genesis. 
 
CONTINUING STRUGGLE OVER INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1880-1896 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Berliner joint-stock banks would 
reverse the steps through which they issued securities. As was examined in the thesis up 
to this point, founding new companies involved either, promoting and accumulating 
subscriptions for shares, or underwriting an entire issue of stock in advance of a new 
firm’s establishment.165 This was a speculative form of financing, because the prospects 
for the firm could not be based on past experience of profitable operation.166 Financiers 
engaged in such foundations despite the risk because of the prospects that new industrial 
firms presented for steering social change in the direction of industrialization. 
Conversely, between the 1880s and the turn of 20th century, the provision of debt and 
                                                
165 The transformation of existing firms occurred differently, but was potentially no less risky as 
often the transformation process involved amalgamating previously separate businesses into 
entirely new ones that needed to establish new working patterns. The example of the 
Discontogesellschaft’s experiment with the failed Dortmunder Union demonstrates this point 
(Kleeberg, 1989: 306-313).  
166 Although, as previous chapters have shown, banks did indeed try to influence and take 
control of how firms would be received and operate once they came into existence. 
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equity capital for industrial firms was reversed: only firms with which banks had prior 
relationships (for commercial credits) were provided long-term capital through equity 
issues (Wixforth, 2002: 22-3).  
Some scholars have argued that this change can be rooted in the experience of 
the Foundation Crash. Indeed, following the crash, banks’ business stratagems changed. 
This was however, only a short-term change in business strategy for many banks. 
During the 1880s there would be a period of increased optimism that the bourses would 
return to their former vitality (Wehler, 1995: 570) and a revival of the foundation 
business amongst the big Berlin banks (Reitmayer, 2001a).167 Although corporate banks 
like the Deutsche Bank, as well as some others like the Disconto-Gesellschaft, only 
engaged in the new form of foundation business—providing short-term loans for an 
initial period to establish a relationship with their new clients. Nevertheless, returns to 
the corporate banks from the foundation arm of the investment banking business were 
astronomical in the 1880s. Indeed, Burhop has shown that profits were consistently 
higher for the foundation business during the 1880s than they had been during the four 
Foundation Years (Burhop, 2006b).  
This shift in foundation financing began with a move of the location of 
investment to the “new” industries of the second industrial revolution. This move was in 
turn influenced by the ongoing social struggle over industrialization through the 
nationalization of the railways. Finally, the agitation of anti-industrial and anti-capitalist 
agrarian interest groups would help to ensure that foundation financing was consecrated 
in the new more conservative manner through promulgation of new financial regulation.  
 
New sectors of the industrial economy 
The “new” sectors of the “second industrial revolution” included the machine, 
chemical and electrical industries. These were, for the period, “knowledge intensive” 
industries, that presupposed scientific breakthroughs and technical knowledge. 
Entrepreneurs in these industries were often highly educated and technically skilled 
persons, unmotivated by the acquisitive drives of commercial gain. Their principal 
concerns were often scientific achievement, or the power that they could exercise over 
the natural and social world through their technical achievements  (Kocka, 1975: 89-
90).  
                                                
167 Discussed in more detail below. 
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The corporate banks had been driven during the foundation boom to speculate 
on the foundation of many new industrial firms. The bulk of those enterprises were in 
some way involved in railway industries. The Reich nationalized the German railways 
in 1878, and began using them as a policy tool to assist and support Eastern agricultural 
regions in Prussia (Wehler, 1995: 678). With railway investment no longer a possible 
destination for corporate banks’ capital, funds were freed for other purposes. The large 
corporate banks sent a good deal of their funds for speculative investments to the United 
States where the booming railroad market provided another opportunity to engage in 
railroad foundations (Fear and Kobrak, 2010). More importantly however, was the 
freeing up that it provided for the corporate banks to invest in new industrial firms.  
 
Agrarian agitation against industrial capitalism 
The “Great Deflation” has been suggested as proof positive that German society 
had become an industrial state by the end of the Gründerkrach (Wehler, 1995: 586). 
This argument posits that it was the economic dynamics of deflation, labour cutting, and 
bankruptcies that exactly demonstrated through their widespread destabilizing effects 
the cementing of an industrial society in the Kaiserreich. Whether this was objectively 
the case or not, contemporaries certainly did not think of industrial society as a fait 
accompli. Indeed, different than the short period of détente catalogued in the last 
chapter, the Kaiserreich is generally depicted as a period where the fault line between 
agrarian and industrial values, norms and economic organization reappeared at the 
forefront of public discourse, and political activity. Intellectuals, state bureaucrats and 
above all different agrarian social forces mobilised ever more strongly in the aftermath 
of the Gründerkrach against “industrial society” and the forces of international 
capitalism (Fairbairn, 2008: 69; Krüger, 1983; Barkin, 1970). In other words, the 
conflict over the future direction of German social change continued to be cleaved along 
the lines of anti-industrial agrarian social groups against those forces attempting to 
promote the further industrialization of Germany. 
The persistence of anti-modern attitudes within the state, and the formation of a 
wide ranging number of “pressure groups”—especially those representing agrarian 
interests is often considered to have been in the favour of, if not orchestrated by, the 
Prussian Junkers. Agrarian interest groups like the Bund der Landwirte (BdL), were 
nominally formed in order to promote the interests of agrarian concerns, and are often 
presented as having been dominated by the large latifundia of Eastern Prussian Junkers 
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(cf. Pühle, 1967). More recent research has highlighted how agrarian groups may have 
been less “elite-dominated,” and equally as driven by lower socioeconomic strata within 
agricultural regions. Important for our purposes here, is the manner in which agrarian 
interests actively agitated against industrial capitalism and to put curbs on speculative 
finance (Seabrooke, 2007: 89).  
The first fruits of anti-industrial groups agitation was the amendment of the New 
Company Law of 1870, in 1884. Following a series of commissions led by conservative 
politicians affiliated with agrarian interests groups in the immediate aftermath of the 
Gründerkrach, a series of amendments was tabled to the New Company Law of 1870 
(discussed here in Chapter 4). These amendments included larger minimum share 
values for new issues (1000 Marks minimium), the formalization of the supervisory 
board roles as distinct from management, as well as greater fiduciary requirements for 
the supervisory board (i.e. penalties for not supervising as they should have) (Reich, 
1980). These amendments of the 1884 Law gave further preference to the large 
corporate banks in Berlin over smaller independent brokers and private banks. 
Inadvertently, they also provided a basis for the corporate “mixed-banks” to become 
more cautious about their foundation activities, as the minimum share worth of 1000 
Marks made reselling in secondary markets more difficult. The higher fiduciary 
requirements and greater liability for failed foundations also increased the stakes, but 
not so much that foundations became comprehensively undertaken only after short-term 
credit relations had been established.    
Following a series of scandals and banking collapses in 1891 anti-industrial 
groups began to make public calls for enquiry into the financial system (Baltzer, 2013: 
105). After it was revealed that there had been fraud committed on the part of banks 
holding deposits of securities for clients, counterfeit broker’s notes created, and abuses 
of commodity futures, conservative and centre party politicians at the behest of agrarian 
interest groups like the BdL, organized a public enquiry in order to investigate the 
financial system and propose regulatory measures in 1892 (Reitmayer, 2001b: 143). 
With the Gründerkrach less than a generation earlier, and the failure of the 1884 
amendments to the New Company Law to have provided any worthwhile protection, 
social outrage was marked in public discourse and venues. This resulted in the near 
unanimous passing of the Stock Exchange and Deposit Laws of 1896. The new stock 
exchange law forbade futures contracts 
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for mining and industrial securities, as well as grain and wheat, established “a gambling 
register” of traders, and prevented any company worth less than one million marks from 
listing, including the added pain of having to wait twelve months before listing for those 
with sufficient capital (Seabrooke, 2007: 89). 
 
The Stock Exchange Law was nominally an attempt to reduce speculation, especially in 
important, socially necessary goods. Its promulgation was a definitive feather in the cap 
of agrarian social forces intent on stopping the forward march of industrialization 
throughout the German pastoral landscape. It has typically been remarked how the 
effect of this law was to perversely increase the power of the Great Berlin Banks at the 
expense of smaller private bankers, and the savings and cooperative banks (Tilly, 1999). 
In fact, however, it was partly successful in providing a further legal reason for the large 
corporate banks to shift to pre-financing. As the last stipulation above notes, firms 
needed to wait a full year before their shares could be traded on German exchanges. 
This had the effect of solidifying the practice of short-term pre-financing in advance of 
floating securities for firms.  
The new Deposit Law has less often been remarked upon than the Stock 
Exchange Law. This law was enacted in order to prohibit the fraudulent voting of 
securities held in custody (on deposit). When securities were sold on to individual 
clients, those clients frequently did not collect the shares themselves, but devolved 
voting rights and so on to the banks who had bought the securities on their behalf. 
Following the revelations that Great Banks had been voting shares without their 
customers’ permission, and often with disastrous results, the Bank Deposit Law 
specifically prohibited this practice. Consequently, the Great Banks were pushed into 
the provinces in order to search out new clients to whom they could sell shares, and then 
in turn exercise the voting rights of those shares on behalf of these customers (Fear and 
Kobrak, 2010: 729). 
 
THE COMPETITION OVER DEPOSITS, 1896-1914 
From 1896 until the outbreak of the First World War, the shift towards the use 
of deposits and pre-financing of the foundation business would be irrevocably enshrined 
in the business programmes of almost all the big Berlin banks. Banks had been drifting 
in the direction of becoming more conservative in their foundation activities, but the 
ever growing emphasis on the use of deposits would ultimately compel them to give up 
entirely on the speculative foundation methods of earlier.  
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The ever-increasing use of deposits was itself a product of the cutthroat 
competition that broke out in the provinces. The Stock Exchange and Bank Deposit 
Laws of 1896 set this development in train. One outcome of the division of labour 
between the financial centre banks focused on speculative foundations business, and 
provincial banks focused on the provision of short-term working credit, was the 
channelling of investment clientele over networks from the province to the centre. As 
discussed above, provincial banks’ clientele would often serve as an ultimate market for 
the securities floated by corporate banks in financial centres. The advantages of this 
system for the corporate banks in financial centres were the proxy-voting rights 
conferred on them for securities they held on deposit. Being able to exercise the votes of 
their collected clientele allowed the corporate banks to vote a far larger number of 
shares than they actually owned. The Bank Deposit Law effectively prohibited this by 
disallowing the provincial banks to pass on their proxy-votes to financial centre banks. 
Eager to maintain this advantage, and fearful of losing their outlet for securities issuing 
in the provinces, the Great Berlin Banks began forming “communities of interest” with 
provincial banks in 1896 (M. Pohl, 1982a).    
The expansion of the Great Berlin Banks into the provinces was originally 
driven by their desire to maintain advantages they possessed in investment banking. 
Once in the provinces, the competition between different affiliates became so intense 
that maintaining provincial affiliate banks cost more money than it made (Reitmayer, 
2001b). The Deutsche Bank showed the way by establishing deposit offices at its 
provincial branches, to increase its network for accumulating deposits. The aim to 
imitate the deposit practice of the Deutsche Bank drove many banks to similarly expand 
into the provinces; however, for many of the banks deposit collecting was initially 
unprofitable. This was in part because of the aforementioned competition over other 
elements of their financial service provision. It was also because collecting deposits in 
the provinces brought the Great Banks into competition with savings and cooperative 
banks, turning competition into a cross sector affair.168 It was often the ability to place 
securities with customers gained through the local-provincial connections that kept the 
corporate banks committed to the deposit business in the hope that transitive gains from 
the investment side would balance out the regular losses from their provincial bases. 
                                                
168 This competition against the savings and cooperative banks is highlighted by Deeg (2003), 
who does not however acknowledge the ongoing evolution of concrete universal banking: see 
chapter 1.  
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Despite the economic costs involved, the move towards deposits would produce 
a ratcheting effect prohibiting them from turning their backs on the new source of 
external funds. Adopting the use of deposits, in conjunction with the move to the 
provinces, led to a massive shift in the liability structure of the Big Berlin Banks 
between 1905-1914. Deposits grew more quickly than equity capital, and the ability to 
find profitable short-term outlets for those deposits led banks to change their business 
strategies  (Holtfrerich, 1981). Whereas previously the equity capital of banks had been 
used to finance the speculative business of foundations, now the liabilities of deposits 
became the source of banks’ funding for their assets. This further reinforced the banks’ 
decision to turn away from speculative underwriting of firm foundations, as the risk of 
failure increased astronomically. The change in capital source enacted a concomitant 
alteration in emphasis on short-term current account credits, bill discounting, and 
lombard loans (Wixforth, 2002). Pushing all the banks to seek reliable existing 
industrial clientele that could be the source of “guaranteed” agiotage profits from 
securities issues. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 By 1909, the Great Berlin Banks had taken over, or formed communities of 
interest with nearly all of the remaining provincial banks. This effectively extended 
their influence over a national network of branches,169 through which they mobilized 
deposits for the funding of their loan activities. At this point, the corporate banking 
sector had finally institutionalized the concrete practices of universal banking as they 
were described by Gerschenkron, and explained by Tilly.  
 The arrival at this terminus from the Gründerkrach was influenced by the 
ongoing struggle over industrialization and the speculative implementation of deposit-
taking by the Deutsche Bank. The reaction against liberalism and the nationalization of 
the railways helped to shift foundation investment into the new industries of the 1880s, 
as well as change the basis for this business practice through pre-financing. The new 
techniques for financing foundations were then edified by a changing regulatory 
environment, itself a product of the continuing attempt by anti-industrial forces to steer 
German social change away from industrial capitalism. Finally, once the institutional 
                                                
169 Even though in communities of interest, both original firms maintained legally separate 
identities, the “exchange” of equity involved was usually one-sided so that the Berlin banks de 
facto controlled the provincial banks. 
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environment of German finance had been so shaped, the exigencies of the deposit 
business, and in particular maintaining a national network of branches, institutionalized 
concrete universal banking across the corporate banking sector of Germany. 
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CONCLUSION 
The social core of economic institutions 
And the performative codification of Universal Banking 
 
 
 “If the Macmillan Committee could still recommend the 
German universal banking system as worthy of emulation at 
the beginning of July 1931, Dernburg, who was a 
professional banker of the highest caliber, could not give his 
seal of approval following the banking crisis. Dernburg was 
not alone. During a Banking Enquiry with experts and Reich 
representatives, the Reichsbank president Luther forwarded 
the idea that a division of labour should be enforced amongst 
the existing banks.”170 
 
“[F]or Marx, the ultimate secret of capitalist production is a 
political one. What distinguishes his analysis so radically 
from classical political economy is that it creates no sharp 
discontinuities between economic and political spheres; and 
he is able to trace the continuities because he treats the 
economy itself not as a network of disembodied forces but, 
like the political ‘sphere’, as a set of social relations.”171 
 
 
 
This thesis has put forward a substantively new composite narrative of the 
development of German universal banking, centred on social struggle and delineated in 
an idiom of power. The pages of the text have emphasized the historical narrative, 
intertwining in many places theoretical reflections about the nature of financial 
development, the genesis of economic institutions, the social basis of economic activity, 
and the fundamental role of power in the operation of the economy. Key to the 
argument, has been the thesis that economic activity is at its core socially constructed. 
Socially constructed is taken to mean that “the economy itself is not a network of 
disembodied forces but, like the ‘political sphere,’ a set of social relations” (Wood, 
1981: 68). That is to say, that abstract disembodied economic forces, determined in 
advance of historical analysis will always be unable to account for historical agency, 
because people make history, even if not under the conditions of their own choosing. 
Nevertheless, simply highlighting that the economy is composed of social relationships, 
that are themselves subject to differential social power, is of little benefit if our 
substantive narratives of economic dynamics remain unchanged. In other words, an 
abstract justification of the social basis of the economy is only worthwhile if it does 
                                                
170 Born (1976: 18), my translation. 
171 Wood (1981: 68) 
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more than cloak familiar narratives in the garb of new language.  In that vein, the 
weight of emphasis here has been on historical narrative rather than explicit theoretical 
reflection. This has been intentionally undertaken in order to provision a new narrative 
of the evolution of German universal banking, which is recounted in synopsis here, 
before the wider stakes and relevance of this study are outlined. 
The development of universal banking as an institution was driven forward 
directly and indirectly by a conflict over the shape of German society that arose in the 
European international context of the early 19th century. The principal social struggle in 
the German lands was over the direction, extent and form of industrialization. This 
struggle over industrialization shaped not only the emergence of the necessary, but also 
the sufficient, conditions for universal banking to emerge over the course of the 19th 
century. The necessary conditions—the emergence of “abstract” universal or “mixed” 
banking—can be traced to the unintended outcome of financiers’ activity to sponsor an 
industrial order through the expansion of a railway system across the German states of 
the 19th century. The battle amongst businessmen, and between businessmen and the 
state to bring about an industrial order provides the key piece of the puzzle to 
understanding investment decisions of Rhenish financiers. Private bankers in the 
Rhineland believed it was crucial to invest in railway companies because they believed 
that these companies would both solidify the advancing industrial order as well as solve 
many of their quotidian problems, namely liquidity concerns, in maintaining their then 
position in the quasi-feudal social order of the pre-March period. In this case, an 
economic activity was undertaken for a social purpose, the cost and benefit of which 
cannot be properly understood without including the social context.  
“Mixed-banking” was relatively successful in its early form, but it was rather the 
concern about liquidity that actually generated the first demand for corporate banking 
institutions. The amalgamation of “mixed-banking” into corporate banks occurred 
contingently as the product of political struggles during the revolution, and amongst 
financiers over the character of the post-revolutionary credit order. The battle between 
bankers motivated, on the one hand to establish industrial financing on a firmer footing 
in joint-stock banks, as against private bankers concerned to shore up their privilege in 
the old order of corporate estates and government securities, demonstrates the 
continuation of the sociopolitical conflict over industrialization by other means. The 
resistance to joint-stock banks from private bankers of the old order, and conservative 
forces within the Prussian state, is indicative of the “industrial” social purpose of these 
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institutions. Even though institutions that would later become some of the most 
important corporate universal banks were founded during this “first foundation wave,” 
and none of them had restrictions on the financial business they could undertake, they 
were not yet universal banks in the theoretical sense widely appreciated in GPE. Indeed, 
their social purpose was also driven principally by the conflict over industrialization, 
and characterized by the speculative techniques pioneered by the Rhenish private banks.  
Liberalisation of the regulatory order would ironically help to compel private 
bankers to establish joint-stock banks leading to a second foundation wave of corporate 
banks between 1869-1873. Both the new regulatory statues as well as the foundation 
banks established were equally products of the struggle over industrialization. The 
specificities of the institutions involved in founding new enterprises further indicate 
why the efficiency narrative for founding joint-stock banks is insufficient, and why 
charting institutional development and dynamics requires a perspective of power.  
The final crystallization of German corporate financial institutions on concrete 
universal banking arose as an outcome of speculative practices, and in conjunction with 
the struggle over industrialization. The implementation of deposit banking by the 
Deutsche Bank, was undertaken at a time when the German political economy was in no 
way ripe for deposits. Beginning deposit-taking when it did was an act of wagering on 
an uncertain future outcome: that German development would attain the level of that 
reached in England, and then justify the deposit business. While the Deutsche Bank was 
extending this business segment, there was a concomitant social backlash against 
speculative financial practices leading to the implementation of new financial 
regulation, most drastically in 1896. This new regulation imposed waiting periods that 
formalized the new manner of issuing securities following the prior establishment of 
short-term credit relationships with new firms. Moreover, the Deposit Law, helped to 
steer the development of banking practices into a head on collision amongst the big 
Berlin banks over the collection of deposits. In this way, financial regulation enacted by 
the state at the behest of agrarian anti-industrial interest groups helped to consecrate the 
trend toward the patient provision of capital. Between the widespread adoption of 
deposit banking by the Big Berlin Banks, and the consequent increase in competition 
over deposit customers in the provinces during the early 20th century, concrete universal 
banking was developed amongst the Big Berlin Banks. The imperatives of this business 
practice shifted universal banking off of a developmental trajectory reliant on 
speculative praxis. The big Berlin banks would maintain the provision of investment 
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services to their customers, but not for the original speculative purposes that they had 
adopted investment banking. Consequently, securities issuance was redirected towards 
the patient configuration that would be institutionally reproduced throughout the 20th 
century. 
 By the outbreak of the First World War the financial practices of many of the 
Big Berlin Banks had evolved so as to fit the image of universality that would be 
prominent during the post World War II period. The savings banks and credit 
cooperatives had also moved steps closer to becoming universal in their array of 
financial services, and something resembling a national credit market was in emergence. 
Crucially, one key element of their changing practices towards the more conservative 
cultivation of the deposit business involved using deposits more and more frequently to 
supplement own capital. In the aftermath of the first world War the rapid inflation that 
set in completely eroded the capital base of all the banking pillars. The end of the 
inflation in 1923 helped to stablise the situation, but all of the banking pillars had been 
brought closer into competition with each other in the search for deposits as a manner to 
finance their own asset generating activities.  These developments led in 1929 to the 
introduction of retail banking by the big banks, and securities flotation by the credit 
cooperatives and the savings banks (Deeg, 2003).  
 Although all pillars of the German banking system now possessed the full 
complement of contemporary financial activities, it was not yet a complete “system” in 
the full institutional sense. We can mark this development with the British Macmillan 
Committee of 1929 and the Reich banking enquiry of 1933. For, it was during these 
public enquiries into the failings of British and German finance, respectively that a 
“universal” system was as such consciously recognized by the actors that embodied it. 
Throughout the 19th century, the practices that had been adopted by the corporate banks, 
and then later slowly adopted by the other banking pillars had been developed without 
much conscious reflection on whether they were “universal.” The specific reflection of 
this character made “universal banking” an object of social praxis itself. The Macmillan 
Committee was charged with researching the failure of British industry, and highlighted 
the German “universal banking system” as something to be mimicked in order to 
provide better financing for industry. Its recommendations came, however, just as the 
German financial panic of 1931 erupted. Consequently losing much of their force, and 
were not implemented. The Reich Banking enquiry of 1933 was charged with 
examining the failure of German finance during the 1931 crisis, and, as the quote at the 
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beginning of this chapter explains, the universal banking system was highlighted as an 
institution deserving of reform. Opposition from the banks, and lack of support from the 
Reich government helped to stymie anything from occurring. Following the end of the 
Reich dictatorship, the banks were broken up by the American forces stationed in 
Germany, and came close to losing their universal banking characteristics, however, 
after a battle with the occupation authorities were finally allowed to reagglomerate in 
1957 having kept the blueprint of the institution of universal banking alive as an object 
of struggle. 
 
This substantively different narrative of universal banking evolution helps to 
underscore a raft of theoretical points for GPE more broadly beyond the local narrative 
of German financial development. Firstly, it highlights that the creation of economic 
institutions is not always the outcome of purely, or ultimately, economic logics focused 
on the rational pursuit of efficient cost-minimization/profit-maximization. The 
development of economic institutions is influenced by power, and the proper way to 
study power is through an examination of the dynamic sociopolitical relationships of 
historical actors. To understand the crystallization of economic institutions on a durable 
(or at least minimally persistent) form, their study requires a method that is capable of 
breaking down the presupposed borders between “the economic” and “the political.” 
This is only partly in the trivial sense that everything “economic” is also more 
fundamentally “social” and of political significance. More specifically, it relates to the 
way in which, buried in the labelling of things as part of  “the economic,” they become 
associated with a causal necessity that activates an ahistorical rational behaviour. 
Despite guaranteeing universal applicability, such an ahistorical vision of rationality 
risks leaving our explanatory framework incapable of determinate, dynamic accounts of 
institutional development (Varoufakis, 1991: 185). Consequently, in order to properly 
delineate institutional evolution, it is necessary to bring in historical-empirical details 
from particular contexts: it is necessary to account for the social purpose that animates 
historical agency. 
Dissolving the barriers between economics and politics does not mean ridding 
the conceptual vista of GPE entirely of all things “economic.” It would be an analytical 
failure to entirely eliminate the distinction between activities, institutions, relations and 
objects, which are economic and political. This distinction will at certain levels continue 
to be useful for telling stories about the social world. Indeed, many of the chapters here 
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have themselves been implicitly reliant on mobilizing distinctions between these two 
“realms.” Bankers had different concerns from Monarchs in the early 19th century. 
Where this thesis has attempted to go further however, and the added value of being 
able to tear down the barrier between “economic” and “political,” has been to remove 
obstacles from our path to an historical understanding of key economic institutions. 
Such a methodological precept suggests a manner in which to go about studying 
historical material so that our theoretical suppositions—of homoeconomicus, markets, 
economic logic, or social ontology more generally—do not do the heavy lifting of 
historical analysis for us.  
The reexamination of historical German financial practices conducted here, 
pinpoints the origins of universal banking in the quintessentially economic category of 
speculation. That the most sophisticated tools of mainstream economic analysis have 
missed this important economic facet of the development of universal banking is 
testament to the need for a conceptual shift in its methodological precepts. Indeed, by 
charting historical struggles around the shape of German society, this thesis 
demonstrates that examining the economy from the perspective of power offers a 
superior account of the genesis of important economic institutions. This result further 
highlights that studying the economy from a perspective of power does not reduce the 
entire social world to politics, or obliterate “the economy” as some form of post 
structural language game.  Instead, it demonstrates a richer method for approaching the 
analysis of key elements of the global political economy. 
Beyond the local insight provided into the specific history of Germany’s 
universal banking system, this approach suggests wider implications for GPE. Important 
strands of contemporary political economy, such as VoC and CC, have in part built their 
theoretical understanding of path-dependence in 20th and 21st century CMEs on the 
mainstream historical narrative of universal banking. Demonstrating the operation of 
power and social purpose in the economy should offer the opportunity to reflect on 
these principal categories.  
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